THE PHILOSOPHY OF INJUNCTIONS

V. N. JHA

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(Containing the Sanskrit Text of the *Vidhivāda* of the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gangeśa with its English rendering and a detailed Introduction)

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"अज्ञानतिमिरान्धस्य
ज्ञानाञ्जनशलाकया।
चक्षुरुन्मीलितं येन
तस्मै श्रीगुरवे नमः ॥"

To

My *Paramārādhya Guru*

Paṇḍit T. S. Śrinivāsa Śāstri

Preface

In recent years I have been observing that the interest to study Indian Logic, specially, the Navya Nyāya is growing very fast. ven the theoretical linguists and formal logicians have started showing keen interest in the study of Navya Nyāya. The reason is very clear. Hardly there is any other system of Indian philosophy which has presented a meticulous and rich analysis of the verbal epistemotogy and the relation between language and reality than the system of Navya Nyāya.

But the greatest hurdle on the way of entering into this system is its highly technical and abstruse language. In fact it is this unusual form of language which frightens even an intelligent student of Sanskrit.

With a mind to remove this fear and also being encouraged by my students' inquisitiveness I have decided to present in English the entire *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeṣa which is the basic elaborate work on the system of Navya-Nyāya Logic of the 13-14th Century A.D.

The present work is a free English rendring of the *Vidhivāda* of the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of the said *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. The entire Sanskrit text is split into 366 passages for the sake of convenience of presentation and transparency of the arguments. A detailed Introduction is added to it in the form of the study of the *Vidhivāda*. At the end, the Sanskrit text of Śaśadhara's *Vidhivāda* is appended for comparison.

The *Vidhivāda* deals with the meaning of an injunctive suffix. Śaśadhara too discussed this topic in his *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*. In the introduction I have given a free rendering of that text also. The reader may compare the *Vidhivāda* of Gaṅgeśa with that of Śaśadhara. In my opinion Gaṅgeśa has elaborated over Śaśadhara and has shown his originality on this topic.

The present work, the Philosophy of Injunctions, is first of its kind in the sense that it points out how it is absolutely necessary to analyse language in the context of the culture of which that language is an expression.

I have also pointed out here the principles underlying the analysis of Gaṅgeśa.

I have also tried to give the historical link to the reader about the origin and developement of the discussion on this topic.

In passing I may say that I have started with the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* because for last 100 years it has not seen the second print. And also because it is this part of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* which will attract more and more attention of the modern language philosophers and Semanticists o the world.

My success in this endeavour will depend upon the constructive criticism and suggestions from the readers. I would also like to say : *"Aparitoṣād viduṣām na sādhu manye prayoga-vijñānam*".

First of all I express my gratefulness to my *guru* Paṇḍit T. S. Śrinivasa Śastri, a living Gautama and Gaṅgeśa of India today. Whatever I know, it is his blessing. I offer this flower on his feet.

I cannot forget to keep on record my thankfulness to Prof. S. D. Joshi, Director, Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, who has all through encouraged me for learning and research by providing me with all necessary facilities.

My students have always provided me with all encouragement and assistance for writing this book Dr. Ujjwala Panse, Dr. Nirmala Ambiye, Dr. Shailaja Bapat, Mr. Brundaban Patra, and Mr. Suryanarāyan deserve special thanks for preparing the press copy.

I have no words to express my indebtedness to Dr. Vachaspati Upadhyaya, Professor of Sanskrit, Delhi University, who has showered on me his love and affection as my elder brother. It is Prof. Vachaspati Upadhyaya who so kindly arranged to publish this work.

Finally, I thank the publisher Shri R. S. Shukla for bringing out this book in such a short period of time.

V. N. Jha

INTRODUCTION

ROUGHLY, the activities of a living being can be classified into three categories : (1) Positive endeavour, (*Pravṛtti*), (2) Negative endeavour (*nivṛtti*) and (3) Indifference (*audāsinya*). In other words, a person either acts forward or withdraws his activities backward or remains indifferent. Now the question arises : When does he go to act ? When does he withdraw his activities ? And when does he remain indifferent ? Needless to say, all these three types of actions are preceded by consideration, either right or wrong. Thus, all these activities have some purpose behind them. Naturally, when a person acts forward, he has some motivation; he wants to achieve something. Then he identifies the means to achieve that something and acts forward to accomplish that means. But before acting to accomplish the means of his desired goal, he confirms three things :

(*a*) Whether it is possible on his part to accomplish that means or not;

(*b*) Whether that means is capable of producing his desired goal or not; and

(*c*) Whether the act of accomplishing the means involves a lot of exertion, more than necessary, or not.

And after he confirms that the means which he is going to adopt is the real instrument for his desired goal and that it is possible on his part to take up that means and that it does not involve any exertion more than necessary, he acts forward. In the absence of any of these three facto rs he does not act. To

illustrate, if one wants to write on the black board, he goes to take the chalk in his hand since he has confirmed that the chalk is the means of writing on the black board, that it is easily possible for him to take up the chalk and write and that the taking up of the chalk and writing by it does not involve much exertion more than necessary.

On the other hand, one does not normally take up chair to write on the black-board since it is not the means of writing. Similarly, one does not go to bring the entire river for water when he is thirsty since it is not feasible. Likewise one does not eat food mixed with poison for satisfaction of hunger though it is feasible and although it can be the means of satisfaction of hunger, because its consequences are unwanted.

Thus, the Naiyāyikas hold that these three are the factors which prompt inducement.

Now the question arises : How are these factors known ? The answer is that they are known by the established *Pramāṇas*. One may know them either by Perception or by Inference or by Verbal testimony or by the three. In any case, the knowledge of these three factors, causes inducement and *Śabda* is one of the means for knowing them. *Śabda* means a sentence of a reliable speaker. The next question, now, is : Which part of the sentence caused the knowledge of these factors ?

The Naiyāyikas hold that the optative suffix expresses all those factors since it is an injunctive sentence that causes inducement. When one utters *ghataḥ asti*. 'The Pot exists', the listener of this sentence does not do anything. But if he hears *ghaṭam ānaya* 'Bring the Pot', he goes to bring the pot. Thus it is the knowledge arising from the optative form which causes inducement and we have already seen that the knowledge of the three factors, causes one to move and hence it is argued by the Naiyāyikas that the optative suffix must express all those three factors.

The Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras do not agree with the Naiyāyikas in totality. According to Maṇḍana Miśra, the author

of the *VidhiViveka* and the follower of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, an optative suffix expresses *iṣṭasādhanatva* 'the state of being the means of desired goal' only and the other two factors are understood by implication. Similarly, according to the followers of the Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, an optative suffix expresses *kāryatva* i.e. *kṛtisādhyatva* i.e. 'the State of being feasible to be accomplished by one's effort' only and the other two factors are known by implication.

It should be noted that it is not true to hold that the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras do not require the knowledge of the three factors as the cause of inducement when the Bhāṭṭas say that the *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the meaning of *vidhi* or when the Prābhākara hold that *kāryatva* is the meaning of *vidhi*, they simply want to say that all the three factors need not be taken as the expressed sense of the optative suffix when one can be taken as the expressed meaning and the other can be obtained by implication. Thus, the difference between the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakās, lies only in accepting all the three factors *as the meaning of vidhi* and in not accepting all the three *as the expressed sense of vidhi.* The reality is not denied by the Mīmāṁsakās that the knowledge of all the three factors, is essential to explain the inducement of a living being.

The Naiyāyikas want to insist that since there should be one-to-one correspondence between the sentence and the content of the knowledge arising from that sentence and since it is a fact that the knowledge arising from an optative form, causes the inducement and since it has been already agreed upon by all of us that the knowledge of all those three factors is the cause of inducement, one must accept that all those factors constituting the content of that knowledge arising from the optative form. And since those factors cannot be obtained as the expressed, meaning of any other constituent of that sentence, one has to accept that all the three are expressed by *vidhi* only.

Obviously, the principle of *ananya labhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ*[1] is

1. This principle has been explained in detail by me in the Introduction of 'The Logic of the Intermediate Causal Link' (In Press).

applied here by the Naiyāyikas, according to whom no element other than the relations between two meanings can appear in the verbal understanding without a correspondence with the linguistic element of the sentence. The relation between two meanings, is not required to be the expressed sense of any element of the sentence, according to the Naiyāyikas. So even if such a relation is not a *padārtha,* it can appear in the verbal understanding on the basis of *saṁsarga maryādā,* hold the neo-logicians.

On the other hand, although the Bhāṭṭas obtain such a relation by *lakṣaṇā,* the Prābhākaras do not allow any meaning element to appear in the verbal understanding unless it is expressed by the linguistic element of the sentence. Thus, even the relation between two meanings in a *Padārtha* according to the Prābhākaras. Now if this were so the Prābhākaras cannot accept that all the three factors required for inducement from the content of the understanding arising from the optative form. In other words, the hearer of the injunction will not have the *śābdabodha* of all those factors from the injunction, but he will have the *śābdabodha* of *kārya* only and the knowledge of other factors can be acquired by other way of implication.

To this stand of the Prābhākaras, only the Naiyāyikas object.

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE VIDHI ANALYSIS

The history of the philosophic enquiry into the meaning of an optative or injunctive suffix (*vidhi*) goes back to Jaimini, the author of the *Mimānsāsūtras,* if not earlier. The discussion of the injunctive sentences by Jaimini seems to be the starting point.

Although in the beginning, the discussion must have been limited to the analysis of the meaning of Vedic optative forms only since they were primarily concerned with the Vedic injunction on which the performance of the Vedic rituals, was

based, still later on it gave rise to various theories and the scope of the discussion, also, must have extended from Vedic optative forms to optative forms in general.

While Kumārila came forward with the theory that *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the meaning of *Vidhi*, Prabhākara proposed *Kāryatva* or *Kṛtisādhyatva* as the meaning of *vidhi*.

A full account of the meaning of *vidhi* is given in the *vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra. Vācaspati Miśra also discusses it in his *Tattvabindu*. After that in the 12th Century A.D. we find a full treatment of this subject by Śaśadhara in his *vidhivāda*. Gaṅgeśa took the discussion still further in his *vidhivāda* which forms the part of his *śabdakhaṇḍa* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

After Gaṅgeśa, however, many authors wrote on the meaning of *vidhi*, but there has not been any substantial contribution, either conceptual or otherwise, to the issue under discussion. They have been more or less, summarising the results of Gaṅgeśa. Hence, I decided to present the translation of the *vidhivāda* of Gaṅgeśa here which has been the main source for later writers.

Since the understanding of the *Vidhivāda* of Śaśadhara would help better understanding of Gangeśa's *Vidhivāda*, I here give the entire subject-matter of the *vidhivāda* of Śaśadhara below. The Summary is almost a free translation of the entire text of Śaśadhara.

THE VIDHIVĀDA OF ŚAŚADHARA

Śaśadhara begins the discussion in the following way. At the very outset he sets forth the causal relationship between an injunctive sentence and the inducement of the listener of that injunctive sentence. To put it in his words : There is a speaker and there is a listener and there is an observer or learner. The speaker utters one injunctive sentence and the listener goes to

perform the act as per the instruction of the injunction. The observer observes this activity of the listener and compares it with his own activity. As his external activity is caused by his internal volition which is caused by his desire to do and that desire to do is caused by the knowledge of that which is to be done, similarly, the observer infers that the activity of the listener is caused by the listener's volition which is caused by the listener's desire to do which is in turn caused by the listener's knowledge of the activity to be performed. Now, that knowledge also is produced by the sentence uttered by the speaker. Thus the observer ascertains that (1) the listener's knowledge which has induced him into action is produced by the speaker's injunctive sentence and (2) that such a knowledge of the speaker is the function of the speaker's sentence. In other words, it is the sentence that has induced the listener through the knowledge produced by the sentence.

To that it in the language of Navya Nyāya, since the knowledge produced by the injunctive sentence induces the listener in to action, there is *janakatā* in the knowledge and that *janakatā* is delimited by the object of that qualified knowledge. That object of knowledge is what is known as *vidhi* and that is made known by the injunctive sentence.

That the object of the knowledge which induces the listener is *vidhi,* is supported by Udayana also. Udayana says : Volition is produced by the desire and desire is produced by the knowledge and the object of that knowledge is *vidhi* or the generator of that knowledge (i.e. the optative suffix) is *vidhi.*

Now, what is that object of knowledge ? Is it (1) the word that expresses the inducement or (2) the function of that word, namely, the primary relationship between the word and its meaning or (3) the volition or (4) the volition which has the purpose of the performer as its result, or (5) being the object of the desire or (6) the determination or (7) the intention of the speaker or (8) the state of being 'to be accomplished' (*kāryata*) or (9) being the cause of desired goal ?

Of these, the final one (9) is the view of the Naiyāyikas. According to Śaśadhara this (9) is accepted because others have no capacity to induce a person in action.

Thus, the first alternative cannot be *vidhi* because even a deaf who has not heard the injunctive sentence, or one who does not know the language in which the sentence is written, gets inducement. Moreover, 'being the word which expresses *vidhi*' does not appear as the qualifier in the verbal understanding arising from an injunctive sentence like *agniṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*.

The second alternative is also not tenable. Because there is no *abhidhā* other than the relation between the word and its meaning.

Neither the third alternative is possible. Because the knowledge of volition does not induce a man. However, the volition is the meaning of any personal ending and so how can it be held as the meaning of the optative suffix alone?

One need not argue that the meaning of a personal suffix should be the number because in the verbal form *Karoti* if it means volition, *Karoti* will mean 'volition of which volition is the object' which is absurd and also because it cannot be accepted that volition produces another volition; therefore, no *janyajanakabhāva* also can be established between the meaning of the root √*kṛ* namely, *kṛti* and the meaning of the personal suffix.

Such an arguement is not tenable because although one cannot relate *kṛti* which is the meaning of the personal suffix to the root-meaning *kṛti*, it is possible to relate 'the state of being the producer of' which is presented by the suffix to the root-meaning.

If some one asks that is not an established fact that *la* in general expresses *kṛti*, it should be pointed out to them that the verbal forms of different tenses are paraphrased by *kṛti* only by using the form of the root *kṛ*.

If some other suggests that let 'the action which produces a result' be the meaning of the suffix but not the '*kṛti*' and if at all in some cases the suffix should mean *kṛti*, it should mean as function or action 'but not as *kṛti*, they should be told that there too the personal suffix is paraphrased by the √*kṛ* and hence, we must accept that the personal suffix means *kṛti*.

Moreover, when some says *gṛhaṁ kṛtam, Kandarā na kṛtā*, 'House is made, (but) the cave is not made', then invariably, the action leading to the result is understood.

Now, if the personal suffix means *kṛti*, how to justify it in the case of an inanimate agent as in the sentence *ratho gacchati* 'the chariot moves.'

It is answered in the following way : 'As in the case of *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām*' 'the card is to be protected from crows and all those which may spoil the curd', the meaning 'crows and all those which may spoil' is obtained by secondary denotation (Lakṣaṇā), similarly by secondary denotation we shall get the meaning 'the action causing the result' from the personal suffix although it primarily stands for *kṛti*.

Again one may say that let 'being the producer (of the result)' also be the primary meaning of the personal suffix since '*kṛti*' is implied as the producer (of the result). But this also is not tenable because 'being the producer (of the result)' need not always imply *kṛti*. Sometimes other activity can also be implied by it.

Neither can one argue that let the result be the primary meaning of personal suffix and let the root mean 'the activity which causes (the result)'. Because it will lead to the following alternative questions :

(1) Whether the personal suffix expresses result in general or, (2) Whether it expresses a particular result

(1) is not tenable, because the knowledge of result in general never induces a man into action. If it were so, no one will

understand a particular result from the expression *pacati* (2) also it is not tenable because if all personal suffixes mean a particular result of sacrifice, they cannot mean the result of cooking.

Similarly, whether a root means the function which produces the result in general or the function which produces a particular result.

Both are not desirable because it is absolutely necessary to state the result as the adjunct of the function (*Vyāpāra*) and so it is proper to accept the primary relation of the root with the result. Otherwise there will arise the contingency that as we use the sentence *kāṣṭhena pacati* 'He cooks with the fuel' should use *Pākena Pacati*. 'He cooks with cooking' which is absurd.

Then let the optative suffix mean the *bhāvanā* which has the purpose of the performer of the sacrifice as its result. Thus, the purpose of the performer can be the heaven only which is beautiful by nature and so the same can be understood from the sentence '*svargakāmo yajetā*' 'one desirous of heaven should perform the sacrifice' because the *bhāvanā* which is expressed by the injunctive suffix becomes expectant of the result. Moreover, when the word expressive of heaven is in the vicinity the heaven alone will be connected with the *bhāvanā*.

One may argue that in comparison to heaven the root-meaning (i.e. sacrifice) is closer to the meaning of the injunctive suffix (i.e. *bhāvanā*) since both are expressed from one word-unit and so it is proper to relate the sacrifice to the *bhāvanā* as producer-and-produced, and not the heaven which is expressed by another word. But such a view will not be proper because as in the sentence '*grāmam gacchati*'. He goes to the village, though the going is *bhāvya* (i.e. sādhya) still the contact with the village is the result, similarly, if sacrifice is related as the immediate *bhāvya*, still the heaven can be the result and hence there is no contradiction. Thus, the sentence-meaning from the sentence *svargakāmo yajeta* would be *svargaphalā yāgajanikā bhāvanā*. 'The *bhāvanā* which brings the sacrifice into existence and which has the heaven as its result'.

Therefore, from the knowledge of this sentence-meaning one who is desirous of heaven will go to perform the sacrifice. This is the view of the Mīmāṁskas.

This is also not tenable. Because it is as good as refuted if you consider the fact that the knowledge of *bhāvanā* cannot produce *bhāvanā*. Moreover, when the inducement can be explained by simply, knowing *svargaphalaḥ yāgaḥ*, 'the sacrifice has heaven as its result', it is unnecessary to add anything more to account for the inducement.

Furthermore, if what you have suggested above is accepted, then it will amount to the deviating from your original proposition, namely the knowledge of *bhāvanā* alone is the inducing factor. Not only that in that case you will have to accept that *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the meaning of the injunctive suffix.

The fifth alternative also cannot be accepted. Because *iṣṭatva* means 'being the object of desire' and so the knowledge of the desire of the desired cannot be the inducing factor. Moreover, is desire (1) a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) to the object of desire or (2) an indicator (*upalakṣaṇa*)? (1) is not a correct proposal because in that case there should be inducement towards desire also. (2) is equally not acceptable. Because the following doubts remain unanswered :

What is indicated ? (*a*) Happiness etc. ? or (*b*) the state of being the object of knowledge which produces desire ? or (*c*) something else ? (*a*) is not correct. Because inspite of the knowledge of heaven and the like there is no criterion to decide that a person will be induced to take up a particular means only such as the sacrifice and the like. And the result is not yet established and hence the knowledge of that also cannot induce anybody. Moreover, there is no common factor to unite the results. (*b*) is also not proper. Because it is difficult to characterise the delimitor of 'being the content of the knowledge which pro-

duces the desire to act'. (*c*) is obviously out of question. Because it is not accountable.

If mere knowledge of the desired were the inducer, there should be inducement for collecting gems from the bottom of the sea—which is not observed ordinarily. If you say that a further qualification namely, 'if it were feasible to be accomplished' can be added to explain the non-inducement for collecting gems from the ocean, then since the knowledge of feasibility will necessarily take the means as its object you will have to accept that *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the meaning of *vidhi*.

Moreover, what is meant by *iṣṭatva* ? Does it mean,

(1) being the object of desire alone ?
(2) being the object of desire to act ?

Even with regard to the desire we would line to know whether the desire is,

(1) of the result ? or
(2) of the root meaning ?

Also, whether that desire is,

(a) of the speaker ?
(b) of the listener ?
(c) of any body ?

The first alternative (1) is not tenable. Because the knowledge of the desire of the speaker does not generate the inducement in the listener unless the speaker orders him or makes a very polite request to act.

The second alternative is also not proper. Because if the desire of the result does exist in the listener, the direct mention of a word expressive of desire becomes redundant. And if such a desire is not there, its mere knowledge does not induce any body.

The other alternative (2) is equally not tenable. Because if it is not known that the root-meaning is the means of the desired goal inspite of the knowledge of 'being the object of the desire of the listener' one will not act. And the desire of the speaker of the meaning of the root has no capacity to induce the listener, it is as good as stated above.

The third possibility is also not acceptable because it will lead to unwanted consequences.

The other possibility is also ruled out. Because of the ground already stated above.

Well, then let there be the sixth alternative namely, *savikalpa* is the *prakāra* in the knowledge that induces a man. Thus, whatever is ascertained as the cause of one's own inducement, the same can be inferred as the ground for other's inducement. And, one has determined for one's own inducement that the means of his desired goal is *Kārya*, and so he should accomplish it. Without this determination (*savikalpa*) even after the detection of the means of the desired goal, no inducement is observed and so one will infer the knowledge of determination only as the cause of inducement generated by the verbal understanding. And hence that (determination) alone is the meaning of the optative suffix.

This view is not proper. Because *savikalpa* is nothing but 'a desire to do or accomplish' the same fault which cropped up in the case of the paraphrase of *iṣṭatva* as *icchāviśeṣa-cikīrṣā-viśayatva*. If you say that *saṅketa* means something else, there is no proof for that.

Moreover, let us discuss whether that is the meaning of *liṅ* the arising of which causes inducement or whether that the knowledge of which cause inducement is the meaning of *liṅ*.

If the first alternative is accepted then even the knowledge itself which induces a person, should be postulated as being the object of the inducer knowledge.

And if the second alternative is accepted then since the desire to do (*savikalpa*) by itself, without being known, induces a person, it cannot be accounted for.

As regards the seventh alternative, we would like to know whether the intention of the speaker stands for (1) his knowledge or (2) his desire.

If (1), then the hearer, after hearing the sentence of the speaker, '*Agnyartham darumathanam kāryam*', should have the knowledge namely, 'I have known the intention of the speaker to churn the wood'. But the hearer will not take action for churning merely on the basis of this.

One need not argue that-from that one can infer the *iṣṭasādhanatva* and then act. Because the speaker may as well have the knowledge of *aniṣṭahetu*.

If (2), then whether that desire is qualified by the speaker or not. In either case there can be no inducement. Because the knowledge of that desire is never the inducer.

Moreover, if *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the meaning of vidhi then one cannot use *iṣṭahetuḥ pākaḥ mayā kartavyaḥ* (I should do cooking since it is the means of my desired goal). Because the *tavya* - suffix itself will express *iṣṭasādhanatva*.

Similarly, in a case where the *iṣṭasādhanatva* is already known by other means there cannot be the following dialogne :

Student : *Kim aham pākam kuryām* ?
Teacher : *Bho Devadatta* ! *tvayā pākaḥ kartavyaḥ*

Because the *iṣṭasādhanatva* is already known before.

Therefore, the intention of the speaker should be treated as the meaning of liṅ.

But even if we accept that the intention of the speaker is the meaning of *liṅ*. the following difficulty cannot be avoided.

For example, when *x* tells *y* that *Pākādikam mama iṣṭam* there is no guarantee that *y* will start cooking. On the contrary *y* may ask :

Why should he do that ? The speaker may reply :

Because I wish that you cook. But inspite of this *y* may not take action.

Thus, it is clear that even the intention of the speaker cannot be the meaning of *liṅ*.

If you argue that in the case of order, it is the desire of the speaker that activates and so here too, the desire should be the meaning of *liṅ*, it will be wrong. Because in that case, the use of the derivative of the root, *iṣ*- along with the vidhi will not be allowed. Thus one cannot say *'tava pākakṛtiḥ mama īpsitā iti tvayā pākaḥ kartavyaḥ'*. Because here - *tavya* will express intention according to you.

The eighth possibility is also ruled out. Because what should we understand from the word *Kāryatā* ? Does it mean, (1) merely the state of being feasible to be accomplished by volition ? or (2) merely being accomplishable by one's own volition ? or (3) being a subject *(uddeśya)* at the same time being accomplishable by one's own volition ?

The first proposition does not hold good. Because in that case, one will have volition to take poison since it is feasible. Also because there will arise another contingency namely, there will be inducement to an act to be performed by *x* on the basis if the feasibility of that action by *y*.

The second alternative is also not tenable. Because there will arise inducement for taking poison inspite of the fact that it is not desired, since it is possible on one's part to take poison.

The third proposal is also not acceptable. Because it is

difficult to define what could be the subject (*uddeśya*). Thus, what is an *uddeśya* ? Does it mean (A) 'being an object of mere desire ?' or (B) being the possessor of the delimitor of being the object of mere desire ? or (C) being the object of a desire to do ? or (D) being the possessor of the delimitor of being the object of the desire to do ? (E) being the object of the knowledge of which is the cause of desire in general ? or (F) being the object of knowledge which causes the desire to do ? or (G) being the posessor of the delimitor of being the object of the knowledge which causes the desire to do ? or (H) being accomplished by volition, or (I) being accomplishable by volition caused by the desire to do ? or (J) something else ?

(A) is not proper. Because one will act towards the object of other's desire, which is unwanted by him.

(B) is not correct. Because one will act towards the happiness or the absence of unhappiness or enjoyment instead of acting towards happiness etc. In a sacrifice it is impossible to define the delimitor over and above 'being the means'.

One cannot argue that let 'being the desired one' be the delimitor. Because it will lead to self depending.

(C) is also not tenable. Because there will arise the contingency such that the knowledge of the desire to do, will also start inducing a person which is not a fact. Also because it will lead to mutual dependency. To explain : after the desire to do there will arise the knowledge of that and after that knowledge these will be the desire to perform the sacrifice.

(D) is equally untenable. Because there is no uniting factor. And that which is not uniting one, cannot be explained. And even if it is explainable, it is proper to have the knowledge of that which induces a person.

(E) is likewise not tenable. Because there will arise induce-

ment towards the object of the knowledge which is the cause of other's desire. Similarly, the knowledge of knowledge would also become an inducer.

That is why (F) is also not proper.

(G) is equally untenable. Because it is difficult to describe that very knowledge.

(H) is also not tenable. Because the knowledge of mere form does not induce anybody.

(I) is also not correct. Because there will be inducement for labour also since labour too, can be accomplishable through volition caused by the desire to do. The knowledge of the desire to do will also become the inducer.

(J) is obviously not tenable. Because it is not defined.

Well, then let the final proposition be accepted to explain : A person goes to perform a sacrifice after knowing that the heaven is produced by the sacrifice which is performed by him. This is what is meant by the word *kāryatā* by others.

For one's own inducement this factor alone when known, becomes the cause. Even the new born baby makes attempt to take milk from its mother due to remembrance caused by the previous impressions.

It cannot be argued that along with the state of being the means (of heaven) the *kṛtisādhy ıtva* is also known by the same knowledge and so there is no criterion to decide which one is to be considered the inducing factor. Because it is not an established fact that both are known by the same knowledge. To explain : In the expression *yāgasadhyaḥ svargaḥ* 'Heaven is produced by the sacrifice', what is known is : The heaven immediately follows the sacrifice and not 'what immediately preceds the heaven is the sacrifice.'

(Objection) : Well, whether from the utterance '*ghatasādha-*

nam dandaḥ 'the stick is the means of the pot', the instrumentality (sādhanatā) is understood first then does not that knowledge induce a person ?

(Reply) : Apparently it is so. But after the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva,* the person will refer 'the pot is produced by the stick and thereafter he will act'. If you ask what the decisive factor would there be, our reply will be the following :

Even according to you (Naiyāyikas) it is necessary that you postulate *kṛtisādhyatva* which is the cause of inducement. There the question arises : whether the *sādhyatva,* which is already established, should be postulated or *sādhanatva* which belongs to a different class. Since the postulation of the latter will involve cumbersomeness, the former is proper to be postulated.

It need not be worried that how the knowledge in which the result is the qualificant can induce a person. Because in that knowledge the *sādhana* or means also appears as the qualifier. Whether qualificant, (or qualifier) is not a criterion for explaining the inducement. Moreover, sometimes the *sādhana* can also appear as the qualificant in the knowledge. For instance as in the case of *kṛtisādhyo yāgaḥ svargasādhakaḥ.* 'The sacrifice which is produced by the volition, produces the heaven.'

Whatever is stated above is not a correct stand. Because as *sājātya* is the criterion for you to decide the inducing factor, similarly, the colocusness of the *sādhanatva* with *kṛtisādhyatva* will be the deciding factor for us. Thus, what induces a man is the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* and not the knowledge of that the aim of which is the *iṣṭa.*

Moreover, *Kṛtisādhyatva* is not treated as the cause at all. What induces a man is the knowledge namely, *Kṛtisādhanakaḥ yāgaḥ svargasādhanam* 'the sacrifice which is produced by the volition is the means of heaven'.

(Prābhākaras) : well, even the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* cannot induce anybody. Because in that case a man will take

action towards an activity even if that is impossible to be undertaken by him. Even the qualifying clause, 'Provided it is feasible to be accomplished by volition' is not going to help much. Because then there should be inducement towards performing the *Kāriri* sacrifice (i.e. the sacrifice for rains) when that is being performed by someone else.

To avoid this if you modify the qualification as 'Provided that if it is feasible to be performed by one's own volition' even then there will arise the contingency that there should be inducement for some means which is feasible to be adopted but which is the means of desired goal of others and which is the means of unwanted result for the performer.

If you qualify now the desired goal by 'one's own', it will be of no help. Because even then there should be inducement for the past eating which is *sva-kṛtisādhya* and *sva-iṣṭasādhana.* Moreover, it is contradictory to treat one and the same entity as both, *sādhya* and *sādhana.* It is not true that whatever follows can also precede.

If you try to justify by showing the different describers then in any case the above-mentioned defects remain unanswered.

If you say that the knowledge namely, 'that cannot come into existence' with one's volition and that is the means of one's desired goal will produce inducement, you are mistaken. Because in that case there will be inducement for the means of a little desired object.

Moreover, what is intended as the desired object (iṣṭa) for which something is called the means (*sādhana*).

If you say that 'being the object of the present desire' is iṣṭatva, then you are wrong. Because the knowledge of the desire will also become the inducer.

If you clarify that the knowledge of possessing the delimitor of the *viṣayatā* of the desire will be so, then also it is not tenable on the same ground.

If you hold that in case desire is indicator (*upalakṣaṇa*) and not qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), it is not proper. Because there can be no single indicator to unite heaven and the highest Bliss.

Moreover, the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the cause of inducement through the desire and that is possible provided there is something to generate the desire that generator cannot be the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* since there is inconsistency. To explain : that knowledge will generate a desire in general or a particular desire or a desire to do.

The first alternative is not proper. Because even without the knowledge of *sādhanatva*, the desire for heaven or for a specific enjoyment is observed.

The second possibility is also not tenable. Because one observes a desire to do with reference to heaven also. Because a desire to do means a desire to produce by volition. And this cannot be prevented with reference to the heaven.

Moreover, *iṣṭasādhanatva* cannot be called *vidhi*, because in the injunction *ahar ahaḥ sandhyām upāsita* 'one should perform *sandhyā* everyday.' There is no mention of any result (*iṣṭa*) and so the performance of *sandhyā* cannot be the means of *iṣṭa*.

Likewise, in the prohibitive sentence *na kalañjam bhakṣyet* 'one should not eat *kalañja*' what is to be prohibited according to the theory that *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the meaning of *liṅ*.

If you say that *iṣṭasādhanatva* is negated here, you are wrong. Because it is contradictory. It is not the case that the eating of *kalañja* is not the means of desired goal.

Restoring to *paryudāsa* if you say that here *aniṣṭa sādhanatva* is enjoined, it will not be proper. Because here the negative particle does not occur in a compound and so it has no capacity to convey paryudāsa, and also because here the negative has the force of negating the action.

Nor can you hold that here the negation is of 'not being

the producer of unwanted consequence more than necessary. Because, had it been so that the meaning of *liṅ* is being the means of desired goal which does not lead to unwanted consequence more than unavoidable', then what you say could have some meaning. But it is not so. Really speaking, the knowledge of being the producer of great unwanted consequence acts as an obstructing factor (*Pratibandhaka*).

(*Naiyāyikās*) : Well, even with so much of argument it is not established by you that *kṛtisādhyatva* is the meaning of *liṅ*.

If you say that to raise counter argument to prevent your proposition to be proved was your only purpose, then the same can be done by us also.

(Prābhākaras) : It seems that you have not understood our intention. To explain : *kāryatva* means 'being accomplishable by the volition which is produced by the desire to do.'

It is not correct to say that in that case the knowledge of the desire to do will also induce a person. Because that desire indicates a particular volition. And that particular volition has to be accepted even by those who do not accept quality and universal as separate entities from the substance in order to justify that the desire to do is the cause of a particular volition. Otherwise to what type of volition can the desire to do be the cause ? It cannot be cause to volition in general because that will not be true. For those who do not accept quality and universal as distinct from the substance has no chance of any argument.

Thus, 'being accomplishable by a particular volition' is the meaning of *liṅ*, since that is simpler than *kṛtisādhya-iṣṭasādhanatva* 'being the means of an *iṣṭa*, which is feasible to be performed.' And this will be commonly applicable to heaven, the Bliss etc.

It is not correct to say that there will be inducement for a laborious act also. Because a laborious act is not accomplished by a volition which is produced by the desire to do. Even

from the act of breathing and from an act caused by anger or hatred one gets tired.

It is also not correct to hold that there will arise inducement to the past eating since that is accomplishable by a volition produced by a desire to do. Because if you mean that there will be inducement to eating in general, there is no harm and hence I accept it. But if you think that there will be inducement to the past eating, it is not possible because the present attempt to past action is contradictory. And since it is impossible to be accomplished, it cannot induce anyone.

(Naiyāyikas) : Well, a person desirous of heaven goes to perform a sacrifice on the basis of the knowledge that it is feasible to be accomplished by his volition produced by his own desire to do. Such *kṛtisādhyatva* is in a stick also and hence he should go to do the stick also when he has to accomplish heaven.

(Prābhākaras) : No, there will not arise such contingency. Because what will induce a person to the performance of the sacrifice is the knowledge of the feasibility to accomplish his desired goal by his volition caused by the desire to do which is inferred on the basis of the '*svargéṣṭasādhanatva*' being the means of the desired goal, namely, the heaven. The Naiyāyikas need not argue here that let the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* itself be the inducer since without that the kṛtisādhyatva itself cannot be inferred and so if x which is the cause of y can produce z, what is the necessity of bringing y in between x and z ? Because even the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* stands at par with our position since this knowledge, too, by itself does not induce anyone.

One does not have such *kṛtisādhyatva jñāna* as described above in the stick and hence there can be no inducement to the stick for the sake of heaven. Needless to say, if an illusion arises then, one will definitely go to the stick.

Or, to be precise, an inducer knowledge is that which is the knowledge of that which is accomplishable by volition as being

produced by the desire to do of one who is desirous of the heaven.

Siddhantin (The Naiyāyikas).

Here is our answer. The state of being accomplishable by a volition as being produced by the desire to do of one who is desirous of heaven is not found in the means (i.e. here the sacrifice) also. Otherwise, if someone is induced out of illusion, he will not make a stick by his effort which is caused by the desire to do pot.

You cannot welcome his contingency because from a volition produced by the illusion also it is seen that a stick is produced.

Moreover, when a person seeking a proper means of his desired goal adopts a false means if it is accepted that he adopts the means on the basis of the knowledge of being accomplishable by a particular volition, then even at the time of his knowledge of the falsehood of that means there can arise the knowledge of accomplishability by the volition produced by the desire to do, and hence you should say that one can go to adopt something which is not the means of his desired goal which is absurd.

If you argue that since the performer has the knowledge that what he is going to adopt is not the means of his desired goal, it will prevent him from adopting that, then you will have to accept that the absence of the knowledge of not being the means of his desired goal is the cause of his inducement. Instead of this, why do you not accept the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* itself as the cause of inducement,—which is a simpler cause-and-effect relationship.

Similarly, one will go to draw circles also for getting heaven on the basis of the knowledge of feasibility by his volition produced by the desire to do. And in that case the sentence *svargakāmaḥ maṇḍalīkaraṇam kuryāt* 'one desirous of heaven should draw circles' should also be treated as an authoritative sentence.

You cannot argue that since 'the drawing of circles' is obviously not the means of heaven, how can there be knowledge of accomplishability by the particular volition produced by the desire to do ? Because we have already stated above that it is quite possible that such a desire to do may arise with reference to something which is not the means.

Nor can you argue that the knowledge of *kāryatā*, inferred by the probans, '*iṣṭasādhanatva*' can also be an inducing factor. Because this probans is fallacious. Not only that, the knowledge of *kāryatā* inferred by the *iṣṭasādhanatva* even cannot arise with reference to the sacrifice. Because according to the theory that *kāryata* is the meaning of *liṅ*, the element *iṣṭusādhanatva* itself is not understood.

If you try to prove that somehow it is known, then let the same be the meaning of *liṅ* since on the basis of that alone the knowledge of *kāryata* can arise. It has been already stated before that mere knowledge of *kāryata* does not induce anybody.

Moreover, in comparison to the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* obtained on the basis of the knowledge of the probans namely *iṣṭasādhanatva*, the knowledge of being the means of one's desired goal, which is feasible to be performed by the volition satisfies a simpler cause-and-effect relationship.

You need three factors namely, the knowledge of the state of not coming into existence without one's volition; the *kṛtisādhyatva* and *iṣṭasādhanatva* but we need only two factors namely, the knowledge of the *kṛtisādhyatva* and *iṣṭasādhanatva* as the cause of inducement. Thus, reverse is now the position. Our proposition is simpler.

This is the reason, why one does not adopt the means of drawing circles for obtaining the heaven even if he may be induced due to illusion of the *sādhanata* and even if he thinks that it is possible on his part to do the circling.

Thus, it is the fanciful idea of the Prābhākaras when they

say that a person, in need of the means wants to adopt that means which is naturally bad upto that time till he does not remember the *kṛtisādhya iṣṭasādhanatā* 'the state of being the means of desired goal, which (the means) is possible to be performed.'

Hence, we consider our view only one cannot argue that in the expression, *tarati mṛtyuṁ tarati brahmahatyāṁ yo'śvamedhena yajeta* 'one who performs the Aśvamedha sacrifice surpasses death and gets rid off the sin of killing a Brahmin', one directly gets the knowledge of the means from other elements in the sentence and so how can it be inferred that an injunctive suffix expresses *iṣṭasādhanatā* ? Because such a meaning of liṅ is postulated on the basis of the concommitance between the Arthavāda—sentences and the injunctive sentences or it has been postulated in order to remove the doubt by showing that in the absence of the pervader (the *vidhi*) there will be absence of the pervaded (the *Arthavāda*). It is not postulated to know the *iṣṭasādhanatā*.

(Prābhākaras) : Well, you should state what the delimitor of the causality the counter-correlative of which is the effectness delimited by the desireness could be in the knowledge.

(Naiyāyikas) : None, which can be unifying.

(Prābhākaras) : Then how can a knowledge be the cause of a desire ?

(Naiyāyikas) : There arises desire for the heaven from the knowledge in which the state of being happiness is the qualifier; there is desire for the absence of sorrows from the knowledge wherein the state of being the absence of sorrows is the qualifier. Similarly, the desire for the means of heaven etc. arises from a knowledge in which the state of being the means is the qualifier. Hence, there is no unifying delimitor of *kāraṇata* as in the case of the scorpions growing from the cow-dung, another scorpion etc. Otherwise, what answer do the Prābhākaras too have here ? To explain : the knowledge of the accomplishability by a particular volition caused by the

desire to do is not the cause of desire in all cases. Because the desire arises even for the gems on the crest of the Nāga prince. Similarly, there arises desire for heaven even before the knowledge of accomplishability by one's particular volition and so enough of torturing !

(Prābhākaras) : Well, what will be the object of negation in the case of *na kalañjam bhakṣayét* 'one should not eat kalañja', according to the Naiyāyikas. Such an object cannot be 'the state of being the means of the desired goal existing in the eating of kalañja. Because it has been already said that it will be contradictory.

Nor can the state of not producing the unwanted consequence more than necessary. Because the knowledge of that is not the inducer and so that cannot be presented by the *liṅ*—suffix and the relation of the meaning of the negative particle has to be with the meaning of the *liṅ* only.

One cannot argue either that one will act even after knowing that act is going to yield great unwanted consequence. Because we have already stated that it will act as an obstructing factor.

Nor can one say that even if the meaning of the negative particle is stated to the root meaning (*bhakṣaṇa*) as in the case of the sentence *yajatiṣu ye yajāmahaṁ kurvanti nānuyājeṣu* where resorting to *paryudasa* one understands that one should utter the '*ye yajāmahe*' *mantra* in all sacrifices other than the *Anuyāja* sacrifice, similarly here also the sentence *na kalañjam bhakṣayet* can mean *kalañjabhakṣaṇam aniṣṭasādhanam* 'the eating of *kalañja* is the means of unwanted result.' Because there in the case of *yajatiṣu* etc., there is no other go. But it is not the case here.

(Naiyāyikas) : What you have said is not proper. Because if the knowledge of 'being producer of a great unwanted consequence' is treated as the obstructing factor, then its absence will be the cause of inducement. And in that case both the

knowledge of the absence of *pratibandhaka* and the knowledge of 'being producer of the greater unwanted consequence will be the cause.

Thus, the state of being the means which does not produce great unwanted consequence is *vidhi* and the same is the meaning of *liṅ* – suffix.

Thus, even if one does not want one will have to accept that the meaning of the negative particle is related to the meaning of meaning presented by the *liṅ*—suffix, namely, 'that which does not produce great unwanted consequence.'

Otherwise, what answer do the Prābhākaras even have here? They, too, cannot negate *kṛtisādhyatva* in the eating of *kalañja*, since it is contrary to the fact.

Nor can they suggest that here the negative conveys *nivṛtti niyoga* (*apūrva* arising from the withdrawl from the act). Because since such an *apūrva* does not yield any result there is no proof for such a *Paṇḍapūrva*.

Nor can one understand pre-absence of the eating of *kalañja* here. 'Because a pre-absence is without a beginning and hence it cannot be *sādhya*.

They can also not argue that as accomplishing can be the aim of man's life the maintaining of what is accomplished can also very well be such an aim and so the maintaining of pre-absence can be understood in the present case. Because since a pre-absence has an end and here it is difficult to maintain what is earned.

Nothing else can be possible as an object of the negation there.

(Prābhākaras) : well what is the desired goal in the obligatory injunction *Aharahaḥ sandhyām upāsīta* 'one should perform *sandhyā* every day' for which the performance of *sandhyā* can be the means ?

You cannot maintain that the removal of the obstruction (sin) can be the desired goal. Because there is no proof to accept the existence of sin before the performance of the *sandhyā*.

Nor can it be maintained that the absence of sin committed at night can be the desired goal. Because everywhere it is not true. For instance, it is not there in the case of the injunction *Aharahaḥ snāyāt* 'one should take bath every day'.

Nor it is true that the non-performance of the obligatory rite is the cause of sin and hence by performing the sandhyā one accomplishes that. Because if absence of non-performance means performance, then the performance should be treated as the result. But the performance cannot be the result itself when it is a means. The performance itself cannot be the aim. If were it so it should be either the ultimate aim or intermediate one. It cannot be the ultimate aim because happiness and the absence of unhappiness alone can be ultimate aim of one's life. The performance cannot be the intermediate aim either, because the intermediate aim can be only that which is the means of ultimate aim. No purpose is served by the performance of *sandhyā*.

Someone opined that the performance of *sandhyā* produces *apūrva* which will be the destroyer of the sin. That *apūrva* can be the object of the desire of the performer as an *apūrva* which is the destroyer of the sin and not as simply apūrva and so *apūrvatva* is maintained.

But this has been answered already, before. Moreover, there is no proof for such an *apūrva* (*Paṇḍapūrva*).

If one argues that unless such an *apūrva* is postulated how can there be injunction to perform the *sandhyāvandana*, it will not be tenable. Because we are going to explain how even without postulating that the injunction can be explained.

Therefore, it is merely a fancy to say that the meaning of the *liṅ* suffix is *iṣṭasādhanatva* since there is no mention of any *iṣṭa* in the obligatory, injunctions.

(Naiyāyikas) : What you have said is not tenable.

Your contention that in the case of *aharahaḥ sandhyām upāsīta*, the performance of *sandhyā* cannot be the aim since it can neither be an ultimate aim nor an intermediate aim is not proper. Because the performance of an obligatory rite can be included in the ultimate aim itself since an ultimate aim or purpose is defined as the object of a desire which is not produced by another desire located in the same soul. Or as an aim which does not produce another aim. The same is what is called the object of an unqualified desire.

It is not the case that these two definitions do not apply to *sandhyāvandana*. Thus, the performance of *sandhyā* becomes the object of the performers' desire as being the absence of the cause of unhappiness.

It is not true that the absence of the cause of unhappiness is desired to produce something else. It is desired as it is, as it can be confirmed when we want to avoid snakes, thorns etc.

It cannot be argued that in that case it is not true to say that ultimate aim or purpose is two fold, happiness and absence of unhappiness. Because by the expression *duḥkhābhāva,* the absence of twenty one varieties of unhappiness are intended. Or, let the performance of sandhyā be an intermediate aim.

(Prābhākaras) : Well, how can it be treated as an intermediate aim, since that alone can be intermediate which has some other purpose to serve. But nothirg is mentioned here in the case of obligatory rites.

(Naiyāyikas) : This argument also is not tenable. Because an intermediate aim is defined as the object of a desire produced by the knowledge of *sādhanatā*.

(Prābhākaras) : But it is not established in the case of *sandhyopāsana* since no purpose is mentioned there. So how can the *sādhanatā* be known there ?

(Naiyāyikas) : Although it is a fact that the performance of *sandhyā* does not possess any *sādhanatā* for any purpose, still the non-performance becomes the object of the desire produced by the knowledge of *sādhanatā* whose counter-correlative is the sin (i.e. the *sādhanatā* which is described by the *sādhyatā* existing in the sin). And as an absence of performance, the performance can be the object of such a desire and hence it can be an intermediate aim, as the approaching of the snake becomes the object of the desire produced by the knowledge of the cause of unhappiness, so the running away of the snake becomes the object of such desire as opposite of that and hence a *gauṇa phala*.

In this way once the performance of *sandhyā* is established, as the purpose of the performer, the volition which will produce that becomes the means of that.

Or, let us say that the *iṣṭasādhanatā* presented by the *liṅ*-- suffix ultimately relates to the performance of *sandhyā* since there is no mention of any *iṣṭa* in that sentence. Simply because an *iṣṭa* is not mentioned in an obligatory injunction, it will not be proper to conclude that *iṣṭasādhanatā* is not the meaning of *liṅ* suffix. Because the relation of the *liṅ*-suffix is ascertained in the *iṣṭasādhanatā* only.

(Prābhākaras) : Well, then how can one go to perform the *sandhyā* when *iṣṭopāyatā* cannot be shown in the performance of *sandhyā* ?

(Naiyāyikas) : Apparently it is so. But since *sandhyopāsana* is enjoined by the Veda, first of all it is inferred that it has to be performed and then one remembers other sentences which narrate that the non-performance of act enjoined by the Veda leads to sin and decides that the opposite of non-performance i.e. the performance has to be adopted by him and accordingly he goes to acquire the means of the *sandhyā*. He does not act to the *sandhyopāsanā* which is not the means, but the result itself.

Some also suggest that the *sādhanatā* is related as a means of *sandhyā*, known from the context.

(Prābhākaras) : According to the Naiyāyikas' theory also, the knowledge of desire itself can become the inducer since the desire is a qualifier in the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva*.

(Naiyāyikas) : It is also not proper to say that the knowledge of *sādhanatā* the counter correlate of which is the qualifier namely, the delimitor of the *viṣayatā* of the desire.

(Prābhākaras) : Here too we can ask : What is the status of desire ? Is it a qualifier ? Or an indicator ? If it is a qualifier then its knowledge also can be the inducer. And if it is an indicator then since there can be no uniform indicated entity (*upalakṣya*), one cannot unite all cases.

It is not proper to postulate relation of the *liṅ*-suffix to a meaning incorporating the desire. Because the desire by itself (i.e. without being known) induces a man into action.

It is also not proper to say that the *liṅ*-suffix has relationship with the *svargasādhanatva* making the *iṣṭatva* as an indicator. Because in that case the suffix will become polysemous.

Nor can mere *sādhanatva* be the meaning of the *liṅ*—suffix. Because the knowledge of mere *sādhanatva* does not prompt any one to act. And also because it will go against the established doctrine.

(Naiyāyikas) : You are wrong. Really speaking, *sādhanatā* alone is the meaning of a *liṅ*-suffix.

Simply because of this, it will not become identical with other modal forms and tense forms. Because although it is true that it has a common sense with other personal suffixes namely, the *kṛti* (volition) still it has an uncommon meaning namely, the *sādhanatva*. Hence the above mentioned fear is baseless.

The elements *svargasādhanatva* and the like are obtained by the juxtaposition of morphemes.

Even if it is accepted that the meaning of the *liṅ*-suffix is *iṣṭasādhanatā*, for knowing the particular *sādhanatā* namely, the *svargasādhanatā*, the ground will be the argument showing a particular sequence or juxtaposition of morphemes only. Hence in this theory, strictly speaking, the meaning of liṅ is *sādhanatā* only. When they say that the meaning of *liṅ* is *iṣṭasādhanatā*, it is said so keeping the sentence meaning in view, but not as a word meaning. So, there is no question of going against the established view also.

Moreover, the desire of the ultimate aim by itself prompts one into action, still it is necessary to include *iṣṭatva* also in the meaning of *liṅ*. Otherwise, it is impossible to know *svargasādhanatva*.

One cannot argue that by juxtaposition itself one can obtain *svargasādhanatva*. Because due to juxtaposition also that alone gets related without which the relationship between two meanings cannot come into existence. It is not the case here that in the sentence *svargakāmo yajeta* after the relation of *sādhanatā* with the heaven is established, the relation between the *sādhya* (i e *yāga)* and the *sādhanatva* does realise. The *sādhanatva* does not come into existence unless it is related to *sādhya*. Thus, the sacrifice alone relates as *sādhya* and not the heaven, the relational expectancy is satisfied after it is related to the performer.

(Prābhākaras) : As in the case of *Devadattaḥ Pacati* 'Devadatta cooks', the root meaning 'cooking' is related to the agent Devadatta so here also the sacrifice is to be accepted as related with the performer. If it is so then since it is semetrical and since the root meaning (sacrifice) is adjacent to *sādhanatva* let it be related to *yāga* only, when *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the meaning of *liṅ* suffix, whatever is presented as the object of desire the same is capable of being related and this above is proper. This is why, in the sentence *viśvajitaṁ yajēta* 'one should perform the *viśvajit* sacrifice' till the heaven is not presented as the object of desire, the relation of *iṣṭasādhanatva* does not take place.

Some hold the following view : In *iṣṭasādhanatva*, *iṣṭa* means the object of an unqualified desire and not mere object of desire. Thus, the relation has to be with the heaven and not with the secrifice.

But this view is proper. Because if that is accepted then in the sentence *Agnikāmo darūni mathniyāt* 'one desirous of fire should churn the two woods' fire cannot be related as *sādhya*.

Therefore, 'being the means of the desired goal, which (the means) is accomplishable by one's volition and which does lead to great unwanted consequence' is the meaning of *liṅ* suffix being excluded from fruitless and unwanted fruit and this view alone is proper.

(Objection) : Then, in the case of '*śyenena abhicaran yajeta*' 'one who wants to kill his enemy should perform the *śyena*-sacrifice' on the strength of *Prāyaścitta* since the great unwanted result is produced, the meaning of *liṅ* should not include *balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva.*

(Reply) : No, it is not correct. Because there, in the case of *śyenena abhicaran yajeta* the *iṣṭasādhanatva* and *kṛtisādhyatva* alone will be related since these alone are compatible.

Moreover, it is proper to hold that in the Veda, the *śyena-yōga* is enjoined aiming at the killing of the enemies. Otherwise, the author of the Veda (i.e. the God) cannot be maintained as reliable.

This is why, the entire compounded form of the meaning of liṅ is fit to be related. In that case, the enjoining of the *Prāyaścitta* (atonement rite) also when someone out of jealousy performs the *śyena-yāga* to kill a Brahmin—becomes meaningful.

(Prābhākaras) : Well, in that case, why does one not go to perform the fire different activities of the inner air which is *iṣṭasādhana*, *kṛtisādhya* and *balavadaniṣṭānanubandhin* ?

(Naiyāyikas) : It is not so. Are the five inner airs accomplished by the volition which sustains life ? Or do you understand the activities of the five airs from the word *prāṇa-pañcaka* ?

The former is not true. Because there is no proof for it.

If the latter is true then we would like to know what do you intend by the word *pravṛtti* ? Does it mean effort in general or the specific effort namely the volition ?

The first alternative is not true. Because there is always the effort to sustain one's life. The second alternative is also not teneable because the activities of the five airs connot be accomplished by volition, since they are achieved by the effort to sustain life (*Jīvanayni prayatna*).

That effort is not *kṛti* because by *kṛti* what is meant here is the effort produced by the desire to do. Otherwise, on the basis of the inference of *kāryatā* based on the *iṣtsādhanatā* you too should also go to do *Prāṇpañcaka*.

Moreover, we do not say that the moment the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* and *kṛtisādhyatva* arises one definitely goes to act. But what we say is if one arts he arts from the knowledge of those two provided there is no *pratibandhaka*.

Where, however, *anyathāsiddhi* crops in there even if one does not art, it does not tell that the knowledge of those two properties is not the cause of inducement.

Someone said that the desire of the results becomes useful only after it is known. But since it is insignificant it has to be ignored. Because there is no proof to hold such a view. Enough of elaborating !

The comparison of the Śaśadhara's content given above with that of Gaṅgeśa would immediately reveal—I am confident—that Gangeśa is a further elaborate extention of Śaśadhara.

PĀṆINI AND VIDHYARTHA

Paṇinī 3.3.161 says that an optative suffix is added in six different modal senses. The senses are vidhi, nimantraṇa, āmantraṇa, adhiṣṭa, sampraśna and prārthanā. In other words, these are the six shades of the meaning of the optative suffix. The Kāśikā vṛtti gives the following six examples for illustrating these six shades.

1. *Kaṭaṁ Kuryāt (vidhi)*
   'One should make the mat'.

2. *iha bhavān bhuñjīta* *(nimantraṇa)*
   'Here you should take food'.

3. *Iha bhavān āsīta* *(āmantraṇa)*
   'Here you should sit'.

4. *Adhicchāmo bhavantam māṇavakam bhavān Upanayet.*
   (adhīṣṭa)

   'We wish that you please do the saṁskāra of the thread ceremony to the boy.

5. *Kim nu khala bho vyākaraṇam adhīyīya ?*
   May I study the Grammar *(Sampraśna)*

6. *Bhavati me Prārthanā vyākaraṇam adhīyīya*
   (Prārthanā)

   I have a request may I study the grammar ?

From p. 3.3.161 it is clear that the use of the optative suffix was in six different moods or mannerisms. In course of time, however, the nuances of these meanings seem to have been lost and people must have started using the suffix in a very limited sense. Mostly the sense of *vidhi* alone has been given attention and the tendency of seeing *vidhitva* in the remaining aspects became prominent. This the reason why doubts have been raised regarding the distinction between *vidhi* and *adhīṣṭa*, *nimantraṇa*, and *āmantraṇa* and so on in Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (on p. 3.3.160). While commenting on this Bhāṣya, Kaiyaṭa remarks :

Prapañcārtham nyāyavyutpādanārtham vā arthabhedam āśritya bhedena upādānam vidhi—nimantraṇādnām Kṛtam Vidhirūpatā hi sarvatra anvayinī vidyate.

The expression *vidhirūpatā tu sarvatra anvayinī vidyate* clearly indicates the state of affairs. They already identified the common property namely, the *vidhirūpatva* in all the six meanings of the optative suffix listed by Pāṇini.

In the philosophical *sūtras* and in the Bhāṣyas thereon *liṅ* (optative suffix) was paraphrased as *vidhiliṅ* keeping the other senses in oblivion.

The reason behind this may be the entire focus on the analysis of the injunctive sentences of the Veda.

It would be a worthwhile endeavour to take up the study of the meanings of *liṇ*. But since there is no such scope here I do not go into it right now. I would like to simply point out that *vidhi* is only one out of the six meanings of *liṅ*-suffix and it is not the only meanings of *liṅ*.

Vidhivāda of Gaṅgeśa : English Translation

1. आचारमूलत्वं वेदस्य प्रवर्तकज्ञानजनकत्वेन भवतीति प्रवर्तकज्ञानं निरूप्यते ।

2. तत्राभिधा-सङ्कल्पापूर्व-भावनाज्ञानं न प्रवर्तकं, तस्मिन् सत्यपि अप्रवृत्तेः असत्यपि प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

3. कार्यत्वज्ञानं प्रवर्तकमिति गुरवः ।

1. A vedic injunction is the indirect cause (*prayojaka*) of inducement (to an act) since it generates the verbal cognition which (directly) induces (a person to an action) and therefore the cognition that induces (a man) is being analysed (now in this chapter.)

2. **On this** issue there are divergent views : (Some hold that) the knowledge of *śābdībhāvanā* (is the inducer : some others think that) the knowledge of desire (is the inducer ; whereas others hold that) the knowledge of merit (is the inducer ; and some think that) the cognition of volition (is the inducer). (But) none of these is tenable because inspite of the presence of those (knowledges) no inducement (is seen) and even in the absence of those (knowledges) inducement (is seen, if there is the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā*).

3. The *gurus* (=Prābhākaras) hold that the knowledge of *kāryatva* 'to-be-done-ness' induces (a person to take up an activity).

4. तथा हि ज्ञानस्य कृतौ जन्यायां चिकीर्षातिरिक्तं न कर्तव्यमस्ति ।

5. तत्सत्त्वे कृतिविलम्बो हेत्वन्तराभावात्,

6. चिकीर्षा च कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारिका कृतिसाध्यक्रियाविषयेच्छा, पाकं कृत्या साधयामीति तदनुभवात् ।

7. सा च स्वकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानसाध्या इच्छाया: स्वप्रकारकत्वं धी साध्यत्वनियमात् ।

8. अत एव स्वकृतिसाध्ये पाके प्रवर्त्तते ।

4. It can be explained as follows : If the cognition has to produce volition it cannot produce any thing but the desire to do (that particular activity).

5. (Sometimes even) in the presence of that desire to do a delay in volition (is found) because of the absence of other causal factors.

6. A desire to do is a desire which has *kṛtisādhyatva* *i.e.* 'the state of being the object of one's volition', as its qualifier, and the action to be performed by volition as its qualificand, because it is our experience when we express our desire that, 'I want to accomplish the action of cooking by (my) volition.'

7. That (desire to do) is produced by the knowledge of the state of being the object of one's volition, because it is always a fact that the desire is produced by the knowledge, the qualifier of which is that of the desire.

8. This is why one goes to perform the action of cooking which is the object of his volition.

9. न त्विष्टसाधनताज्ञानसाध्या स्वकृत्यसाध्ये चिकीर्षापत्तेः ।

10. स्वकृत्यसाध्यत्वं प्रतिबन्धकमिति चेत्,

11. न, तद्भावकारणत्वे गौरवात् ।

12. अथाभाव उभयसिद्धः कृतिसाध्यताधीरसिद्धेत्यतो न लाघवावसर इति चेत्,

13. न, यत्र शब्दादनुमानाद्वा दैवात् सा तत्र लाघवावतारादिच्छायाः स्वप्रकारकज्ञानसाध्यत्वनियमेन कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानस्यावश्यकत्वाच्च जनकज्ञानं विघटयत एव ज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वाच्च । व्याप्तिज्ञानविघटनद्वारा अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकानैकान्तिकज्ञानवत् ।

9. (The desire to do), however, is not produced by the knowledge of the state of being the means of desired object, because in that case there will arise a contingency of (the production of) desire to do also with regard to some activity which is not feasible to be accomplished by one's volition.

10. Opponent : (There is no inducement in the case of an activity which is not feasible to be performed by the performer simply because) there is the obstruction (*pratibandhaka*) namely, the knowledge that such an activity is not possible to be accomplished by one's volition. If we argue this way, then ?

11. No. (It is not correct) because if the absence of the determination of incapability (to perform an action) is treated as the cause (of inducement) (instead of the knowledge of) capability) it will become a cumbersome (cause-and-effect relationship).

12. (Opponent) Well, the absence (of determination of capability) is an established fact according to both (of us) and (naturally) the knowledge of capability is not established (so far at that time) and so there is no question of simplicity.

13. No. It is not correct. Because where from a sentence or from inference or by chance there arises that (inducement),

14. अन्यथा स्वकृत्यसाध्यत्वानिष्टसाधनत्वोपेक्षणीयत्व-निष्फलत्वज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकं क्रियाज्ञानमेव प्रवर्त्तकं कल्प्येत ।

15. ननु सन्नोधात्वर्थगोचरेच्छावाचित्वात् लाघवाच्च कृताविच्छा चिकीर्षा सा च वृष्टाविवेष्टसाधनताज्ञानादिति चेत्,

in that case one can find the simplicity of argument, and also becauce a desire is always produced by the knowledge, the *prakāra* of which is that of the desire and so it is necessary to postulate the knowledge that such and such act is possible to be accomplished by one (as the factor which causes inducement to that act). Moreover, only that knowledge is considered to be the obstructing one which destroys the knowledge which produces the effect, as the knowledge of *vyabhicāra* obstructs the inferential cognition through the obstruction of the knowlege of invariable concomitance.

14. Otherwise, one could have postulated the knowledge of the state of not being feasible by one's effort, the state of being the instrument of undesired result the state of being fit to be ignored, and the state of being of no result as the *pratibandhaka* (of *cikīrṣā*) and mere knowledge of an act would have been postulated as the inducing factor.

15. (Opponent) Well, the desiderative suffix—*san* expresses the desire the object of which is what is expressed by a root on account of this fact and also on account of the fact that (*kṛtīcchātva*) is a simpler delimitor of *sādhyatā* (than *kṛtisādhyatvaprakārakeccātva*), the word *cikīrasā* is derived as *kṛtau* '*icchā*' 'a desire for volition' and that (*cikīrṣā*) is (caused) by the knowledge of the state of being the instrument of a desired goal as in the case of rains (its desire is produced when one knows that rains are the instrument by which good harvest could be obtained.)

16. न, वह्निना साधयामीतिवत् कृत्या साधयामीतीच्छायाः कृतेः पूर्वमनुभूयमानायाः सनन्तावाच्यत्वेन गौरवेण च प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात् ।

17. किञ्च पाकं चिकीर्षतीत्यत्र प्राधान्येन पाकस्येच्छाविषयत्वमनुभूयते, न तु कृतेः ।

18. धातोश्च सन्प्रत्ययाभिधेयेच्छाप्रकारवाचित्वं, ओदनं बुभुक्षत इत्यत्र भोजनविशेष्यतयौदनस्येच्छाविषयत्वानुभवात् ।

19. इष्टसाधनत्वेन वृष्टाविव कृताविच्छासम्भवेऽपि कृतीच्छा न प्रवर्त्तिका किन्तु स्वकृतिसाध्येच्छैव, घटं जानाति चिकीर्षति करोतीति ज्ञान-चिकीर्षा-कृतीनामेकविषयत्वानुभवात् ।

16. (Reply) No. Because as in the case of 'I wish to accomplish (the cooking) by fire' the *sādhyatāprakāraka* desire is realised before similarly in the case of 'I wish to accomplish by *kṛti* the desired is realised prior to *kṛti* and so *icchā* cannot be said to be expressed by the desiderative form and moreover it will lead to complexity (of *pravṛttinimitta*), and thus it is not possible to deny (that *kṛtisādhyatvajñāna* is the cause of *pravṛtti*).

17. Moreover, here in the case of 'he wants to cook' prominently (as qualificand) what is experienced is the cooking as having the state of being the object of desire and *kṛti* is not experienced as such.

18. The root, however, expresses the qualifier of the desire which is the expressd sense of the suffix – *san* (the desiderative suffix). Because here in the case of, 'he wants to eat rice' the rice is realised as having the state of being the object of of desire and as the qualificand of eating.

19. Moreover, as in the case of rains the desire arises by mere knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* (without the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva*) and similarly although it is possible that desire arises with referenee to *kṛti* on account of the knowledge of

20. अथ यदि कृत्या साधयितुमिच्छा सा तदा चिकीर्षितस्य पाकस्यान्यतः सिद्धौ सा नापगच्छेत्,

न ह्युपायविशेषसाध्यत्वेनेच्छोपायान्तराधीनफललाभेन निवार्य्यते, प्रीत्या धनलाभेऽपि प्रतिग्रहेण तल्लिप्साया अनिवृत्तेरिति चेत्,

21. न, स्वविषयसिद्धत्वस्य फलेच्छाविच्छेदस्य चोपायेच्छा-विरोधित्वात्। अस्ति च तत्र पाकौदनयोः सिद्धत्वं, अन्यौदनेच्छायां पाकचिकीर्षा भवत्येव,

प्रत्युतासिद्धयत्वात् कृतावेवेच्छा न विच्छिद्येत यदि कृतिविषय-सिद्धत्व-फलेच्छाविच्छेदौ न विरोधिनौ।

iṣṭasādhanatva (without that of *kṛtisādhyatva*), still the desire of *kṛti* cannot be held to be the inducer, but the desire that it is possible to be accomplished by one's own *kṛti*, since in all the three expressions, "He knows the pot, desires to do (the pot and) does (the pot)", the knowledge, desire to do and the volition have one and the same object. This is our experience.

20 (Opponent) : Well, if that *cikīrṣā* stands for the desire to accomplish by volition then when the cooking which was desired to be accomplished is already accomplished by other means, (even then) the desire to accomplish it will not be over. Because the desire to accomplish by a particular means is never ruled out by the accomplishment of the result by another means. (For instance), even if same wealth is obtained (as a gift) out of love, the desire to obtain it by *pratigraha* (a particular mode of receiving gifts) does not cease.

21. (Reply) No. Because (the knowledge that) the object of the desire is already accomplished and the absence of the result are obstacles for the desire of the means (for that result). And in that case (i.e., in the case where cooking is already established by other means) both cooking and rice are already accomplished.

(But) if one desires another rice, there does not occur the desire for cooking.

22. प्रीत्या धनलाभे च तदधिकधनेच्छा न विच्छिद्यते तस्यासिद्धत्वात् तत्फलेच्छायाश्च सत्वात्।

23. धनमात्रार्थिनश्च प्रीत्या धनलाभेऽपि प्रतिग्रहेण तल्लिप्सा नास्त्येव धनमात्रस्य सिद्धत्वात्। किञ्चिद्विशेषसिद्धयैव हि सामान्येच्छाविच्छेदः।

24. अन्यथा सकलस्वविषयसिद्धेरसम्भवेन तद्विच्छेदो न स्यादेव।

(Thus it is not true that in spite of the fact that cooking is accomplished, one will still have desire to accomplish it.) On the contrary, since the cooking is not accomplished (with reference to other rice) the desire for volition itself will not cease if it is not accepted that 'being accomplished of the object of volition and the absence of desire of result are not contradictory.

22. So far the point of obtaining wealth on account of love or affection is concerned, it is a fact that the desire for more and more wealth does not cease.

Because that (more wealth) is not yet established and there is desire for that result.

23. For one who is desirous of mere wealth after he gets wealth as gifts out of love, he does not have desire to procure further wealth because wealth is already established. (It is normally the case that) when a particular is obtained the class (automatically) ceases.

24. If this is not true, then since the accomplishment of all objects of desire is impossible, there would be no cessation of the desire.

25. वस्तुतस्तु क्रियानुकूला कृतिरिष्टोपाय इति ज्ञाने क्रियायाः कृतिसाध्यत्वमिष्टोपायत्वञ्च भातं क्रियाद्वारैव कृतेरिष्टसाधनत्वादिति तद्बोधात् कृताविव कृतिसाध्यत्वेन क्रियायामपि सैवेच्छेति चिकीर्षायां कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारनैयत्यम् ।

26. अतः कृतिसमानविषयचिकीर्षात्वेन चिकीर्षायाः कृतिकारणत्वं न तु कृतीच्छात्वेन भिन्नविषयतया गौरवात् ।

27. तथापि येन रूपेण यस्येष्टसाधनत्वं तेन प्रकारेण तत्रेच्छा यथा स्वकेदारवृष्टित्वेन इष्टसाधनत्वात् तथैवेच्छा तथा कृतिसाध्यत्वेन पाकस्येष्टसाधनत्वमतः कृतिसाध्यत्वेन तत्रेच्छा भवतीति, कृतौ कृतिविषये वा चिकीर्षायां न वृष्टीच्छा,

25. Really speaking, the volition which causes activity is the means to the desired result and therefore, that the activity is to be accomplished by volition and it is the means of the desired goal is understood only through activity. And so on account of that understanding as there will be desire for volition, there will be desire for activity as well since it (i.e. the activity) is to be accomplished by volition. And thus there is the qualitier namely, the state of being accomplished by volition, present invariably in each desire to do.

26. And so the desire to do is the cause of volition as the desire to do, the object of which is that of volition, and not as the desire of volition, since it will result into complexity if different objects accepted for the desire and volition.

27. Still (this is an established fact that) in whatever form something is known as the means of desired goal in the same form that something has to be desired. For instance, rains are known as the means of the desired goal as the rains falling in one's own field and accordingly in the same form it will be desired. Similarly, since cooking is the means of desired result as an activity to be accomplished by volition and so (naturally, there will be desire in the same form (and so there is no desire to do if the knowledge arises that it is possible to be accomplished).

28. विलक्षण सामग्रयन्तरकल्पनमिति चेत्, भवेदेवं, यदि कृतिसाध्यत्वेन पाकस्य ओदनसाधनता स्यात्, न चैवं, गौरवात्, किन्तु पाकत्वेन, स तु कृतिं विना नेत्यन्यदेतत् ।

29. वह्निना साधयामीतिवत् कृत्या साधयामी[नी]तीच्छा इष्टसाधनताज्ञानादेवेति चेत् ।

30. तर्हि तत्र वह्निसाध्यताज्ञानवदत्रापि कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानं कारणमावश्यकं कृतौ चानुभवसिद्धचिकीर्षाधीनत्वं विशेषः तेन प्राणपञ्चकसंसारे जीवनयोनिकृतिसाध्ये न प्रवृत्तिः ।

If the desire to do arises with reference to either volition or to the object of volition then there can be no desire for rains (because rains are already accomplished and only the contract with accomplised rains is desired in the field.)

28. If one argues that a different set of causal factors (other than accomplished things) is to be postulated (it would not be correet since) had it been so as you think, provided the cooking would have been the means of (*odana*), cooked rice as an activity to be accomplished but it is not so, since it would lead to cumbersomeness, but as being the cooking (it is the means of cooked rice). That the cooking is not materialised without volition is a different matter.

29. (Opponent) As the desire arises : "let me accomplish it by fire," similarly the desire, "Let me accomplish it by volition" will arise only from the knowledge of its being the means of desired result.

30. (Reply) Then as there, (in cooking) the knowledge of being accomplished (*sādhyatva*) by fire is required as the cause similarly here (in the case of *kṛtyā sādhayāmi*) too it is necessary to have the knowledge of 'being accomplished by volition' as the cause (to *cikīrṣā*).

31. अन्यथा कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनतापक्षेऽपि तत्र प्रवर्तेत ।

32. ननु चिकीर्षाधीनत्वस्वोपलक्षणत्वे उपलक्ष्यमात्रगतान् अति-प्रसक्तधर्म्माभावात् कृतिमात्रस्य चातिप्रसङ्गात् तत्तत्कृतिविशेषा उपलक्ष्या·,

33. तथा च तदनुगमात् प्रवृत्त्यननुगमः, विशेषणत्वे चिकीर्षायां प्रवृतौ च चिकीर्षाज्ञानकारणत्वे गौरवं प्रमाणाभावश्च ।

In volition, however, there is a qualification namely, the state of being dependent upon *cikīrṣā* established by experience, and therefore, no *pravṛtti* is found with regard to the movement of the five types of winds in the body which is to be accomplished by the volition, the source of life (*jīvanayoni kṛti.*)

31. Otherwise, even according to the view that the (knowledge of) being the means of desired result which is fit to be accomplished (is the cause of *pravṛtti*) there (i.e. with regard to *prāṇasañcāra*) will arise the *pravṛtti*.

32. **(Opponent)** : Well if the state of being dependent on *cikīrṣā* is treated as mere indicator (*upalakṣaṇo* and not qualifier) then since there is no property existing in all that is indicated (*upalakṣya*) and at the same time which does not overlap and also since the volition in general (i.e. volitionness) is very wide (i.e. it will include *jīvanayonikṛti* also) it becomes necessary to indicate particular volitions as having particular volitionness and thus it is not possible to unite all those volitious it is difficult to unite *pravṛttis* (by providing a single cause and-effect relationship).

33. If on the other hand the state of being dependent on on *cikīrṣā*) is treated as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) then both the knowledge and *cikīrṣā* will be the cause of *cikīrṣā* and *pravṛtti* and as such it will lead to cumbersomeness and moreover, there is no ground to accept (that *cikīrṣā* produces *cikīrṣā*).

34. किञ्च चिकीर्षासाध्यवस्थायाः कृते सिद्धावस्थसाधनत्व-विरोधेन कृतिसाध्यता पाकादौ न ज्ञायेतेति चेत्,

35. न, अस्ति हि कृतिविशेषो मानसप्रत्यक्षसिद्धो जीवनयोनि-प्रयत्नव्यावृत्तश्चिकीर्षोपलक्ष्यः यत्र चिकीर्षाकारणत्वग्रहः स च तव जातिरूपो मम त्वनुगतकारणोपाधिरूपः ।

36. एवञ्च चिकीर्षाधीनत्वेनानुगतेन कृतिविशेषाणामुपलक्ष्याणाम् अनुगतत्वमपि । यथा गोत्वेन तटस्थेनोपलक्षिता महिष्यादिव्या-वृत्तधानकर्म्मव्यक्तिविशेषाः धेनुपदेनोच्यन्ते न तु गोत्वमपि, तथा चिकीर्षापि,

34. Moreover since it is contradictory to treat a volition which is in the state of being accomplished by *cikīrṣā*, as a means which is required to be of the state of being already accomplished and as such the state of being accomplished by volition cannot be known in cooking.

35. (Reply) : No. There is a particular volition which is known by mental perception, different from the *jīvanayonikṛti* and which is indicated by the desire to do wherein one gets the knowledge of having *cikīrṣā* as its cause. That (particular *Kṛtitva* is what is called universal (*Kṛtitva*) according to your doctrine and according to our doctrine (the same is called) as *anugatakāraṇopādhi* (a particular property of the cause which unites all that is called *kāraṇa*).

36. Thus the particular *Kṛtis* (other than *jīvanayoniyatne*) which are expressed by the word *cikīrṣā* are also brought under one class by the uniting property namely being dependant upon desire to do'—as the word *dhenu* expresses the particular cow individuals—the object of the act of milking and which are different from the buffaloes etc. and which are known by the property of cow-ness which is present there but does not act as the *śakyatāvacchedaka* but the word *dhenu* does not express cowness also.

37. एवं जीवनयोनियत्नव्यावृत्तकृतिविशेषाणां कृतित्वेन ज्ञानं कारणमिति नाननुगमः ।

38. ननु, कृतिसाध्ये न कृतिविशेषणमसत्त्वात् सत्त्वे वा कृतौ सत्यां ज्ञानं ज्ञाने च कृतिरित्यन्योन्याश्रयः, नोपलक्षणमतिप्रसङ्गादिति चेत् ।

39. न, कृतिर्हि ज्ञाने विषयतया विशेषणमेव, साध्ये च परिचायकतयोपलक्षणं ।

37. Similarly *cikīrṣā* (*janyatva*) also (does not form the object of the knowledge which is the cause of *cikīrṣā* but it acts merely as the neutral indicator). Thus since the knowledge of the particular volition other than the *jīvanayoniyatna* as qualified by volitionness is the cause of *cikīrṣā*) there is no difficulty of uniting (the volitions and providing a single cause and effct relatiodship).

38. (Opponent) : Well to (the cooking which is to be accomplished by volition cannot be a qualifier since (it is yet to come into existence and so) it does not exist. If it is held that it exisrs (by the *sādhyatā* relation) then there will arise the contingency of interdependency namely, when volition will be produced there can be the knowledge (that the cooking is qualified by the volition) the volition will come to exist (through *cikīrṣā*).

Nor (*kṛti* can be an indicator to *kṛtisādhya* i.e. cooking because it will lead to over-application (i.e. from mere knowledge there will be pravṛtti even after definitely knowing that such and such action is not possible to be undertaken).

39. (Reply) : It is not correct. Because the volition is indeed a qualifier in the knowledge as the object of that knowledge and to the *Sādhya* (say, cooking) it is an indicator since it causes the knowledge (of sādhya).

40. अन्यथा इष्टसाधनेऽपीष्टं न विशेषणमसत्त्वात् नोपलक्षणमतिप्रसङ्गात् लिङ्गज्ञानादौ वा का गतिः

41. नन्वेवं श्रमेऽपि चिकीर्षा स्यात्तस्यापि चिकीर्षाधीनकृतिसाध्यत्वात् ।

42. अत्र वदन्ति ।

श्रमस्तु भोजनादिक्रियासाध्यो न तत्कृतिसाध्यः अचिकीर्षितत्वात् कृतेः स्वध्वंससाक्षात्कारातिरिक्ते चिकीर्षाविषयमात्रे जनकत्वात्; न हि भोजनचिकीर्षाधीनकृत्या गमनं साध्यते इति केचित्,

40. If this is not accepted the same objections could be raised in your doctrine also. For instance, the desired goal is not a qualification of the means of the desired goal since (it is yet to be accomplished and so) it does not exist. Nor can it be an indicator (of *iṣṭasādhana*) because it will lead to the overapplication (of the type mentioned above).

Moreover, what could be the explanation in the case of the knowledge of (past and future) probans (because there too the probanse does noc exist at that moment).

41. (Objection) : Well, if the knowledge of being accomplished by volition dependent upon the desire to do is treated as the cause of *cikīrṣā* then there will arise the *cikīrṣā* with regard to firing labour also, because it is possible to accomplish labour by the volition, dependent upon the desire to do.

42. Some have the following to say :

Labour is accomplished by the action of eating etc. and not by the volition of that action of eating etc. because labour is not the object of desire to do.

A volition is the cause only in the reference to the object of the desire to do in addition to its own destruction and its cognition. It is never the case that the act of going is accomplished by the volition dependent upon the desire to accomplish eating.

43. तन्न, गुरुतरभारोत्तोलने कृत्यसाध्ये भ्रमात् प्रवृत्तस्य निगडनिश्चलदेहस्य वा कृतौ सत्त्यामुत्तोलन-चलन-क्रियानुत्पादेऽपि श्रमानुभवात् कृतेरेव कारणत्वात्। न तु तज्जन्यक्रियायाः सुखे व्यभिचाराच्च।

44. न हि सुखकृतिकारणचिकीर्षाविषय:, उपायचिकीर्षाजन्या हि कृतिः न तु सुखचिकीर्षाजन्या।

45. चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यत्वं न श्रमे द्वेषयोनिप्रयत्नादपि तदुत्पत्तेरिति अपरे।

46. तन्न। शत्रुबधस्येष्टसाधनत्वेन चिकीर्षाजन्य कृतिसाध्यत्वात् द्वेषस्य यत्नाजनकत्वात्, द्वेषसिद्धिस्तु शत्रुं द्वेष्मीत्यनुभवबलात्।

43. (But) it is not correct. Because when someone goes, out of a wrong estimate to lift a very heavy weight which is not possible on his part to lift or when someone, whose body does not move because it is tired, attempts to walk—although neither lifting nor walking is accomplished, the person concerned does not feel tiredness and so with reference to this tiredness (labour) volition alone is the cause and not the action produced by that volition, because it will violate the causal relationship in the case of pleasure. Because it is not the case that pleasure is the object of 'desire to do' which is the cause of volition.

44. In fact, a volition is caused by the desire to accomplish the means (of pleasure) but not by the desire to accomplish pleasure.

45. (Objection) : Some others say that there is no accomplishability by the volition produced by the desire to do in tiredness (labour) because tiredness may arise even due to the volition which is the source of hatred.

46. Reply : It is not correct. Because the killing of one's enemy can be the means of one's desired goal and as such it can be accomplished by one's volition produced by the desire to do and so hatred does not produce volition. The presence of hatred is inferred due to the experience, 'I hate the enemy.'

47. यत्तु श्रमः कृतित्वेन कृतिसाध्यो न चिकीर्षाधीन-कृतित्वेन ।

यद्यचिकीर्षितेऽपि श्रमे चिकीर्षाधीनकृतित्वेन कारणता स्यात् तदा चिकीर्षितमेव भोजनं कृत्या साध्यते नाचिकीर्षितं गमनादीति न स्यात्, श्रमवद्गमनेऽपि तज्जन्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

48. भोजनादिश्च चिकीर्षाधीनकृतिविशेषात्, स हि कृतिमात्रं व्यभिचरति, जीवनयोनिकृतेस्तदनुत्पादात् ।

49. यद्वा श्रमो न भोजनकृतिसाध्यः किन्तु तन्निरंतरोत्पन्नाज्जीवनयोनिप्रयत्नादेवेति ।

47. (Objection) : Some have the following to say : Labour is accomplished by volition as simply volition and not as a volition dependent upon the desire to do. If the volition is accepted as the cause of the unwanted labour as the volition dependent upon the desire to do, then it will not be the case that one accomplishes the act of eating which is desired to be accomplished by volition and not the act of going. Otherwise, (if labour is accepted as being produced by the volition inspite of its not being the object of desire to do then) as in the case of labour so in the case of going also one should say that it is produced by the volition to accomplish the act of eating. This will be the contingency.

48. In fact, the act of eating etc., is produced by the particular volition dependent upon the desire to do (the act of eating etc.).

That particular volition (which produces the act of eating etc.), however, cannot stand for volition in general because the volition which sustains life (is also a volition, but it) does not produce (the act of eating etc.).

49. Or, (one can say that) the labour is not accomplished by the volition (which produces) the act of eating, but it is produced from the volition for sustaining life which is always being created.

50. तन्न । न हि कृतित्वेन तच्छ्रमजनकत्वं, नापि कृत्यन्तरादेव श्रमोत्पत्तिः, जीवनयोनिप्रयत्ने सत्यपि भारोद्वहनादिकर्मकुर्वतस्तादृशश्रमाननुभवेन तस्य श्रमाजनकत्वात् ।

51. तस्मात् भोजनादिवत् श्रमविशेषाणामपि भोजनादि-कृतिमाध्यत्वमनन्यगतिकत्वात् ।

52. सुप्तस्य स्वेदाद्यनुमितः श्रमः तज्जन्य इति चेत्

53. न, स्वेदादेः श्रमान्यहेतुकत्वात्,

अन्यथा जागरेऽपि तदनुवृत्तौ श्रमानुवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् इति

50. (Reply) : (Both these alternative explanations are) not correct. Because, neither it is true that the volition produces labour as simply volition, nor is it true that another volition (namely, the volition to sustain life) produces labour, because inspite of the presence of volition which sustains life, a person does not feel tired without performing the act of lifting a load and so that (volition which sustains life) does not produce labour.

51. Therefore, as the volition of eating etc., the same volition also produces particular labour. This fact has to be accepted because there is no other go.

52. (Objection) : Well, the labour of one who is asleep, inferred on the ground of sweating is caused by the volition which sustains life.

53. (Reply) : It is not true. Because sweating etc. is produced by some factor other than the labour (and so it is not proper to infer labour on account of sweating). Otherwise, even after awakening when the volition for sustaining the life continues to occur there will arise the contingency of the continuous occurrence of labour.

54. मैवं, स्वेच्छाधीनत्वस्य कृतिविशेषणत्वात्, श्रमश्च नियमतोऽन्येच्छाधीनकृतिसाध्यः श्रमे दुःखत्वेनेच्छाविरहात्

अत एवान्येच्छाजन्यकृतिसाध्यत्वेन श्रमो नान्तरीयक इत्युच्यते ।

55. स्वचिकीर्षाधीनत्वन्तु न कृतौ विशेषणं गौरवात् ।

56. अन्ये तु कृतिगतं धर्मान्तरमेव उद्देश्यत्वं तद्विशिष्टकृतिसाध्यश्च न श्रमः अचिकीर्षितत्वात् किन्तु कृतिमात्रसाध्यः ।

अत एव कष्टं कर्म इत्यनुभवो लोकानाम् ।

54. (Reply by the *Prābhākaras*) : It is not correct (that the state of being dependent on the desire to do can neither be a qualification of volition nor an indicetor (*upala kṣaṇa*) because the state of being dependent on the desire of its own object can be the qualifier of the volition. Labour, however is always produced by the volition dependent upon the desire of something other than (the labour) and there can be no desire of labour since it gives pain. And this is the reason why the labour which is produced by the volition dependent upon the desire of something other than the labour itself is called an unavoidable exertion.

55. The state of being dependent on the desire to accomplish its own object is indeed not the qualification of volition because it will involve cumbersomeness, (since in that case the desire in which *kṛtisādhyatva* is *prakāra* will be the cause of *kṛti* and *kṛti* will be the cause of *kṛti* which is absurd.).

56. Some (Mīmāṃsakas) say that another (specific) property existing in volition is what is called *uddeśyatva* and exertion is not accomplished by the volition qualified by that specific property because it is not desire to be accomplished, but it is caused by mere volition. This is the reason why people have such experience as, 'It is a troublesome job.'

57. एवं चिकीर्षायां ममैकं कृतिसाध्यत्वं प्रयोजकं तव तु कृति-साध्यत्वे सतीष्टसाधनत्वं सुखत्वं दुःखाभावत्वञ्चेति चतुष्टयं,

58. इच्छाप्रयोजकन्तु मम सुखत्वं दुःखाभावत्वञ्चेति द्वयं, वृष्टि-साध्ये सुखे हीच्छावृष्टिमपि विषयीकरोति, न त्विष्टसाधनत्वेन तत्रेच्छा साधनत्वस्येच्छाविरोधित्वात् ।

59. तव तु त्रयम् ।

57. (Reply) : Thus, for me there is a single factor namely, 'the state of being accomplishable by volition' which causes the desire to accomplish (something) whereas you have four, namely,

(1) the state of being accomplishable by volition.

(2) the state of being the means of desired goal,

(3) the state of being the happiness and

(4) the state of being the absence of unhappiness.

58. For me, the causes of desire are only two :

(1) the state of being the happiness, and

(2) the state of being the absence of happiness—

The desire of happiness caused by rains has rains too as its content ; it is not the case that rains are (independently) desired as the means of desired (happiness) because a desire has contradiction with instrumentality (*i.e.* if something is already accomplished it can be the instrument, but in that case it cannot be the object of desire because it is already accomplished).

59. But you need, three factors (for the same purpose namely, (*i*) the state of being the means of desired goal, (*ii*) the state of being the happiness, and (*iii*) the state of being the absence of unhappiness).

60. विषभक्षणे तु कृतिसाध्यत्वेऽपि बलवदनिष्टसाधनत्वेन चिकीर्षा नास्तोति कृतौ चिकीर्षाजन्यत्व विशेषणमिति कश्चित्

61. तत्तुच्छं, एवं हि विषभक्षणं कृतिसाध्यमेव न स्यात् जीवनयोनिकृतेस्तस्यानुत्पत्तेरिति व्यर्थं विशेषणम्।

62. स्यादेतत् इष्टसाधनताभ्रमाद् विषभक्षणे चैत्यवन्दने च चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यत्वमस्ति ज्ञानप्रयुक्तत्वात् कार्यत्वस्य, तथा च सञ्जातबाधोऽपि तत्र कार्यत्वज्ञानात् प्रवर्तेत तथा तृप्तोऽपि भोजने।

60. (Objection) : In case of taking poison although it is accomplishable by volition one does not desire to accomplish it because it is the means of severe unwanted consequence and so, 'the state of being produced by the desire to accomplish' can be the qualification of volition. This is what some say.

61. (Reply) : But it is a negligible reply. Because if this is accepted it cannot be said that taking poison is an accomplishable act since the act of takinig poison does not take place by mere volition which sustains life and so the (said) qualification is redundant.

62. (The Naiyāyikas) : It may be so. But (sometimes) out of illusion one may grasp that taking poison and worshipping *Caitya* are means of desired goal and in that case there does exist in both these acts 'the state of being accomplished by the volition arising due to the desire to accomplish' because the volition here is produced by the knowledge (of *iṣṭasādhanatā*). Thus even a person who has the knowledge that a particular act is liable to cause adverse result although it is feasible to be performed will go to perform such an act because of his knowledge (remembrance) that it is possible for him to be accomplished by his volition. Similarly, a person whose hunger is already satisfied will (again) go to take food (because you do not require the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* as the cause. Nor do you require the knowledge that such and such act is going to cause adverse result as the cause of *pravṛtti*).

63. ननु स्वकृतिसाध्यतानुभवस्तथा, अन्यथेष्टसाधनतास्मरणे विषभक्षणेऽपि प्रवर्तेत,

न चेष्टसाधनताज्ञानं वेदोवाऽनुभावकमस्तीति चेत् ।

64. न, वस्तुतस्तत्र कृतिसाध्यत्वेलिङ्गान्तरेणाप्तवाक्येन वा तदनुभवसम्भवात् लिङ्गाभासाच्छब्दाभासाद्वा अप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च, भेदाग्रहवादिनस्तत्र तव तदनुभवाभावात् ।

65. मैवं, स्वविशेषणवत्ताप्रतिसन्धानजन्यं हि कार्यताज्ञानं प्रवर्तकं तथा हि काम्ये पुरुषविशेषणं कामना ततः काम्यसाधनताज्ञानेन यागपाकादौ कार्यताज्ञानं, नित्यं च कालशौचादिस्वविशेषणं, तथा चैतत्सन्ध्यायामहं कृतिसाध्यसंध्यावन्दनः संध्यासमये शौचादिमत्त्वात् पूर्वसन्ध्यायामहमिवेति कार्यताज्ञानं शौचादिस्वविशेषणज्ञानजन्यं तदुक्तं, स च कार्यविशेषः पुरुषविशेषणावगतः प्रवृत्तिहेतुरिति ।

63. (Some supporter of the Prābhākaras) : Well, (it is not true that the remembrance of *kṛtisādhytā* is the cause of inducement but) the experience of one's own *kṛtisādhyatā* is so. Otherwise, after mere remembrance of *iṣṭasādhanatā* one will go to take even poison.

One cannot argue that there is knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* (in the present case). Nor is there any vedic injunction to cause the experience.

64. (Reply) : It is not correct. As a matter of fact, it is possible to have an experience of *Kṛtisādhyatā* there (in taking of poison) by another ground or by the statement of a reliable man and also there will arise the contingency of absence of inducement from pseudo-reason and pseudo-words, because you have absence of experience of *kṛtisādhyatā* since you hold the view that 'not knowing the difference' is the cause of inducement. (Therefore, how can experience be the cause of inducement in the case of illusion of erroneous cognition) ?

65 (Prābhākara). It is not correct. The knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā*, which is produced by the rememberance of being

66. सञ्जातबाधस्य च विषभक्षणे चैत्यवन्दने च भ्रमदशायामिव नेष्टसाधनताज्ञानमस्ति येन तज्जन्यकार्यताज्ञानात प्रवर्तेत तृप्तस्य च कामनाविरहेण इष्टसाधनताज्ञानाभावात् न तथा बोधः।

67 अन्ये त्वात्मनो जीवितप्रतिसन्धानजन्यं श्रमे कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं सम्भवतीति जीवनव्यतिरिक्तत्वं स्वविशेषणे विशेषणमिति।

possessed of own qualification is the cause of inducement. Thus, in the case of *kāmyakarma*, the qualification of the man is his desire (to obtain the goal). From that follows the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* in sacrifice or cooking etc. by the knowledge of being the means of desired object. In the case of obligatory rites, however, the qualification of the person will be the proper time, purity etc.

Thus, in this evening I am performing *sandhyāvandana*, because in the evening I have purity etc., like me in the earlier evening.

This knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* is produced by the knowledge of the qualification of the performer, namely, purity etc.

It is supported (by the following state of the Mīmāṃsakas): That *kāryaviśeṣa* or *kṛtisādhyatva* at the present moment known by the qualifier of the man is the cause of inducement.

66. In the case of one who knows that a particular act is going to cause great harm to him, and in the case of taking poison and also in the case of worshipping the *caitya*, there is no knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* as in the stage of illusion. Had it been so then only one would have been induced because of the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* produced by that (*iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*). For one whose huger is satisfied, simply because he has no desire he has no knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* and so he does not have the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* of that type.

67. (The opinion of Mahārāṇavakāra) : Others hold that since it is possible to have the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* in labour, arising out of the knowledge of being alive, it is necessary to qualify the qualifier of the performer with being different from life.

68. तन्न, श्रमे स्वेच्छाधीनकृतिसाध्यत्वाभावात् ।

69. इष्टसाधनतालिङ्गकं कार्यताज्ञानं प्रवर्तकं इत्यपरे

70 तन्न, नित्ये तदभावात् ।

71. ननु विषभक्षणव्यावृत्तमिष्टसाधनत्वमेव कृतिसाध्यताज्ञाने विशेषतया विशेषणमस्तु स्वविशेषणवत्ताज्ञानजन्यत्वापेक्षया लघुत्वात् ।

72 किञ्चोपायविषया चिकीर्षा इष्टसाधनताज्ञानसाध्या उपायेच्छात्वात् वृष्टीच्छावत् ।

73. भोगचिकीर्षायां तदभावादप्रयोजकमिष्टसाधनत्वमिति चेत् ।

68. (Reply) : But it is not correct. Because there is no *kṛtisādhyatva* caused by one's own desire in labour.

69. Others say that the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* obtained on the basis of *iṣṭasādhanatā* is the cause of inducement.

70. (Reply) : But it is not true. Because in the case of obligatory rites (where there is no mention of *iṣṭa*) there can be no such knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* (and so there will be no inducement).

71. (Naiyāyikas) : Well, let the state of being the means of desired goal other than taking of poison be the qualifier in the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* as its content because it is simpler in comparison to 'the state of being produced by the knowledge of having (*kāmanā* etc.) as the qualification of the performer.'

72. Moreover, the desire, to perform the means (of desired object) is produced by the knowledge of being the means of desired goal ; because it is a desire of the means, like the desire of rains.

73. (Prābhākara) : With reference to the desire to accomplish the enjoyment there is no knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* in which *iṣṭasādhanatva* is also object and so *iṣṭasādhanatva* cannot be the cause (of inducement).

74 न, तत्रापि स्वविशेषणधीजन्यत्वाभावेन तत्र तस्य अप्रयोजकत्वात् ।

75. कृतिहेतुचिकीर्षायां तत्प्रयोजकं, न च भोगचिकीर्षा तथा, उपायचिकीर्षात एव कृतिसम्भवात् इति चेत्,

76. तुल्यमिति,

77. मेवं, साध्यत्व-साधनत्वयोर्विरोधेनैकत्र ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् ।

78. असिद्धावस्थस्य हि साध्यत्वं सिद्धतादशायां तदभावात्, सिद्धतादशायाञ्च साधनत्वं असिद्धावस्थावतः कार्यानुत्पत्तेः तथा च पाकादेरसिद्धत्वसिद्धत्वज्ञाने साध्यत्व-साधनत्वग्रहः ।

74. (Reply Naiyāikas) : It is not correct. Because even in your doctrine there can be no 'state of being produced by the knowledge of qualification of the performer and so the state produced by the knowledge of qualification of the performer cannot be the cause (of inducement).

75. (Prābhākara) : That (*svaviśeṣaṇadhījanyatva*) is the cause (of inducement) with reference to the desire to perform which is the cause of volition; the desire to accomplish the enjoyment is not like that; here from the desire to perform the means itself generates volition.

76. (Reply Naiyāyikas) : It is all the same (with you too).

77. (Reply Prābhākara) : (What you have been arguing so far) is not correct, the state of being accomplishable and that of being a means are contradictory properties (in one and the same thing) and so it is impossible to know them in one and the same thing.

78. The state of being accomplishable (exists) in a thing which is not yet accomplished (but which is in the formative stage) ; when that is already accomplished, that property will not be there. Again, when something is already accomplished

79. न चैकमेकेनैकदा सिद्धमसिद्धञ्च इति ज्ञायते ।

80. न च स्वरूपगतता साध्यत्व-साधनत्वयोरतो न विरोध इति वाच्यं ।

81. यदि हि स्वरूपनिबन्धनं तदुभयं तदा तत्स्वरूपं सदैव सिद्धमसिद्धञ्च, भिन्ननिरूपितत्वेऽपि तयोः सिद्धत्वासिद्धत्वे अनवगम्याज्ञानात्, तस्मात् समयभेदोपाधिक एव तदुभयसम्बन्धः पाके ।

82. इदानीं साध्यत्वं अग्रे साधनत्वं ज्ञायत इति चेत् ।

the property of bein g an instrument or means exists in that because from a thing which is in the formative stage no effect is generated. Thus, after the knowledge of *asiddhatva* and *siddhatva* respectively there will arise the knowledge of *sādyhatva* and *sādhanatva*.

79. It is not a fact that a person knows a particular thing as accomplished and to be accomplished both at one and the same time.

80. Nor can one argue that the properties of to be accomplished and already accomplished form the nature of things and so there will be no contradiction, because if both the properties are treated as natural then the nature of things will be always 'accomplished' and 'unaccomplished'.

81. Although *siddhatva* and *asiddhatva* are described by different things (and so there can be no contradiction in question), still without knowing the *siddhatva* and *asiddhatva* the two cannot be known.

Therefore, the relation of these two with *pāka* is characterised by the difference of time.

82. (Naiyāyikas) : Now *Sādhyatva* is known and later *sādhanatva* will be known.

83. न, इदानीमग्रिमपदार्थयोर्नानात्वादननुगमेन व्याप्त्यग्रहात्। शब्देन तथा प्रतिपादयितुमशक्यत्वात् गौरवाच्च।

84. न च कृतितः सिद्धमिष्टसाधनमितिज्ञानात् चिकीर्षा, न हि सिद्ध कश्चित् चिकीर्षति, कृतेः पूर्व कृतितः सिद्धमिति ज्ञानाभावाच्च।

85. न च कृतिसाध्यत्वेन पाकादेरिष्टसाधनत्वात् साधनत्वमपि साध्यम्। न हि कृतिसाध्यत्वेन पाकस्यौदनसाधनता, इत्युक्तम्।

86. तस्मात् कृत-क्रियमाणविलक्षणं कृत्यनन्तरभविष्यत्तारूपं कृतिसाध्यत्वं चिकीर्षाप्रयोजकं, तादृशञ्च साधनत्व-विरोध्येव।

83. (Prābhākara) : No. Because the meanings of the words 'now' and 'later' are different and so there is no common property by which both could be brought together and in that case the collocation is not known and it is impossible to convey in that form by the word (*vidhi*) and (if without caring for the common property if one accepts the *śakti* in *vidhi* then) there will be cumbersomeness also.

84. Neither can one argue that there will arise 'the desire to perform' from the knowledge : what is accomplished by the volition is the means of desired object.

It is not the case that anyone desires to do something which is already done. Moreover, it is not possible to have the knowledge : 'accomplished by volition' before the arising of the volition.

85. Nor is it the case that since *pāka* is accomplishable by volition it is the means of desired object and so it is not the case that this instrumentality is also to be established. *Pāka* has instrumentality not because it is accomplishable by volition —this has been already said (before).

86. Therefore, the cause of 'desire to do' is (the knowledge of) *kṛtisādhyatva* which is of the nature of coming into existence in future by another volition and that type of *kṛtisādhyatva* is indeed contradictory to the concept of instrumentality.

87. किञ्च साधनत्वस्य सिद्धमात्रधर्मत्वात् साधनत्वज्ञानमिच्छा-विरोधि, न हि कश्चित् सिद्धमिच्छतीत्युक्तम् ।

88. एतेन, वृष्टयादाविष्टसाधनताज्ञानमुपायेच्छाकारणत्वेन क्लृप्तमिति निरस्तं ।

89. कथं तर्हि स्वतोऽसुन्दरे वृष्टयादाविच्छा,

90. तत्साध्येष्टज्ञानादिति गृहाण ।

91. अन्ये तु सुख-दुःखाभाव-तत्साधनेष्विच्छाप्रयोजकमनुगत-मुद्देश्यत्वं पुरुषार्थपदवेदनोयं धर्मान्तरमस्ति अनुगतकार्य्यस्यानुगत-कारणनियम्यत्वात् । तदेव दुःखतत्साधनव्यावृत्तं सुखतत्साधनादौ चिकोर्षाप्रयोजकमिति ।

87. Moreover, the property of being an instrument exists in all that is already accomplished and so the knowledge of instrumentality is contradictory to the desire (to do). As it has been already said that nobody wants to do something which is already done.

88. By this (argument of ours), the argument that the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* in rains is established as the cause of the desire to perform the means is also refuted

89. (Naiyāyikas) : How, then can there be desire for rains which are by very nature terrible (in the form of flood) ?

90. (Reply Prābhākaras) : From the knowledge of the desired object which is produced by rains. Take this (to be the answer to your question).

91. (Others may be a section of Prābhākaras) : Others hold the view that there is another property namely *uddeśyatva*, which is known by the word *puruṣārtha* (the aim of man's life) which can be a common property which causes desire with regard to happiness, absence of unhappiness, and their means, because a consistent effect is controlled by a consistent cause. And that (*uddeśyatva*) itself which is different from unhappiness and its means is the cause of desire for happiness and its means.

92. न च दुःखविरोधित्वमेव तथास्तीति वाच्यम् ।

93. सहानवस्थाननियमविरोधस्यासम्भवात् ।

94. वध्य-घातक-भावस्यैकसमये समानाधिकरण्याभावस्य च यत्नादिसाधारण्यादिति ।

95. तन्न । तदज्ञानेऽपि सुखत्वज्ञानादिच्छोत्पत्तेः,

न हि सुखत्वे ज्ञाते धर्मान्तरज्ञानं विना नेच्छेति ।

तथात्वे स्वतःप्रयोजनहान्यापत्तेः ।

तदेव हि स्वतःप्रयोजनं यदवगतं सत् स्ववृत्तितयेष्यते ।

92. One cannot argue that the property of being contradictory to happiness can be the cause of desire.

93. Because the contradiction namely, 'regularly not co-existing together' is not possible (since wherever there is happiness, there is unhappiness).

94. Nor can there be the contradiction of the type of killer-and-killed (because happiness does not destroy unhappiness) ; nor can there be the contradiction of the type of not existing is one locus at one and the same time (because there can be pleauresome touch in the hand, whereas pains in the head at the same time) : Because it is common to volition etc. (the special quality of the soul, since knowledge also destroys another knowledge.

95. (Prābhākara) : It is not correct. Because even without the knowledge of that (*uddeśyatva*) from the knowledge of pleasure itself there arises the desire to do. It is not the case that after the knowledge of happiness, the desire does not arise without the knowledge of other property. If that is the case then a purpose will not remain a purpose ; because that alone is a purpose which when known is wanted as one's own.

96. किञ्चानुगतधर्मकल्पनानि कारणे ।

97. न च सुखादिइच्छाकारणं, अनागतत्वात्, किन्तु तदवगमः ।

98. तर्हि सुखादिज्ञाने तत्स्वरूपसदेवेच्छाप्रयोजकमस्त्विति चेत् ।

99. न, यथा ह्युद्देश्यत्वं सुखज्ञानादिषूत्पद्यते अन्यतरत्वात् तृणारणिमणिन्यायाद्वा तथैवेच्छैव जायतां,

100. कृतिसाध्यत्वं च कृतौ सत्यां अग्रिमक्षणे स्वरूपं न कृतिं विना ।

क्षेमसाधारणञ्चैतत् । कृतिसाध्यत्वं च न कृतेः पूर्वम् ।

96. Moreover, it is not proper to postulate a common property in the means (of happiness and absence of unhappiness because there is no *anugatavyavahāra* in *sukha* and *sukhasādhana*).

97. Nor is it correct that the pleasure etc. are the cause of desire because they are not yet in existence, but the knowledge of that pleasure etc. can be so.

98. (Objection) : Then after the knowledge of pleasure etc., let that pleasure be the cause of desire by itself (not through knowledge of pleasure).

99. (Reply by Prābhākaras) : No. As the property of *uddeśyatva* is produced in pleasure, knowledge etc. because of its being one of the many or on the ground of *tṛṇāraṇimaṇinyāya* (the maxim of specific causal relationship i.e. by postulating that the fire produced by *tṛṇa* (grass) is different from the fire produced by *araṇi* (churning wood) and *maṇi* (stone) and so there is no *vyabhicāra* with regard to the cause of fire)—similarly, let the desire be produced.

100. *Kṛtisādhyatva* means after the arising of volition, arising of the form of the effect in the next moment and not without volition (in this moment) and this is common to both

101. ननु कृतौ नष्टायां सन्नपि धर्मी न कार्यः तथा च कथं कार्य्येऽपूर्वे कामिनोऽन्वयः क्षणिकत्वेन क्रियातुल्यत्वादिति चेत् ।

102. न, यद्वृत्तिकाम्यसाधनत्वं तत्र कार्यताबुद्धेः प्रयोजकत्वात् न तु कार्यताविशिष्टस्य काम्यसाधनतेति व्याप्तिः ।

103. ननु पाकादौ कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं न प्रत्यक्षेण, कृत्यनन्तरं पाके सति कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं तस्मिन् सति कृतिरित्यन्योन्याश्रयात् कृतिसाध्यतोत्तीर्णे चिकीर्षाकृत्योरसम्भवाच्चेति चेत् ।

the cases of *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* i.e. in the case of a prohibitive sentence say, *na kalañjam bhakṣayet*, 'one should not eat *kalañja*' there is no *krtisādhyatva* (in the pre-absence of eating of *kalañja*).

Before the arising of the volition there can be no *kṛtisādhyatva*.

101. (Objection) : Well, after the volition is destroyed, the *dharmin* (i.e. the *apūrva*) cannot be called *kṛtisādhyaḥ* Thus, how can the person desirous of a result be related to *apūrva* which is *krtisādhya* because a volition is momentary and so it is like action (and so gets destroyed) ?

102. (Reply) : It is not the case. The state of being the means of desired object prompts the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* with reference to that where the state of being the means of desired object exists—and not the *iṣṭasādhanatā* qualified by *kṛtisādhyatā*. This is the *vyāpti* (and so there is no scope of your objection that after the destruction of *kṛti* how the performer will be related to apurva).

103. (Objection) : Well, the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatā* in the action of cooking is not possible directly by perception; because after the arising of the volition when the action will come into existence then one will have the knowledge of

104. न, पाको मत्कृतिसाध्यः मत्कृतिं विना असत्त्वे सति मदिष्ट-साधनत्वात्, दैवाद्यनधीनत्वे सति मदिष्टसाधनत्वाद्वा मद्भोजनवदित्य-नुमानात् स्वकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं यस्य यदिष्टसाधनं यत्कृतिं विना यदा न सम्भवति तत् तदा तत्कृतिसाध्यम् इति व्याप्तेः ।

105. असिद्धस्येष्टसाधनत्वाभावात्, बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वञ्च लिङ्गविशेषणं तेन न मधुविषसम्पृक्तान्नभोजने व्यभिचारः ।

kṛtisādhyatā andafter that (knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva*) *kṛti* will come into existence and so there will be mutual dependency. Moreover, after *kṛtisādhyatā* is over, there cannot be the desire to do and the *kṛti*.

104. (Reply by Prābhākaras) : No. the knowledge of one's own *kṛtisādhyatva* is possible by inference such as follows :

The action of cooking is possible to be accomplished by me ;

Because it is not possible without my volition and because it is the means of my desired goal ; or

Because it is the means of my desired goal and at the same time it cannot occur by chance ;

Like my action of eating.

That which is the means of someone's desired goal and which does not come into existence without whose volitional effort at a particular time is accomplished by his effort at that time. This is the *vyāpti*.

105. That which is ficticious cannot be the means of one's desired goal (and so there is no question of *vyabhicāra*) ; moreover, the probans in the above mentioned syllogism is to be qualified by 'not being the cause of greater unwanted consequence' and so there is no chance of *vyabhicāra* with regard to the action of eating food mixed with honey and poison.

106. अतीतपाके च कृतिसाध्यतोत्तीर्णे न व्यभिचारः सामान्यतस्तस्यापि कृतिसाध्यत्वात्, अतीतताद‍शायाञ्चातीतओदनेच्छाविरहेणेष्टसाधनताभावात् ।

107. अतएव निदाघद्रूनदेहो वर्षति वारिदे तायदात्तायलाभसम्भावनायां वा सरोऽवगाहने न प्रवर्तते इष्टसन्तापशान्तिसाधनतोयसम्बन्धस्यस्वकृतिं विनापि सिद्धिप्रतिसन्धानेन लिङ्गाभावेन स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानाभावात् । यदा च मत्कृतिं विना न सम्भवतीति प्रतिसन्धत्ते तदा प्रवर्तते ।

108. यदा सन्तापशान्तिमात्रमिष्ट स सरोऽवगाहनस्येष्टसाधनत्वमेव न प्रतिसन्धत्ते उपस्थितवृष्टितोऽपि तत्सम्भवादिति कश्चित् ।

106. Also, there will be no *vyabhicāra* with regard to the past cooking when the *kṛtisādhyatā* is over, because that (past cooking) also is *kṛtisādhya* in a general way. And when th ‹ cooking is a past one there is no desire for the past 'cooked rice' and so there is no *iṣṭasādhanatva* in the past cooking.

107. On this very ground, a person whose body is heated by the heat of Summer does not go to have a dip in the river when it is raining or when he has a possibility of getting water from the clouds because he calculates the occurrence of the relation (of the body) with water which is the means of removing heat (from his body) which is desired by him, even without his own volitional effort and thus, since there is no probans (namely, *iṣṭasādhanatva*) there can be no knowledge of his *kṛtisādhyatva* (and so there is no inducement for going to have a dip into the river).

But when that person knows that without my volition it is not posible (for me to have the contact with water) he does make an attempt.

108. (Some section of Prābhākaras) : Some explain the above case as follows :

109. तन्न, तोयसम्बन्धत्वेन सन्तापशान्तिसाधनत्वं तस्य च सरोऽवगाहनेऽपि सत्त्वात् ।

अन्यथा वृष्टिरपि तत्साधनं न स्यात् सरोवगाहनादपि तत्सिद्धेः ।

110. कार्यसाधनत्वञ्च कृतिसाध्यत्वे न लिङ्गं पाकादिवदोदनादेरपि प्रवृत्तेः पूर्वं कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञाने हेत्वभावात् ।

111. नन्वेवं लिङ्गज्ञानमेव प्रवर्त्तकं अस्तु, प्राथमिकत्वात् आवश्यकत्वाच्च ।

112. न च लाघवात् कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानं तथा ।

कृतिसाध्यतानुमितौ तदा मानाभावेन युगपदुपस्थित्यभावात् प्रवृत्ति सामग्र्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धाच्चेति चेत् ।

One whose aim is mere removal of the heat (of the body by any means) does not know (specifically) the *iṣṭasādhanatva* in having a dip in the river because that (removal) is possible even from rains arising all of a sudden.

109. (Reply by Prābhākaras) : But that is not correct. Because the cause of removal of heat is as having the contact with water and that is present in taking a dip into the river also. And if this is not accepted as the cause then even the rains cannot be the means for that (removal of heat), because that can be achieved even from taking bath into the river.

110. (Objection by some Prābhākaras) : The state of being the means of desired goal cannot be the probans on the basis of which *kṛtisādhyatva* could be inferred, because like the action of cooking there is no ground to infer *kṛtisādhyatva* of eating rice etc. before the actual inducement.

111. (Objection by Naiyāyikas) : Well, then let the knowledge of probans (*iṣṭasādhanatvajñāna*) be the inducer, because it occurs first and also because it is necessary.

112. One cannot argue that let the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* be the inducer since it is simpler (in comparison to the

113. न, लिङ्गज्ञाने कृतिसाध्यत्वाप्रकाशे तत्प्रकारकचिकीर्षायां तस्याहेतुत्वात् ।

114. अत एव लिङ्गान्तरज्ञानमपि न प्रवर्तकम् ।

115. ननु पाकादिः कृतः क्रियमाणो वा न पक्षः, तस्य कृतिसाध्यत्वे बाधात्, नाप्यनागतः, भाविपाके मानाभावेनाश्रयसिद्धेः ।

116. पाकत्वं भविष्यद्वृत्ति सामान्यत्वात्, गोत्ववत् इति मानमिति चेत् ।

knowledge of probans), because there is no ground at that time to infer *kṛtisādhyatā* since simultaneous occurrence of both is not there. Moreover, since there is the factor which leads to inducement, it will prevent (the occurrence of) the inferential cognition (of *kṛtisādhyatā*).

113. **(Reply by Prābhākaras)**: It is not so. Because if in the knowledge of probans, *kṛtisādhyatā* does not appear then to a desire in which that (*kṛtisādhyatva*) appears as a qualifier that knowledge cannot be the cause.

114. This is why the knowledge of any other probans is also not the inducer.

115. **(Objection)** : Well, the action of cooking, either past or already begun, cannot be the subject of the above inference because it will be contradictory to the property of *kṛtisādhyatva*. Nor can the future action of cooking (be the subject) because there is proof for the future action of cooking and so the fault of locus-lessness (*āśrayāsiddhatva*) comes in.

116. (Reply) : (The following inference can be the proof for the future action of cooking) :

The state of being the action of cooking resides in the future ;

Because it is universal (since universal resides in present, past and future) ;

Like the universal cowness.

117. न, मानाभावन गोत्वेऽपि तस्याप्रसिद्धेः ।

118. पाकमात्रं पक्ष इति चेत् ।

119. न, भावार्थो यदि पाकत्वं तदा बाधो लिङ्गासिद्धिश्च ।

120. सर्वपाकपरत्वे च तस्य सिद्धभागे बाधोऽनागतभागे चाश्रयासिद्धिः ।

121. वर्तमानाद्युदासीनः पाकः पक्षः पाकसामान्ये च कृतिसाध्यत्वं न, सिद्धस्य पक्षत्व नासिद्धस्येत्यनुमितेः सिद्धविषयत्वे बाधात् भिन्नविषयत्वे वा सिद्धविषयेच्छाप्रवृत्त्याद्यनुत्पादकत्वाच्च ।

117. (Reply by Naiyāyikas) : It is not correct. Still there is no proof because there is no proof with regard to the future existence of cowness.

118. (Clarification) : Mere action of cooking (devoid of Present, Past and Future time) can be the subject (of inference).

119. (Reply by Naiyāyikas) : If the meaning of mereness is the state of being the action of cooking then again there will be contradiction (because *pākatva* cannot be *sādhya*) and also there will arise the contingency of the probans not being established (*liṅgāsiddhi*).

120. If cooking in general is treated as the subject, then there will arise the contradiction with regard to the *pāka* which is already accomplished and the fault of locuslessness with regard to the future *pāka*.

121. Nor can one argue that let *pāka* devoid of Present etc. (i.e. any *pāka*) be the subject and there is no contradiction to cooking in general (because some cooking can be *kṛtisādhya*).

Because only that can be a subject which is already established and not that which is not yet established. Therefore,

122. कृत-क्रियमाणसाधारणकृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञानादेवासिद्धविषया चिकीर्षाकृतिश्चोत्पद्यते, अनन्यगतिकत्वेन तथाकारणस्वभावकल्पनादिति चेत् ।

123. तर्हि यादृशं कृतिसाध्यत्वं चिकीर्षायां प्रकारः तादृशं ज्ञाने नास्तीत्यन्यप्रकारकज्ञानादेव चिकीर्षा स्यात् । तथा च लिङ्गज्ञानमेव प्रवृत्तिहेतुरस्तु प्राथमिकत्वात् ।

124. यत्तु स्मृतपाके कृतिसाध्यत्वासंसर्गाग्रहात्प्रवृत्तिः स चासंसर्गाग्रहः इष्टसाधनताग्रहादिति ।

with regard to the above inference if the subject is already established one then there is bound to be contradiction (with *kṛtisādhyatva*) or if Inference takes *pāka* different from already established one as its subject then such an inferential cognition cannot produce a desire of an established object and there after the volition with regard to an established object.

122. (Clarificatin) : From the very knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* in past and present cooking alike, there can arise the desire to do and volition with regard to an action (of cooking) which is not yet accomplished because there is no other go and so such nature of cause needs to be postulated.

123. (Reply) : Then, that type of *kṛtisādhyatva* which is the qualifier in the desire to do is not present in the knowledge and so there will arise the contingeney that the desire to do will arise from a knowledge in which the qualifier is different (from that in the desire to do). Thus, let the knowledge of probans (namely, *iṣṭasādhanatva* and at the same time *kṛtisādhyatva*) be the cause of inducement since that is understood at the first step.

124. (Some followers of Prābhākaras) : Some hold the following :

125. तन्न, स्मृतपाकस्य सिद्धत्वेन तच्च कार्यत्वासंसर्गग्रहेऽनुमान-बाधात् ।

126. स्मृतपाकस्य सिद्धत्वं तदा न गृह्यते इति चेत् ।

127. तर्हि स्मृतपाकस्य सिद्धत्वग्रहे ओदनार्थी पाके न प्रवर्तेत । सिद्धौदनोऽपि पाके, तृप्तोऽपि भोजने प्रवर्त्तेत ।

128. तत्र पाकादौ सिद्धत्वग्रहात्तदसंसर्गग्रह इति चेत्तुल्यम् ।

The inducement arises from the non-knowledge of the non-relation of *kṛtisādhyatva* in the remembered cooking and that non-knowledge of non-relation is due to the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva*.

125. (Reply by Naiyāyikas) : It is not correct. Because remembered action of cooking is already established (in the past) and so if there arises the knowledge of non-relation of *kṛtisādhyatva* in that *pāka*, then the inference will be obstructed

126. (Clarification) : If we say that at that time that the remembered action of cooking is already established is not known, then ?

127. (Reply by Naiyāyikas) : Then if it is known that the remembered action of cooking is already established a person who wants to have cooked rice will not go to undertake the action of cooking. (Not only that) a person who has already accomplished rice and who is satisfied after eating rice will go to accomplish the action of cooking and will go to eat rice again.

128. (Clarification) : There, in the action of cooking since there is knowledge that it is already accomplished and so there is no knowledge of non-relation of accomplishedness.

129. अपि च स्मृतपाके कार्यत्वासंसर्गाद्विद्यमानासंसर्गाग्रहाद्विसंवादिनी प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ।

130. किञ्चैवं सिद्धपाकज्ञानादज्ञातेऽसिद्धे पाके इच्छा-प्रवृत्ती स्यातामिति ।

131. अत्र ब्रूमः। पाके कृतिसाध्यत्वं सिद्धत् सिद्धे बाधात् अनागतपाकमादाय सिद्धयति ।

132. पक्षतावच्छेदकधर्मसामानाधिकरण्यं साध्यमानस्य लिङ्गेन सिद्धतीतिअनुमाने क्लृप्तत्वात् ।

129 (Reply) : It is all the same.

Moreover, in the remembered action of cooking, because the non-relation of *sādhyatva* there will be no knowledge of the existing non-relation and so there will be inducement with regard to that which is *kṛtisādhya.*

130. Moreover, after the knowledge of accomplished action of cooking there will arise the desire and volition with regard to the action of cooking which is not yet established and which is unknown. (Thus, the object of knowledge and that of desire and volition will be different which is contrary to the facts.)

131. (Final Reply by the Prābhākaras) : Here is our say :

Kṛtisādhyatva can be established in the action of cooking (in general) and it is contradictory with regard to already established action of cooking and so it is established by taking the future action of cookIng (which is yet to be established).

132. It is an already established fact that what is established in an inference by a probans is the colocation of what is to be established, with the property that delimits the state of being the subject in that inference.

133. यथाप्रसिद्धवह्निबाधेऽपि वह्निमात्रं न बाधितं इत्यप्रसिद्धोऽपि वह्निः सिध्यति तथा प्रसिद्धपाके कृतिसाध्यत्वबाधेऽपि पाकमात्रे न बाधितमित्यप्रसिद्धं पाकमादाय तत्सिध्यति, अप्रसिद्धयोः पक्षसाध्ययोः सिद्धावविशेषात् ।

134. तस्मात् असिद्धस्य क्वचित् सिद्धे सिद्धे सिद्धस्य च क्वचित् । अप्रसिद्धस्य चासिद्धे सिद्धिस्तेनानुमा त्रिधा ।

135. अन्यथा कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनतापक्षेऽपि पाकादौ कृतिसाध्यत्वं कथमवगम्येत ।

136. किञ्च तवापीष्टसाधनताज्ञानात् कथं वृष्टयादाविच्छा सिद्धत्वस्येच्छाविरोधित्वात् अनागतस्य ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात् ।

133. As in spite of the fact that already known fire (of the kitchen) is not present (on the mountain) fire in general is not absent there and so even unknown fire is established ; similarly, although, in the already known (*i.e.* remembered) *kṛtisādhyatva* is contradictory, it is not contradictory with the action of cooking in general and therefore, taking the unknown (*i.e.* future) action of cooking, that (*kṛtisādhyatva*) can be established. So far the arising of inferential cognition is concerned, the unknown subject and probandum behave alike.

134. Therefore, sometimes, unknown is inferred on/in the known ; sometimes already known is also inferred on/in known ; and (sometimes) unkown is also inferred on/in unknown (as in the present case *kṛtisādhyatva* is known in future *pāka*) and thus there are three types of inference.

135. Otherwise, even according to the doctrine that *kṛtisādhyatva* and *iṣṭasādhanatva* are the meanings of a *vidhi,* how can the *kṛtisādhyatva* be known in the action of cooking and the like ?

136. Moreover, even according to you, how can be desire in rains from the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva*, the property of being already accomplished and the desire are contradictory to each other, and the future rains can be known (at this moment).

137. अतएव सिद्धासिद्धविषयत्वनिरासेन सुखादिज्ञानात् फलेऽपि नेच्छेति न वृष्टयादाविष्टसाधनतापि ।

138. न च वृष्टयादिसाध्येष्टज्ञानात् वृष्टयादाविच्छा, इच्छायाः सिद्धासिद्धवृष्ट्यादितत्फलविषयत्वविकल्पग्रासात् ।

139. अथ सामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्या वृष्ट्यादित्वेन सुखादित्वेन च सिद्धासिद्धवृष्ट्यादि तत्फलविषयकं ज्ञानमुत्पन्नं, तेन सिद्धं विरोधिनं त्यक्त्वा असिद्धविषयेच्छोत्पद्यते ।

140. यदि च सामान्यलक्षणा नास्ति तदा येन रूपेणेष्टसाधनत्वग्रहः तेन रूपेण ज्ञाते सिद्धे वेच्छोत्पद्यते ।

137. This is the reason that there is not even the *iṣṭasādhanatva* in rains because there can be no desire with regard to the result even from the knowledge of pleasure because it is already refuted that a desire can have neither something already established as its object nor unestablished one.

138. One cannot argue that there can be the desire of rains from the knowledge of (crops etc.) which is *iṣṭa* and which is accomplished by rains, because the desire suffers from the alternate objections namely, if the already established rains are the objects of the desire there can be no desire with regard to already established thing and if unestablished *i.e.* future rains are the objects of desire there can be no desire with regard to unknown thing.

139. (Objection by Naiyāyikas) : Well, by the supernatural contact called *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* the knowledge of both established and unestablished rains and there result arises as rains and as happiness and by that leaving aside the contradictory established rains and happiness, the desire of unestablished object can arise.

140. If there is no supernatural contact called *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* (according to you) then in whatever form *iṣṭasādhanatva* is known in the same form whatever is known one can have desire of that.

141. अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तादृशज्ञानस्य तादृशेच्छाजनकत्वावधारणात् सुखेच्छायामप्येव इति चेत् ।

142. तर्हि ममापि पाकत्वावच्छेदेन कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानादनागते चिकीर्षा तच्च ज्ञानं सकलपाकविषयं सन्निकृष्टपाकविषयं वेत्यन्यदेतत् ।

143. बालस्य व्याप्त्याद्यग्रहेणाद्या प्रवृत्तिर्जीवनादृष्टोद्बोधितजन्मान्तरसंस्कारजन्यात् स्तनपानं कार्य्यमिति स्मरणात् ।

144. तवापीष्टसाधनतास्मरणात् तत्र प्रवृत्तिः अनन्यगतिकत्वात् ।

141. Because that such a knowledeg is the cause of desire is ascertained on account of positive and negative reasoning (*anvayavyatireka*). And so the same is the case with regard to the desire of pleasure.

142. (Reply by Prābhākara): Then for me also *kṛtisādhyatva* is known in the action of cooking as the action of cooking and so there can be the desire to do with regard to the future *pāka* and whether that knowledge is of all actions of cooking or of the action of cooking which is very close to the person is a different question.

143. A child has no knowledge of pervasion (between *pravṛtti* and *kṛtisādhyatva*) and so the child's first attempt to suck milk from mother's breast is due to the remembrance, 'sucking the milk from mother's breast is feasible on my part' and this remembrance is caused by the impression acquired in the earlier birth which is stimulated by *jīvanādṛṣṭa*.

144. According to your doctrine also the inducement of the child will be due to the remembrance of the *iṣṭasādhanatā*, since there is no other go.

145. न च जन्मान्तरेऽपि पर्य्यनुयोगः। जन्मधारायाः अनादित्वात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानमूलकत्वाच्च नान्धपरम्परा।

146. वस्तुतस्तु शुष्ककण्ठतया बालो दुःखमनुभवन् विरोधितया सुखं स्मरति, ततः सुखत्वज्ञानात् सुखवृत्तिकार्यत्वं सुखवृत्तितया, अन्तरङ्गत्वात् न तु स्तनपानमिष्टसाधनमिति स्मरणं, सुखावृत्तित्वेन बहिरङ्गत्वात्।

147. सुखकार्यत्वञ्च स्तनपानद्वारा जन्मान्तरानुभूतमिति कार्यत्वस्मरणे स्तनपानमपि विषयः। तेन स्तनपाने कार्यत्वज्ञानादेव प्रवृत्तिः, इष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्य तदानीं सामग्र्यभावात्।

145. One need not put the same objection with regard to the first attempt of the child in the earlier birth also, because the chain of births has no beginning and since such a remembrance is based upon perception and inference there is no question of blind following.

146. Really speaking, the child feels uneasiness because of his dry throat and so he remembers happiness as antonym of uphappiness. And from that knowledge of happiness the child remembers *kṛtisādhyatva* in the happiness as existing in the happiness because it is inside, but he does not remember *iṣṭasādhanatva* in sucking milk from the breasts because that is outside since that does not exist in happiness.

147 The *kṛtisādhyatva* in the happiness was already experienced in earlier birth through sucking milk from the breasts and so in the remembrance of *kṛtisādhyatva* the sucking of milk from the breasts is also object and thus from the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* alone the inducement arises to the act of sucking the breast (for a child), because the factors which will generate the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* are not present there.

148. एवञ्चाद्यप्रवृत्तौ कार्यत्वज्ञानं प्रयाजकं क्लृप्तमित्यग्रेऽपि तदेव प्रवर्तकं क्लृप्तत्वात् ।

149. नवीनास्तु समेदं कृतिसाध्यमिति ज्ञान न प्रवर्तकं अनागतविषये प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरसम्भवात्, किन्तु यादृशस्य पुरुषस्य कृतिसाध्य यद्दृष्टं तादृशात्वमात्मनः प्रतिसन्धाय तत्र प्रवर्तते, तथा ह्योदनकामस्य तत्साधनताज्ञानवतश्च तण्डुलाद्युपकरणवतः पाकः कृतिसाध्यः अहमपि च तादृश इति ज्ञानात् पाके प्रवर्तते ।

150. एवञ्चान्यकृतपाके कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं आत्मनः पाके कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रयोजकविशेषणवत्त्वज्ञानञ्च प्रवर्त्तकं ।

148. Thus, with regard to the first inducement (of a child) since the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* is thus established as a cause, let the same be the cause of inducement even afterwards since it is already established as the cause.

149. The latter Prābhākars hold that the knowledge 'this is feasible to be accomplished by me' is not the cause of inducement since neither perception nor inference can operate to generate the knowledge of the future action. But when a man observes some other man performing an action, the observer considers himself similar to that performer and having remembered that he goes to perform that action.

Thus, (when one observes that) someone who desires the cooked rice and has the knowledge of *insṭasādhanatā* in the action of cooking and who has all the factors necessary for that namely, rice etc. accomplishes that action of cooking (the observer recollects that) I am also like that man and from this knowledge he goes to perform the action of cooking.

150. Thus, the knowledge of *kṛtisadhyatva* in the action of cooking performed by others and the knowledge of the qualifier (namely, the desire for the cooked rice) which is the cause of *kṛtisādhyatva* in his own action of cooking are the cause of inducement (of a man in action).

151. अन्यत्रापि प्रवृत्तिरेवमेवेत्यनादिवत्तैव ।

152. अत एव सञ्जातबाधश्चैत्यवन्दने विषभक्षणे च न प्रवर्त्तते इष्टसाधनता ज्ञानवतो हि तत्कृतिसाध्यम् । न च सञ्जातबाधस्तत्र इष्टसाधनताज्ञानवान् ।

153. एवं तृप्तीच्छावतोऽपि भोजनं कृतिसाध्यं तृप्तश्च न तृप्तीच्छावत्त्वमात्मन्यवर्तीति न भोजने प्रवर्तते ।

154. अतिनवीनास्तु यादृशस्येत्यादौ अविगीतत्व तत्कृतौ विशेषणमाहुः । सञ्जातबाधस्तु विषभक्षणं चैत्यवन्दनञ्च विगीतकृतिसाध्यत्वेनैव जानातीति तत्र न प्रवर्तते ।

151. Elsewhere also there can be inducement in the same manner and it has no beginning as such.

152. This is the reason why a person who knows that performance of particular action would lead to adverse situation does not go to worship *Caitya* or to take poison. Because that (action of worship or taking poison) is feasible to be accomplished only by one who has knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* (in that action). It is not a fact that the person who has the knowledge of adverse effect has knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* in those actions (of worshipping caitya, and taking poison).

153. Similarly, for one who has desire to accomplish satisfaction will go to accomplish the action of eating ; whereas an already satisfied man will not go to eat because he does not feel any desire to accomplish satisfaction (from eating).

154. Still latter Prābhākaras hold that the qualifier 'not being an object of condemnation' is to be added to the *kṛti* in *kṛtisādhya* in the above theory (of the later Prābhākaras).

155. प्रवृत्तिविषयश्च सामान्यतः कालासम्भिन्नः पाकादिर्ज्ञायते, प्रवृत्तिमहिम्ना चानागतपाकसिद्धिः, चिकीर्षा च कालासम्भिन्नविषया न तु भाविनं कृत्या साधयामीत्याकारेवेति ।

156. इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ शब्दाख्यतुरीयखण्डे विधिवादपूर्वपक्षः ।।

विधिवादसिद्धान्त :

157. अत्रोच्यते । विषभक्षणादिव्यावृत्तं कृतिसाध्यत्वज्ञाने इष्टसाधनत्वं विषयतावच्छेदकं लाघवात्, न तु स्वविशेषणवत्ताप्रतिसन्धानजन्यत्वं गौरवात् ।

The person who has the knowledge that the eating of poison and the worship of Caitya will lead to adverse consequences know that taking of poison and worship of Caitya can be accomplished by volition which is condemned and so he will not be induced to perform those actions.

155. The object of volition is, however, the action of cooking generally unassociated with time and on the ground of the inducement that action is established as the future action of cooking. Similarly, the desire to do arises with reference to the object not associated with time and not with reference to future object such as 'let me accomplish the future (action) by my volition'.

156. Here ends the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the *Vidhivādaḥ*.

157. (Final Reply by the Naiyāyikas) : The following is our answer :

After the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* arises, the *iṣṭasādhanatva* excluded from the eating of poison and the like is to be treated as the delimitor (of Kāraṇatā) as the object (of the knowledge) since it is simple; but not the state of being produced by the knowledge of being possessed of the qualifier (namely, the desire of the result) because it will be cumbersome.

158. न च सिद्धासिद्धावस्थयोः साध्यत्व-साधनत्वयोर्विरोधः, निर्विशेषितयोस्तयोरविरोधात् ।

159. पाकोऽसिद्धः साध्यः सिद्धः साधनञ्चेत्यनुभवात् ।

160. तदा साध्यत्वं हि तदा साधनत्वस्य विरोधि, नियमतस्तेनैव तस्य प्रतिक्षेपेण सहानवस्थाननियमात् न तु साधनत्वस्यान्यदा साधनत्वस्य वा तयोरप्रतिक्षेपात् ।

161. अन्यदा साधनत्वेऽपि साधनत्वमस्त्येव सामान्याभावे विशेषाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।

158. One cannot argue that there will be contradiction of the two properties namely, 'the state of being accomplished' and 'the state of being the instrument' which are at the stage of being accomplished and already accomplished respectively, because those two properties are not qualified by a single time and so there is no contradiction between them.

159. It is one experience that when the action of cooking is not yet accomplished it is 'to be accomplished' and when it is already accomplished it becomes the instrument of some results.

160. Because, it is regularly the case that when there is *sādhyatva* it is contradictory to *sādhanatva* of the same time, because the *sādhyatva* sets aside the *sādhanatva* and it is a regular case of non-collocation type of contradiction. But the *sādhyatva* does not set aside *sādhanatva* in general or the *sādhanatva* of another time because these are not capable of being set aside by it.

161. Even in the *sādhanatva* of a different time, the *sādhanatva* does exist. (If *sādhanatva* in general is denied in that) there will arise the contingency that there will be absence of particular in the absence of general.

162. एवन्तदा असिद्धत्वस्य तदा सिद्धत्वं विरोधि नियमतस्तस्यैव प्रतिक्षेपात्, न तु सिद्धत्वमात्रं, अन्यदापि तत्र सिद्धत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।

163. निर्विशेषितयार्विरोधे च सिद्धत्वासिद्धत्वयोश्चान्यतरदेव पाकादौ स्यान्न तु समयभेदेप्युभयम् ।

164. न च तदा कृतिसाध्यत्वे सति तदेष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानं प्रवर्तकं ।

165. अत एव वाजपेयेन यजेतेत्यत्र यागस्य करणावस्थायां सिद्धत्वेन न वाजपेयस्य साध्यता एकदा तयोर्विरोधादिति कर्मनामधेयत्वं, न तु करणस्य सिद्धत्वेन साध्यत्वविरोधः यागस्वरूपे तयोः सत्त्वात् ।

162. Thus, the *Siddhatva*—property of a particular time is invariably contradictory to the *asiddhatva*—property of that very particular time, because that (*siddhatva*) is set aside (by the *asiddhatva* of the same time), but not the *siddhatva* in general (is set aside by that) because there will arise the contingency of the absence of *Siddhatva*.

163. And if a contradiction is accepted between the properties of *siddhatva* and *asiddhatva* even if these are unqualified by time then in the action of cooking either these will be *siddhatva* (all the time) or *asiddhatva* (all the time) and never both even at different times.

164. Nor can one argue that when some action is feasible to be performed at that very time the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the cause of inducement.

165. This is the reason that in the case of 'one should perform the *Vājapeya* sacrifice (if he desires kingdom).' When Vājapeya is an instrument it is already established or accomplished and so it can not be *sādhya* because at one and the same time both are contradictory to each other and thus the word Vājapeya is treated as the proper name for the sacrifice. There is no question of *sādhyatva*—character of *yāga* being contradicted with *siddhatva*—character of the instrument because these two characters reside only in the bare form of the sacrifice (without being qualified by time).

166. अथ विरुद्धयोरवच्छेदभेदमादाय एकत्र प्रतीतिः स्यात् । न च कृतिसाध्यत्वेष्टसाधनत्वयोः समयभेदमादायैकत्र प्रतीतिरस्ति, तथा लिङ्गाभावादिति चेत् ।

167. न, साध्यत्वसाधनत्वयोरविरोधस्योक्तत्वात्,

एवं सिद्धत्वासिद्धत्वयोर्भावाभावरूपत्वेऽपि न विरोधः एकधर्मिगतत्वेन मानसिद्धत्वात् ।

168. तस्मात् संयोग-तदभावयोरिव येन प्रकारेण ययोर्विरोधः तेन तयोरेकधर्मिगतत्वं न प्रतीयते, न तु रूपान्तरेणापीति ।

166. (*Objection* : *Prābhākaras*)

Well, there can be the knowledge of two contradictory properties in one place by taking in to account different delimitors. (But) it is not the case that the *kṛtisādhyatva* and *iṣṭasādhanatva* are known at one place by the different delimitors since there is no such ground to that effect.

167. (*Reply : Naiyāytkas*)

No, it is not true. Because it has been already said that there is no conflict between the two properties namely, *sādhyatva* and *sādhanatva* (in *pāka*).

Thus, even if it is true that *siddhatva* and *asiddhatva* are of the nature of positive and negative entities respectively, there is no conflict because they can exist in one substratum and it is established by proof.

168. Therefore, as in the case of the contact of (monkey on the tree) and the absence of contact (of monkey on the tree) the two things (contact and its absence) conflict in whatever form (namely as contact and absence of it) in that form those two things are not known in one locus.

But if those are known in different forms (namely, as contact delimited by the top of the tree and as the absence of contact delimited by the base of the tree, there is no conflict as such).

169. अपि च यदि साध्यत्व-साधनत्वयोर्विरोधस्तदा तवापीष्ट-साधनत्वेन कार्यसाधनत्वेन वा कार्यत्वं नानुमीयेत हेतु-साध्ययोर्विरोधेन सामानाधिकरण्याभावेन व्याप्त्यसिद्धेः पक्षे साध्य-साधनयोरन्यतरसत्त्वे बाधासिद्धोरन्यतरप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

170. न च वाच्यमिदानीं मत्कृतिसाध्यमिति व्याप्तिः, तथा च समय भेदमादाय साध्यत्व-साधनत्वयोरवगम इति,

इदानीमग्रिमपदार्थयोर्नानात्वादनुगतरूपाभावेन व्याप्तेरग्रहात् ।

169. Moreover, if there is conflict between *sādhyatva* and *sādhanatva* then you too cannot infer *kṛtisādhyatva* either on the basis of *iṣṭasādhanatva* or on the basis of *kāryasādhanatva* because there will be conflict between probans and probandum and so there can be no colocation of the two and thereby there will be no invariable concommitance.

And if there is either probans only or probandum only in the subject it will be a case of the fallacy called *bādha*, and *asiddha*.

170. Nor can it be argued that in that inference the probandum is 'the state of being accomplished by me now' and the probans would be 'the state of being the means of my desired goal at a later time' and the *Vyāpti* would be : whatever is the means of my desired goal at a later time and which does not occur by chance is what is to be accomplished by me now.

Thus, the property of *sādhyatva* and *sādhanatva* are known at two different times.

(All these cannot be argued) because the entities 'now' and 'later on' are different ones and there is no property which can unite them and so it is impossible to have the knowledge of *Vyāpti*.

171. पाकन्यायेनान्यत्रापि तत्तत्समयान्तर्भावेन साध्यत्व-साधनत्वयोरप्रतीतिः, प्रतीतौ वा ममापीदानीं कृतिसाध्यत्वे सत्यग्रे इष्टसाधनमिति ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकमस्तु।

172. न च पाके साध्येष्टकत्वेन कृतिसाध्यत्वमनुमेयं, असिद्धावस्थावतो हि पाकादिष्टानुत्पत्तेः पाकस्य सिद्धत्वमवगम्य तत्साध्यत्वमिष्टस्यावमन्तव्यमसिद्धत्वञ्चावगम्य कृतिसाध्यत्वमिति सिद्धत्वासिद्धत्वयोर्विरोधोऽत्रापि दुर्वारः।

173. अपि च स्वविशेषणधीजन्यकार्यताज्ञानाभावात् सुखे कथं चिकीर्षा

171. As in the case of the action of cooking so also elsewhere (*i.e.* in other actions too) *sādhyatva* and *sādhanatva* are not understood by introducing difference of time. Or, even if it is accepted that they are understood then for me too let "the knowledge of future *iṣṭasādhanatva* at the same time being *kṛtisādhya* at this moment" be the cause of inducement.

172. Nor can one argue that *kṛtisādhyatva* could be inferred by the property *sādhyeṣṭakatva* existing in *pāka*, because the desired object (here, *odana*) is not produced from the *pāka* which is not in the accomplished state. After having understood (first) that *pāka* is already accomplished then one should understand that the desired thing (*odana*) is to be accomplished by that (*pāka*) and after having understood that *pāka* is not yet accomplished one should understand that it is to be accomplished by one's volitional effort—and as such even here it is difficult to avoid the contradiction between the state of being accomplishable and that of being already accomplished.

173. Moreover, in the absence of the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* produced by the knowledge which qualifies the performer as the knowledge of the desired object how can then be any desire to do with reference to pleasure ?

174. न हि कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानमात्रात् सा, सञ्जातबाधस्य विष-भक्षणादौ चिकीर्षाप्रसङ्गात् ।

175. अथोपायचिकीर्षायां तत्कारण इच्छाकारणसुखत्वज्ञाने कृतिसाध्यत्वं यदा विषयस्तदा सुखे चिकीर्षा नो चेदिच्छामात्रमिति द्वयमेव चिकीर्षाहेतुरिति चेत् ।

176. तर्हीच्छाहेतुज्ञाने यदा कृतिसाध्यत्वं भासते तदा चिकीर्षा नो चेदिच्छामात्रमित्येव सुख-तदुपायचिकीर्षाकारणमस्तु लाघवात्, सुखत्वज्ञानवदिष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्यापीच्छाकारणत्वात् ।

174. It is not true that from the mere knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* that (desire to do) arises. If it is taken to be true there will arise the desire to perform 'the act of consuming poison for one who already knows that it is going to lead to adverse result.

175. (Clarification) : Well, that (knowledge of *ṭiṣasādhanata* in which *Kṛtisādhyatā* is the object) is the cause of the desire to perform the means (of the desired object). When *Kṛtisādhyatva* is the object of the knowledge of pleasure which is the cause of desire then there will be the desire to accomplish pleasure. Otherwise mere desire will be the cause and so the causes of the desire to do are only two.

176. (Reply) : Then, when *krtisādhyatva* appears in the knowledge which produces desire then there will be desire to do; otherwise mere desire will be the cause—let this be the cause of desire to accomplish pleasure and its means both since it is simpler. Because as the knowledge of pleasure is the cause of desire similarly the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* also can be the cause of desire.

177. अत एव पाके इष्टसाधनताज्ञाने कृतिसाध्यत्वं विषय इति तत्र चिकीर्षा, न तु वृष्टयादिज्ञाने तद्विषयत्वमितीच्छामात्रं, सुखचिकीर्षायामिच्छाकारणज्ञाने कृतिसाध्यताविषयके चिकीर्षाजनकत्वावधारणात्। अन्यथा तत्र चिकीर्षानुत्पत्तेः।

178. वस्तुतस्तूपायचिकीर्षा इष्टसाधनताज्ञानसाध्या उपायेच्छात्वात् वृष्टीच्छावत्।

179. न च भोगचिकीर्षावत्तेन विनापि स्यादित्यप्रयोजकत्वं, उपायेच्छायास्तदन्वय-व्यतिरेकानुविधानात्, वृष्टेश्च स्वतोऽसुन्दरत्वेनेच्छानुत्पत्तेः अनुगतोपायेच्छायां अनुगतस्य प्रयोजकत्वे सम्भवति बाधकं विना त्यागायोगाच्च।

177. This is why since *kṛtisādhyatva* is the object in the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* with reference to *pāka* the desire to do arises. But in the knowledge of rains etc. the *kṛtisādhyatva* is not the object and so mere desire will be there. When there is desire to accomplish happiness the state of being the cause of desire to do ascertained in the knowledge which is the cause of desire and which has *kṛtisādhyatva* as its object. Otherwise the desire to do cannot arise.

178. As a matter of fact, the desire to accomplish the means (of desired object) is produced by the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva,* because it is the desire of the means like the desire of rains.

179. It cannot be argued that (the desire to accomplish the means) can arise even without that (knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā*) like the desire to accomplish the pleasure and so it cannot be a cause. Because the desire to fetch the means does stand the test of *anvaya-vyatireka* with the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva.*

Moreover, the rains by nature are not pleasure and so the desire for it cannot arise. And when for a common desire for the means there is a common uniting factor it is not proper to give it up unless there any difficulty to do so.

180. न च चिकीर्षान्यत्वे सति उपायेच्छात्वं इच्छात्वं वा तज्जन्यत्वे प्रयोजकं, गौरवात् सुखेच्छायां तदभावाच्च ।

181. एवञ्चोपायचिकीर्षायामिष्टसाधनत्वज्ञाने ध्रुवेऽतिप्रसङ्गवारणार्थं, कृतिसाध्यत्वनिर्वाहार्थञ्च कृतिसाध्यत्वमपि विषयतावच्छेदकमस्तु न तु तद्विहाय तन्मात्रं क्लृप्तकारणं विना कार्यानुपपत्तेः ।

182. अत एव स्तनपानप्रवृत्तावप्युपायेच्छाकारणत्वेन गृहीतस्येष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानस्यापि कल्पनं दृष्टानुरोधित्वात् कल्पनायाः ।

180. It is not the case that the state of being the desire of means at the same time being different from the desire to accomplish or (simply), the state of being a desire is the prompting factor with regard to the state of being produced by the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā*. Because it would be cumber some and also because (this factor) is absent in the desire of pleasure.

181. Thus, when it is definite that the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the cause of the desire to fetch the means, let the *kṛtisādhyatva* too be the delimitor (of *kāraṇatā*) as the object (of knowledge) in order to remove the contingency of causal relationship being too wide (in the cases like arising of the desire to fetch rains etc.) and also to account for the *kṛtisādhyatva*. But let mere *iṣṭasādhanatva* excepting *kṛtisādhyatva* not be the delimitor. Because an effect is not produced without an already established cause.

182. This is the reason why the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* is postulated because it is ascertained as the cause of the desire to accomplish the means with regard to the inducement to sucking the breast (in case of the newly born baby). Because a postulation is made on the basis of an established cause-and-effect relationship.

183. ननु साधनत्वमिच्छाविरोधि तस्य सिद्धधर्मत्वात् वृष्टयादौ तत्साध्येष्टज्ञानादिच्छेति चेत्।

184. न, निर्विशेषितयोः सिद्धत्वासिद्धत्वयोरविरोधेनेच्छासाधनत्वयोरविरोधात्।

तदाऽसिद्धत्वं तदा सिद्धत्वं च नेच्छासाधनत्वयोः प्रयोजकमिति तथा न ज्ञायत एव।

185. यत्तु तत्साध्येष्टज्ञानाद्वृष्टयादाविच्छेति।

तत्तुच्छं, असिद्धावस्थाद्वृष्टयादेरिष्टानुत्पत्तेस्तस्यावश्यं सिद्धत्वमवगन्तव्यमिच्छानुरोधित्वाच्चासिद्धत्वमिति।

तत्रापि विरोध एव। वृष्टौ सत्यामिष्टं तया विना नेत्वन्वय-व्यतिरेकग्रहस्य वृष्टिसिद्धित्वमादाय दृष्टिनिरूपितेष्टसाध्यकत्वग्रहात्।

183. (Objection) : Well, the state of being an instrument is against the desire because that is a property of an already established thing. The desire for rains etc. is due to the

ı esired object to be accomplished by that.

184. (Reply) : No. There is no contradiction between unqualified *siddhatva* and *asiddhatva* and so there is no contradiction between *sādhanatva* and desire. The state of being not established at a particular time and the state of being established at a particular time are not the cause of desire and the knowledge of *sādhanatva* and therefore, in that form it is not at all known.

185. The argument that a desire of rains can arise due to the knowledge of the desired object to be accomplished by that (rains) is insignificant. Because from unestablished rains etc. the desired object cannot arise and so that rains etc. have to be unestablished ones and taking desire in account that rains etc. have to be unestablished ones and thus there to the contradiction remains in tact. If there are rains there will be the desired

186. किञ्च चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यं मण्डलीकरणमित्यर्थप्रतिपादकं 'मण्डली कुर्यादिति वाक्यं प्रमाणं स्यात्' – विषयाबाधात् ।

187. एतेन नवीनमतमप्यपास्तम्,

परस्य हि कृतिसाध्यत्वौदनकामनावत्त्वेष्ट साधनताज्ञानानां ज्ञानं तथा आत्मन ओदनकामनावत्त्वेष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्य ज्ञानं न प्रवृत्तिकारणं गौरवात्, किन्तु मत्कृतिसाध्यत्वे सति मदिष्टसाधनताज्ञानमेव लाघवात् ।

188. यथा च साध्यत्व-साधनत्वयोरविरोधः अनागतस्य पाकादेः कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानञ्च तयोपपादितमेव ।

object and without that there will be none—this knowledge of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* causes the knowledge that the desired object described by the rains is the *sādhya* of the rains taking in to account the property of established rains.

186. Moreover, there will arise the contingency of treating the sentence 'one should make a circle on the ground' as an authoritative injunction which means the act of drawing a circle is feasible by the volitional effort produced by the desire to do. Because *kṛtisādhyatva* is intact there.

187. By this argument the neo- (Prābhākara's) view is also refuted. (According to them) the knowledge of others knowledges of *kṛtisādhyatva*, possessing the desire of *odana* and *iṣṭsādhyatva* is the cause of inducement. The knowledge of one's own knowledges of possessing the desire of *odana* and *iṣṭasādhanatā* is not the cause of inducement, since it will be cumbersome, but mere knowledge of one's own *kṛtisādhyatva* and one's own *iṣṭasādhanatva* (is the cause of inducement) since it is simpler.

188. It has been already shown before how there is no contradiction between *sādhyatva* and *sādhanatva* and also how there can be the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* of future action of cooking.

189. किञ्च परकृतिसाध्यत्वमज्ञात्वापि स्वकृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनताज्ञानात् स्वकल्पितलिप्यादौ यौवने कामोद्रेकात् सम्भोगादौ प्रवृत्तेश्च तदेव प्रवर्तकम ।

190. वस्तुतस्तु सिद्धविषयककृतिसाध्यताज्ञानात् कथं कृत्या साधयामीतीच्छा सिद्धे इच्छाविरहात् असिद्धस्याज्ञानात् ।

191. अथ सिद्धविषयादेव कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानात् असिद्धविषया कृतिसाध्यत्वेनेच्छा जायते इच्छाया असिद्धविषयत्वस्वभावत्वादेकप्रकारकत्वेन ज्ञान-चिकीर्षयोः कार्यकारणभावो न त्वेकविषयत्वे सति गौरवात्

इच्छाया अनागतविषयत्वात् तस्य चाज्ञानात् तथात्वदर्शनात् सुखादीच्छायामप्येवमिति चेत् ।

189. Moreover, even without knowing other's *kṛtisādhyatva* from one's own knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* and *iṣṭasādhanatva*, the inducement is seen towards a symbol coined by oneself and towards sexual act due to sexual feeling in the youth and so that alone can be the inducer.

190. Really speaking, from the knowledge of feasibility by a volitional effort in which an already established thing is the object how can there be any desire like 'let me accomplish (it) by volitional effort because there cannot be any desire with regard to something which is already accomplished and if that something is not yet accomplished how can then be knowledge of it ?

191. Clarification : Well, the desire to accomplish by volition can arise with regard to something which is not yet accomplished from the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* in which the thing to be accomplished is already established. Because a desire has the nature of having something as its object which is not yet accomplished. The cause and effect

192. न, असिद्धविषयेच्छानुरोधेनानागतज्ञानोपायस्य दर्शितत्वात्।

193. अस्तु चैवं, तथापि कृतिसाध्यताज्ञाने इष्टसाधनत्वमेव व्यावर्तकमस्तु स्व-परकीयेष्टसाधनताज्ञान-फलकामनाज्ञानापेक्षया लघुत्वात् इष्टसाधनताज्ञानज्ञानस्य फलकामनाज्ञानस्य च हेतुत्वे मानाभावाच्च।

194. नव्यास्तु स्वकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानमेव प्रवर्तकं तेन स्वकृत्यसाध्ये वृष्टयादौ कारीर्य्याञ्च कृषीबलस्य न प्रवृत्तिः।

relationship between knowledge and the desire to do is governed by the fact that both should have the same qualifier and not by the fact that both should have one and the same object since that will lead to cumbersomeness. A desire has a future object and that future object is not yet known and therefore, it is observed like that and likewise the same will be the position in the case of desire of pleasure etc.

192. No. It has been already shown how the knowledge of a future thing can be had in accordance with the desire of an unaccomplished thing.

193. Or, let that be as you say ; even then let the *iṣṭasādhanatva* be the qualifier in the other's knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* because in comparison to the knowledge of the other's and own knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* and the desire of the result it is simpler and also because there is no proof that the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* and the knowledge of the desire of result are the cause (of inducement).

194. The neo-Prābhākaras hold that it is indeed the knowledge of one's own *kṛtisādhyatva* which induces a person and for this reason no inducement of a farmer is seen with regard to accomplishing rains etc. and to the performance of *kārīriṣṭi*, which is not possible to be undertaken by him.

195. न च सञ्जातबाधस्य विषभक्षणे प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, स्वकृति-साध्यताज्ञानविषये इष्टत्वस्य स्वरूपसतः प्रवृत्तौ सहकारित्वात् ।

196. न च सञ्जातबाधस्य विषभक्षणादाविच्छास्ति, इष्टसाधन-त्वेनाज्ञानात,

197. अतीतभोजनेऽप्यत एव न प्रवर्तते, तृप्तेः सिद्धतया इच्छा-विरहेण भोजने तदुपाधिकेष्टत्वाभावादतीततृप्ताविच्छानास्तीति तत्सा-धनेऽपीष्टत्वा भावादेव न प्रवृत्तिः ।

198. न चैवं पाके न प्रवर्त्तेत, तस्य स्वरसतःइष्टत्वाभावादिति वाच्यं, इष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानेन तस्यापीष्टत्वात् ।

195. One cannot argue that there will arise the contingency of going to take poison for a person who knows that it is dangerous to him. Because in the object of the knowledge of one's own *kṛtisādhyatā*, the state of being the desired object (*iṣṭatva*) exists in its own form and as such it acts as an auxiliary cause for the inducement.

196. The person who knows that it is dangerous, he will have no desire for the taking of poison, because he does not know it as the means of his desired object (*i.e.* satisfaction).

197. For the same reason a person whose hunger is already satisfied does not go for the past eating because the satisfaction has already taken place and so there is no desire (for it) and therefore, there is no *iṣṭatva* described in terms of the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* in eating ; there is no desire for the past satisfaction and therefore, there can be no inducement to the past eating which is the means (of satisfaction) since there is no *iṣṭatva* (from this point of view).

198. Nor can it be argued that there will be no inducement in that case, to the action of cooking since that (action of cooking) is by nature devoid of *iṣṭatva* (since it is troublesome). Because that (action of cooking) is known as the means of one's desired object and so that is also *iṣṭa*.

199. हन्तैवं प्राथमिकत्वादिष्टत्वायमवश्यापेक्षणीयत्वाच्च कृति-साध्यत्वे सतीष्टसाधनताज्ञानमेव चिकीर्षाकारणमस्तु इति चेत्।

200. न, इष्टसाधनत्वाभावेऽपि भोगे चिकीर्षासत्त्वात् तस्यां स्वकृतिसाध्यज्ञाने सतीष्टत्वमेव कारणं न त्विष्टसाधनत्वं व्यभि-चारात्।

201. पाकादौ तदन्वय-व्यतिरेकावपीष्टत्वोपक्षीणौ।

एवं भोगेऽपि प्रवर्तेतेति चेत्।

202. न इष्टसाधनतापक्षेऽपि मुक्तिरूपेष्टसाधने सुखे प्रवर्त्तेतेति तुल्यं।

199. (Naiyāyikas) : Good god ! If it is so then let the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* and *kṛtisādhyatva* be the cause of the desire to do because it appears first before a person and also because it is required for the sake of (establishing the existence of) *iṣṭatva.*

200. (Reply : Prābhākaras) : No. In spite of the absence of *iṣṭasādhanatva* in pleasure, there is desire to accomplish it, and so with regard to that desire to do the knowledge of one's own *kṛtisādhyatva* together with the *iṣṭatva* is the cause and not the *iṣṭasādhanatva* because it will lead to inconsistency.

201. (Naiyāyikas) : In the case of the action of cooking etc. the logic of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* is exhausted with the *iṣṭatva* and so for the inducement if the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* is not required then one may be induced to (do) pleasure also.

202. (Reply : Prābhākaras) : No. Even according to the doctrine of *iṣṭasādhanatva* one may be induced (to do) happiness which is the means of pleasure. And so the same contingency can be raised against your view also.

203. सुखे चिकीर्षा भवत्येव कृतिस्तु न भवति कृतेः सिद्धवृत्यसिद्ध-क्रियाविषयत्वनियमादिति चेत् ।

204. तुल्यम् ।

तस्मात् स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वं विधिरिष्टत्वं सहकारीति ।

205. मैवं, इष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्योपायेच्छायां हेतुत्वावधारणात् तस्यासतज्जन्यत्वनियमादिच्छायाः स्वविषयेच्छानुत्पादकत्वनियमाच्च।

206. ननु सिद्धौदनः कुतः पाकेनप्रवर्तते ।

203. (Naiyāyikas) : Indeed then arises the desire to accomplish happiness but no volition arises them because it is always the case that a volition requires an unaccomplished action in an accomplished thing.

204. (Reply : Prābhākaras) : The same is true for us also. Therefore, the meaning of the optative suffix is 'one's own *kṛtisādhyatva*" and *iṣṭatva* is the auxiliary cause (of inducement).

205. (Naiyāyikas) : All this is not correct. Because it is ascertained that the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the cause of the desire for the means (of desired object) and it is always the case that the desire to do is produced by the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* and it is also a consistently observed that a desire does not produce another desire in which the object is the same (as that of the first desire).

206. (Objection : Prābhākaras) : Well, why is it the case that one who has already accomplished cooked rice does not go to cook again ?

207. ओदनमात्रस्य सिद्धत्वेनेष्टत्वाभावात् ।

अत एवातीतभोजनादौ न प्रवर्तते अतीततृष्णादौ (तृप्त्यादौ) इच्छाविरहात् ।

208. ननु सामुद्रिकविदाख्याते भावियौवराज्ये भोगसाधने स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वे सतीष्टसाधनत्वज्ञानात् कुतो न प्रवर्तते ।

209. भाविराज्यस्यासिद्धत्वात् प्रवृत्तेः सिद्धविषयत्वनियमात् राज्योपायापरिचयाच्च । तत्परिचये च प्रवर्तत एव देवताराधनादाविति चेत् ।

207. (Reply : Naiyāyikas) : Since the cooked rice is ready there can be no *iṣṭasādhanatva* in the action of cooking (and so he will not go to cook again). And this is the reason why a person does not attempt to perform past action of eating since there can be no desire to the past satisfaction. (Thus, in the absence of the desire for the result, there is absence of the desire to accomplish it and so a person does not take initiative for such actions).

208. (Objection) : Well, when a person comes to know from some palmist that there is a chance of his being coronated in fature which is the means of his getting pleasure and when he knows that it is possible on his part to climb the throne and that it is the means of his desired object, why does he not take attempt to accomplish it ?

209. (Reply) : Because the future kingdom is not yet established and any inducement requires an already established thing as its object. Also because that person may not be in the know of the means to accomplish the kingdom (so he does not take any attempt). And when he knows the means he docs take attempt for instance, for worshipping gods etc.

210. न, सिद्धे चिकीर्षाविरहेण यागादावप्यप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् देवताराधनादेरप्यसिद्धत्वे न तत्राप्यप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

211. किञ्च राज्योपायापरिचये तत्र मा प्रवर्तिष्ट स्वकृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वेन ज्ञाते राज्ये प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गे किमायातम् ।

212. न हि कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वेन ज्ञानेऽपि तदुपायज्ञानं तत्र प्रवर्तकम्, गौरवात्, भिन्नविषयत्वाच्चेति चेत् ।

213. मैवं, यौवने हि तावत् प्रवर्तत एव राज्ये, बाल्ये तु राज्योपायमकृत्वा मत्कृत्येदानीं राज्यं न सिध्यतीति स्वकृत्यसाध्यताज्ञानादेव न प्रवर्तते । यथा तण्डुलं विना पाके स्वकृत्यसाध्यताज्ञानात्, राज्योपाये तु स्वकृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वेन ज्ञाते दैवताराधनादौ प्रवर्तत एव ।

210. (*Reply* : *Naiyāyikas*) : No. It is not correct. Because no desire-to-do arises with regard to something which is already established and so there will arise the contingency of non-inducement towards sacrifice etc., and since worhip etc. are also not established ones, there too will arise the contingency of non-inducement.

211. Moreover, if the person does not know the means to achieve kingdom let him not take any attempt for that, but if he knows that the kingdom is possible to be accomplished by him and also when he knows that it is the means of his desired object, what is the harm if he takes endeavour for it ?

212. It cannot be argued that although kingdom is known as the means of one's desired object and as that which could be achieved by oneself, the knowledege of its means is required for inducement. Because it will be cumbersome and also because the object of the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* and that of *pravṛtti* are different.

213. (*Reply* : *Naiyāyikas*) : It is not so. In one's youth one can indeed take attempt for kingdom ; in one's childhood, however, someone, without adopting any means, thinks

214. अतएव ब्रीह्यवघातमकृत्वा पुरोडाशस्तमकृत्वा यागस्तमकृत्वाऽपूर्वं साधयितुं न शक्यत इति क्रमशोऽवघातादौ प्रवर्तते न युगपत् सिद्धवृत्त्यसिद्धक्रियाविषयस्वभावत्वात् प्रवृत्तेः।

215. यागानन्तरञ्च नापूर्वप्रवर्तते। कृत्यन्तरं विनैव यागकृतितस्तत्सम्भवात्।

216. इष्टसाधने चेष्टोत्पत्तिनान्तरीयकदुःखाधिकदुखाजनकत्वं विशेषणं।

that now (in this age) it is not possible to accomplish kingdom by his effort and so he does not take attempt because he knows that it is not possible for him to accomplish, as one does not take efforts to cook when he knows that it is not possible for him to perform the action of cooking rice without rice.

But when he knows that the worship of god is the means of obtaining kingdom and when he knows that the act of worship is possible to be performed by him he does take attempt to worship god and the like.

214. This is why, since it is not possible to accomplish *apūrva* without performing the sacrifice ; since the sacrifice is not possible without the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*) and since without husking the paddy grains it is not possible to prepare the sacrificial cake, a person performs those actions in a sequence and not simultaneously because it is the nature of any effort that it takes unaccomplished act existing in an already accomplished thing as its object.

215. And after the sacrifice is performed, no one takes attempt to accomplish *apūrva*. Because even without another volition, the *apūrva* in produced by the same volition required for the sacrifice itself.

216. And the means of desired object is to be qualified by 'the state of not being the producer of trouble more than necessary for the production of the desired object.'

217. न तु तज्ज्ञानाभावः कारणं, किन्तु तदेव विषयतया कारण-तावच्छेदकं लाघवात् ।

218. तेन मधु-विषसम्पृक्तान्नभोजने न प्रवृत्तिः, परेणापि प्रवृत्ति-पूर्वं लिङ्गविशेषणत्वेन अन्यथा वा तज्ज्ञानविनियोगस्वीकारात् ।

219. एवञ्चाल्पायाससाध्यादिष्टोत्पत्तिसम्भवे बह्वायाससाध्ये न प्रवृत्तिः ।

220. अतएव श्रुतस्वर्गफलकत्वेऽपि बहुवित्तव्ययायाससाध्ये ज्योतिष्टोमादौ फलभूमा कल्प्यते अन्यथाल्पायाससाध्यादेव स्वर्गसिद्धि-सम्भवे तत्राप्रवृत्तौ अननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यं तद्विधेः स्यात् ।

217. But the absence of knowledge of that (fact that some action is going to produce trouble or pain more than necessary) is not the cause. But that (above mentioned) qualifier should be treated as the delimitor of *kāraṇatā* because of simplicity (since in that case the knowledge of two factors namely, *kṛitisādhyatva* and *iṣṭasādaanethva* alone can be the cause and not of three factors including *valavad duḥkha-janakatva*).

218. And therefore, there will be no inducement to taking rice mined with honey and pioson.

As a matter of fact the opponent also has accepted the utility of that knowledge (of that qualifier) either as the qualification of the indicator (of *kṛtisādhyatva*) or otherwise (i.e. as the qualificand of the indicator).

219. Thus, when it is possible to achieve the desired object from action which is accomplished by little effort, no one will go to perform some action which requires a lot of exertion.

220. This is the reason why a different result (plenty in quality and quantity) is postulated for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*-sacrifice which requires plenty of wealth and efforts inspite of the fact

221. बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वञ्च न विशेषणं बहुवित्तव्ययायास-साध्यबहुतरदुःखस्याप्यबलवत्त्वं क्वचिदल्पदुःखस्यापि बलवत्त्वं इत्यनु-गतस्य तस्याभावात् ।

222. न चेष्टापेक्षयानिष्टस्याधिकत्वं बलवत्त्वम् । तस्याप्युक्ताति-रिक्तस्याननुगमात् ।

224. आस्तिकस्य निषिद्धत्वेन ज्ञातेऽपि प्रवृत्तिः रागद्वेषयोरुत्कट-त्वेन नरकसाधनत्वज्ञानतिरोधानात् ।

that the sentence enjoining the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice mentions 'heaven' as its result. If it is not done so when it is possible to get 'heaven' from a sacrifice which requires less effort no body will perform that (*Jyotiṣṭoma*) and as a result there will arise the contingency of inauthoritativeness (negligence) of the injunctive sentence in the form of non-performance of the sacrifice.

221. The state of not being the producer of more and more difficulty or pain can not be taken as the qulification (of the means of desired object) because sometimes a great difficulty or pain arising from huge wealth and effort is not considered to be great and sometimes even a little pain or difficulty is considered to be great and so there is no common property to measure that (degree of greatness).

222. One can not argue that the greatness of difficulty or pain can be defined as 'being more of unwanted difficulty in comparison to the desired object.' Because it is also difficult to measure by any common factor that which is more than necessary to generate the desired object.

223. As *āstika* (one who believes in the Veda) sometimes attempts some action even though he knows that it is prohibited by the Veda, but it is due to the disappearance of the knowledge due to excessive craziness and hatred that such act leads to hell.

224. ननु न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यत्र विध्यर्थनिषेधानुपपत्तिः, तद्भक्षणस्य तृप्तिरूपेष्टसाधनत्वात् ।

225. न चासुराविद्यादिवत् पर्युदासलक्षणया विरोध्यनिष्टसाधनत्वबोधनं नञोऽसमस्तत्वात् क्रियासङ्गतत्वेन प्रतिषेधवाचकत्वव्युत्पत्तेश्चेति चेत् ।

226. न, विशेष्यवति विशिष्टनिषेधस्य सविशेषणे हीति न्यायेन विशेषणनिषेधपर्यवसिततया कलञ्जभक्षणमिष्टोत्पत्तिनान्तरीयकदुःखातिरिक्तदुःखसाधनमिति न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यनेन बोधनात् ।

224. (*Objection*) : Well, (in that case) it is difficult to construe the negative with the meaning of potential suffix in the sentence *na Kalañjaṁ bhakṣayet* "one should not eat *kalañja*. Because eating of *kalañja* can be (one of) the means of satisfaction of hunger, (i.e. the eating of *kalañja* does produce satisfaction of hunger)."

225. It is not possible that the negative would convey the antonym (of *iṣṭasādhana*) namely, the *aniṣṭasādhanatva* secondarily by *paryudāsa* (exclusion) as it does in the cases of *asura* (i.e. *sura-virodhin*) and *avidyā* (i.e. *vidyā-virodhin*). Because the negative particle (in the above sentence) does not occur as a member of a compound and also because when the negative is construed with the verbal form it is understood as conveying prohibition (and not exclusion).

226. (*Reply*) : No, it is not true. Because the prohibition of a qualificand in the case of the prohibition of the qualified results in to the prohibition of the qualifier as per the maxim 'the enjoining and prohibition with reference to a qualificand qualified by a qualifier results in to the enjoining and prohibition of the qualifier if the enjoining and prohibition are found as absurd or contradictory' and so one understands the sentence *na kalañjaṁ bhakṣayet* as 'the eating of *kalañja* is the means of unhappiness more than necessary to produce the desired object.

227. इष्टसाधनतावाचकस्य विधेः सामान्यतो निषेधानुपपत्तेर्बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धीष्टसाधनत्वविशेषनिषेधतात्पर्यं, तथाचाशक्यविशेषनिषेधपरत्वं नञा इति कश्चित् ।

228. तन्न । यथा ह्ययोग्यतया सच्छिद्रं विहाय घटत्वेन तदितरान्वयो न तु छिद्रेतरत्वेन युगपद्वृत्तिद्वयविरोधात् तथात्रापि बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वेनानुपस्थितौ कथं तन्निषेधः ।

229. श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेतेत्यत्र कथं विधिप्रवृत्तिः, हिंसाया बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वात् इति चेत् ।

227. Since it is generally improper to negate the injunction which expresses *iṣṭasādhanatva*, the purport (in such cases) is to negate a particular means of desired object which does not result in to greater unhappiness.

Thus, a negative conveys the negation of a particular meaning which is not the primary meaning of (the optative suffix in the case of the negation of injunction).

228. (*Reply*) : But it is not correct. Because as (when someone says *ghaṭam ānaya* 'Bring the pot') one relates *ānayana* with a pot as a pot, excluding the pot having a hole, but not as being different from that pot which has hole because in that case the word *ghaṭa* will have two relations (with two different senses) and this will lead to contradiction similarly, here too, if the meaning of the optative suffix is not presented as non-producer of greater unhappiness how can the negative particle negate that ?

229. (*Objection*) : Well, how does the injunction induces a man who desires to kill his enemy to perform the *śyenayāga* enjoined by the sentence *śyenena abhicaran yajeta* 'one desirous of killing one' enemy should perform the *śyenayāga*' because the killing does produce greater unhappiness ?

230. न, तत्र कृतिसाध्यत्वे सतीष्टसाधनत्वमेव योग्यतयान्वेति न तु बलवदिष्टाननुबन्धित्वमपि अयोग्यत्वात्। निन्दार्थवादेन प्रायश्चितोपदेशेन च हिंसाया बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वावगमात्।

231. अत एव विहितेऽपि श्येने विगानान्न तात्त्विकप्रवृत्तिः। रागद्वेषयोरुत्कटत्वेनानिष्टानुबन्ध्यंशस्य तिरस्कारात् कस्यचित् प्रवृत्तिरित्येके।

232. अन्ये त्वभिचारस्य वैरिवधफलकत्वेन श्रुतत्वात् वधसाधनत्वेन श्येनो विधीयते न तु बधसाध्यनरकसाधनत्वेन नरकस्य फलकत्वेनाश्रुतेः।

230. *(Reply)* : No. It is not so. There the properties, 'being *kṛtisādhya* and *iṣṭasādhanatva*' only relate (to the root sense) because it is compatible and not the property 'not being the producer of greater unhappiness' also because it is not compatible.

Since killing is condemned in the *arthavāda* and since atonement rites are prescribed for killing it is known that killing causes greater unhappiness.

231. This is the reason why a wiseman does not attempt *Śyena*-sacrifice even if it is enjoined by the Veda because it is condemned (*i.e.* because he knows that *śyenayāga* produces greater unhappiness).

Some hold the opinion that some one attempts *śyena* sacrifice and the like because he does not care for the adverse result caused by that sacrifice because of his having a higher degree of crarziness or hatred (as the case may be).

232. Others, however, think that the injunction of *śyena* sacrifice contains the killing of the enemy as its result ; *śyena* sacrifice is enjoined as the means of killing but not as the means of hell produced by the killing, because hell is not mentioned as the result (of that) sacrifice).

233. न च जनकजनकस्य जनकत्वनियमः, कुम्भकारपितृपरम्परायाः कुम्भजनकत्वापत्तेः विधिनैव श्येनस्य बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वबोधनाच्च ।

234. न च श्येनस्य नरकाहेतुत्वे अपेक्षितवैरिवधहेतुत्वे वा अविगानेन प्रवृत्तिः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । श्येनाद्वधो वधाच्चावश्यं नरक इति प्रतिसन्धानेन विगानात् ।

235. ननु श्येनोमरणफलकव्यापारत्वेन हिंसा सा च नरकजनिकेति चेत् ।

236. न, न हि साक्षात्परम्परासाधारणमरणफलकव्यापारो हिंसा, कूपादौ विनष्टे गवि तत्कर्तुर्गोवधकर्तृत्वापत्तेः वध्यस्यापि हन्तुर्मृत्यूत्पादन द्वारेणात्महन्तृत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

233. It is not the case that the producer of the result is the producer of the result (*i.e.* if *x* produces *y* and *y* produces *z*, then it is not correct to say that *x* produces *z*). Because (in that case) there will arise the contingency that an indirect case namely, the father of potter will become the producer of pot. And also because the potential suffix itself causes the understanding that *śyena* is not the producer of great unhappiness.

234. One cannot argue that if *śyena* is not treated as the cause of hell or if it is treated as the cause of the desired killing of the enemy, it will be looked upon as not causing greater unhappiness and as such, people will go to perform this sacrifice. Because people will come know that *śyena* causes ultimately greater unhappiness since the performance of *śyena* will produce the death (of the enemy) and that death will definitely produce hell.

235. (*Objection*) : Well, *śyena* is *hiṁsā* since it is the action which has death as its result and that produces hell.

236. (*Reply*) : No. *Hiṁsā* is not an action which either directly or indirectly casues death. Because (if that is so) then

237. न हि अनुत्पादितमन्युः कश्चित् कमपि व्यापादयति, किन्त्व-नुनिष्पादिमरणफलको व्यापारो हिंसा यदनन्तरं मरणं भवत्येव ।

न च श्येनस्तथा, किन्तु खड्गहननादिकमेव ।

238. अथ मरणानुकूलव्यापारो मरणोद्देशेनानुष्ठीयमानो हिंसा श्येनश्च, तथा कूपादौ च न मरणोद्देशेनानुष्ठीयमानत्वमिति चेत् ।

239. न, एवं सति गौरवात् मरणानुद्देशेन क्षिप्तनाराचाद्धतब्राह्मणे च हिंसा न स्यात् ।

there will arise the contingency that when a cow dies by falling in a well the maker of the well will have to be considered as the killer. And also because there will be the contingency that a killer who is to be killed (by the king) will be declared as the killer of his own self by producing the death.

237. It is not the case that without anger being produced (by somebody) some one kills someone. (So, the above definition of *hiṁsā* is not correct). But *hiṁsā* is an action after which death occures as the is consequence of that action (*i.e.* after which death invasively occures. The performance of *śyena* is not like that ; rather the killing by sword etc. alone can be *hiṁsā*.

238. (*Objection*) : Well, an action performed with a view to kill and which causes death is *hiṁsā*, and *śyena* is indeed like that ; in the case of well etc., the making of well is not with a view to kill any one.

239. (*Reply*) : No. It is not so. Because that statement incorporating 'with a view to kill' will become cumbersome. Moreover, when a brahmin is killed by an arrow thrown not with a view to kill (but, may be, to kill an animal) it will not be a case of *hiṁsā*.

240. किञ्च हिनस्तिधात्वर्थे अवच्छेदकं फलमव्यवहितमेव मरणं अव्यवहितफलकस्यैव व्यापारस्य धातुवाच्यत्वात्, अन्यथा परम्परया विक्लित्तिफलकान्नकामेष्टतण्डुलक्रयादावपि पचतीति प्रसङ्गात् ।

241. एवं खड्गाभिघातानन्तरं यत्र विलम्बेन मरणं व्रणपाक-परम्परया वा, तत्र हन्तृत्वं प्रायश्चित्तादि च न स्यात् इति चेत् ,

242. न, प्रायश्चित्ततुल्यतार्थं हि तत्र हन्तृव्यपदेशो गौणः, विनि-गमकञ्च लाघवमेव ।

240. Moreover, in the meaning of the root *hiṁs* the qualifier is the result namely the death, which is the immediate consequence (of the action of killing) because a root expresses an action which is qualified by a result which is the immediate consequence.

If this is not accepted there will arise the contingency of using the verble form *pacati* 'cooks' with reference to the action of buying rice which indirectly leads to the result, namely, cooked rice desired by one who is desirous of cooked rice.

241. Similarly, after the stricking of the sword when death occurs late, either indirectly through sepsis of the wound or by food poisoning then the person who stroke or who gave poison cannot be designated as the killer and there can be (no necessity for) the rite o atonement also.

242. (*Reply*) : No. It is not true. The designation 'killer' in such cases is secondary in order to bring those actions under those actions for which atonement rites are prescribed.

The factor which will decide what is killing in primary sense and what is in secondary sense will be the simplicity (of (causal relation only).

243. वस्तुतस्तु मरणोद्देशेन कृतोऽदृष्टाद्वारकस्तदनुकूलव्यापारो हिंसा श्येनश्चादृष्टद्वारा मरणसाधनमतो न हिंसा ।

244. यदि चादृष्टद्वारापि मरणसाधनं हिंसा स्यात् तदा सप्तमीतैलाभङ्गस्यादृष्टद्वारा इष्टभार्याविनाशहेतुत्वादभ्यङ्गकर्त्तुर्हिंसकत्वापत्तिः ।

245. अत एव कूपादौ गोमरणेऽपि न वधकर्तृत्वं तत्कर्तुः, गललग्नान्नमरणे न भोक्तुर्न वा परिवेषयितुरात्महन्तृत्वं ब्रह्महन्तृत्वं वा, व्रणपाक परम्परया विलम्बेन विषप्रयोगेण च हन्तृत्वं मुख्यमेव न त्वनुनिष्पादिमरणफलकत्वं गललग्नान्नमरणे स्वहन्तृत्वापत्तेः ।

243. Really speaking, *hiṁsā* is that action which is aimed at killing and which does not produce death through producing unseen result (*adṛṣṭa*). And *śyena* is the instrument of death through *adṛṣṭa* and so it can not be *hiṁsā*.

244. If an instrument which causes death through *adṛṣṭa* is also treated as *hiṁsā* then since applying of oil throughout the body before taking bath on *saptamitīthi* causes death of dear wife through *adṛṣṭa*, there will arise the contingency that one who smears the oil on that day will have to be designated as the killer (of his wife).

245. This is why, when a cow dies in the well, the maker of the well is not called the killer ; when death occurs due to sticking of any food in the food-pipe neither the eater of food is called the self-killer, nor the person who serves the food is designated as the killer of the brahmin (the eater).

When, however, a person dies late indirectly due to sepsis of his wounds or because of food-poisoning, (the striker of the sword or the giver of the food mixed with poison) is indeed the killer in the primary sense of the term.

Therefore, *hiṁsā* is not that action immediately after which death occurs, because in that case there will arise the contingency that if death occurs due to sticking of food in the food-pipe of a person he himself will be considered as the killer of himself.

246. अन्योद्द्शेन क्षिप्तनाराचेन हते ब्राह्मणे ब्रह्महन्तृत्वं न स्यादिति चेत्,

247. न, इष्टापत्तेः। व्यपदेशस्तु गौणः प्रयोगोलक्षण्यापि समर्थयितुं शक्यते तत्पक्षेऽतिप्रसङ्गो वारयितुं न शक्यत इतीदमेव विनिगमकं।

248. अतएव अतदुद्देशेन कृतेऽपि निषिद्धे प्रायश्चित्तार्द्धमुक्तम्।

249 अपरे तु अनभिसंहितनरान्तरव्यापारमद्वारीकृत्य मरणसाधनं हिंसा।

246. (*Objection*): Then there will arise the contingency that if a person throws his arrow aiming at some body else than the brahmin and if the brahmin dies, that person will not be called the killer of the brahmin.

247. (*Reply*): This contingency is welcome. The designation of (killer) is secondary (in such cases). The usage can be supported even by adopting *lakṣaṇā*.

It is the only decisive point that according to their view (that a *hiṁsā* is that action immediately after which death occurs) it is not possible, to rule out the application of the designation 'killer' in a case (namely, in the case of death due to sticking of food in the throat) where the designation should not apply.

248. This is the reason why half atonement is prescribed in the case of performance of a forbidden act which is not performed with a view to kill any one.

249. Others, however, hold that a *hiṁsā* is the instrument of death which neither involves in the middle, other person's activity and nor it is aimed at also.

250. खड्गकारस्यानभिसंहितनरान्तरव्यापारद्वारा मरणसाधनत्वं, तस्य हि नरान्तरव्यापारो नाभिसंहितः, किन्तु धनलाभ इति खड्गकारो न घातकः ।

251. विषस्यान्ने प्रक्षेपेण नरान्तर व्यापारो भोजनमेवाभिसंहितः अनेनेदं भोक्तव्यमित्यभिसधाय विषप्रयोगादिति हिंसैवान्ने विषप्रयोग इति ।

252. तन्न । गललग्नकवलाद् यत्र मरणं तत्रपरिवेषयितुर्घातकतापातात्, अनेनेदं भोक्तव्यं, इत्यभिसन्धाय परिवेषणाद्भोक्तुरात्महन्तृत्वापत्तेश्च अनभिसंहितनरान्तरव्यापारमद्वारीकृत्य मरणानुकूलान्नभक्षणानुष्ठानात् ।

250. The maker of the sword is the instrument of death through the action of killing by some person, not aimed at (by the maker of the sword). Because he does not aim at the activity of the other person but only obtainment of money and so the maker of the sword is not called the killer.

251. When someone mixes poison in the food he does aim at the activity of other person (*i.e.* the person whom he wants to kill by poisoning) namely, the action of eating because he mixes the poison with a mind that 'he should eat this'. And so the mixing of poison is indeed *hiṁsā*.

252. (*Reply*) : No. Because where death occurs due to sticking of the food in the throat in that case there will arise the contingency that the person who serves the food will have to be termed as the killer since he served the food with a simple intension that he should eat this food (and thereby his action of serving the food satisfies the designation of *hiṁsā* as given by you).

Moreover, there will arise another contingency that the person who ate that food and died has to be called the killer of his own self because he performed the action of eating the food which caused death and which is indeed not done through anybody else's action not aimed at by him.

253. अतएवाव्यवहितप्राणवियोगफलको व्यापारो हिंसा व्रणपाक-परम्परया मृते तु हन्तृत्वं व्यापारस्याव्यवधायकत्वादिति निरस्तम् ।

254. स्यादेतत् नेष्टसाधनता विधिः नित्ये सन्ध्योपासनादौ फला-भावात् ।

255. अथ नास्त्येव तत् नित्यं यत्रार्थवादादिकं विधिवाक्ये वा न फलं श्रुतमस्ति "सन्ध्यामुपासते ये तु सततं शंसितव्रताः । विधूतपापास्ते यान्ति ब्रह्मलोकं सनातनं" इत्याद्यर्थवादात् "दद्यादहरहः श्राद्धं पितृभ्यः प्रीतिमावहन्" इत्यादिविधिवाक्यश्रवणाच्च,

253. This is why (*i.e.* because of the very fact that there will arise the contingency of becoming self-killer), another definition of *hiṁsā* namely, the action which results in to immediate death is also rejected although they try to justify that in the case where someone dies late (after striking of the sword) through sepsis, the striker has to be called the killer because whatever action takes place after the striking of the sword is not considered as any type of intervention.

(Thus the statement, namely, *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the meaning of an optative suffix remains unaffected—the Naiyāyikas may say).

(*Objection*) : (Mīmaṁsaka, probably Prābhākar).

254. Well it might be so, but the meaning of the optative suffix cannot be *iṣṭasādhanatva* because in the obligatory rites like the performance of *sandhyā* etc. there is no result (*iṣṭa*).

(*Clarification* : *Naiyāyikas*) :

255. Well, that (*sandhyā* etc.) is no such obligatory rite where there is no mention of result; either there *arthavāda* sentence (of that particular obligatory rite) or the result is mentioned in the injunctive sentence itself. For instance, there

256. क्त्वा चिन्तयातूच्यते, यत्र न फलश्रुतिस्तत्र विश्वजिन्न्या-यात् स्वर्गः फलमिति चेत्,

257. न, कामनोपाधिकार्यत्वेन यागवन्नित्यताभङ्ग प्रसङ्गादहरहः श्रुत्या हि तत्कालजीविमात्रकृतिसाध्यं सन्ध्यावन्दनमवगतम् ।

258. कामनोपाधिकार्यत्वे च यदा फलकामना नास्ति तदा तत्समय एव तत्कर्तव्यता न स्यात्,

न हि तत्काले फलकामनावश्यम्भावः प्रमाणाभावात् ।

is an *arthavāda* 'hose who firmly adhere to their vows and perform *sandhyā* become free from sins and go to the permanent world of Brahman. Also there is an injective sentence (which mentions the result) namely, 'One should perform *Sandhyā* everyday for the decreased ancestors in order to get their pleasure.

256. It is only for argument's sake it is said that where there is no mention of the result heaven is postulated as the result as per the maxim of *Viśvajinnyāga* (but as a matter of fact all rights have results).

257. (*Reply* : *Mimāṁsaka*) : No. (If the obligatory rites are brought to the level of such acts which are) performed only when prompted by the desire of something there will arise the contingency of their becoming *anitya* like (*kāmya*) sacrifices (because the performance of an obligatory rite will not be everyday but only occasionally, when a person will desire something then only he will perform that).

(As a matter of fact) what is understood from the injunctive sentence 'One should perform *sandhyā* everydy' is that the performance of *sandhyā* is to be accomplished by one who is just alive at that time (*i.e.* if one is alive he should perform *sandhyā*, thus obligatory).

258. If, however, it is accepted that its performance is prompted by a particular desire then when there is no desire

259. किञ्च प्रथमप्रवृत्तेतरनिरपेक्षाहरहः श्रुत्या जीविमात्रस्याधिकारोऽवगतस्तथा च तत्सापेक्षचरमप्रवृत्त्यर्थवादोपनीतफलकामस्य न तत्राधिकारः प्रथमप्रवृत्ताहरहः श्रुतिविरोधात् ।

260. नित्ये फलश्रुतेरर्थवादस्य च स्तुतौ तात्पर्य्यं,

261. अतएव प्रत्यवायपरिहारोऽपि न फलं, तत्कामनोपाधिकार्यत्वे नित्यताक्षतेः ।

then at that very time there will be no performance of that rite. It is not a fact that there must be a desire of some result at that time since there is no proof in this regard.

259. Moreover, by the injunctive sentence 'one should perform *sandhyā* every day' which effects for the first time and which does not depend on anything else it is understood that only qualification which enables a man to perform *sandhyā* is the mere fact of his being alive.

Thus, a person who has the desire of a particular result presented by the *arthavāda* sentence which operates finally because it depends on that injunctive sentence is not qualified to perform that (*sandhyā*). Because in that case the first operated injunction 'one should perform *sandhyā* everyday' would contradict it (*i.e.* the injunction would not remain valid since there would be no performer).

260. The (attested) mention of result in the obligatory injunction and the *arthavāda* to that effect are, (really speaking), intended to praise (the performance of obligatory rites).

261. That is why, the eradication of sins or adversity can also not be the result (of obligatory rites) because in that case their performance would be prompted by the desire to eradicate the sins (and since that will be only occasional) the obligatoriness of those rites will vanish.

262. किञ्च नित्ये कर्तव्यताबोधनात् प्राक् न प्रत्यवाये प्रमाणम् अस्ति विधेः कर्तव्यत्वमवगम्य कर्तव्यताकरणे प्रत्यवायकल्पनं, विधिश्च फलाभावेन प्रथमं मूक एव,

एवञ्च प्रत्यवायप्रमितौ विधिप्रवृत्तिः तत्प्रवृत्तौ च कर्त्तव्याकरणे प्रत्यवायकल्पनं इत्यन्योन्याश्रयः ।

263. अपरे तु न विधेः कर्तव्यत्वमवगम्य कर्तव्याकरणे प्रत्यवायकल्पनं येनान्योन्याश्रयः, किन्तु निन्दार्थवादेन प्रायश्चित्तोपदेशेन चोपासनस्य प्रकृत्यर्थस्य तावद्व्यापारस्वरूपस्याभावः प्रत्यवायहेतुरवगतः, तथा च सन्ध्योपासनाभावः प्रत्यवायद्वारा दुःखसाधनं, तदभावः सन्ध्योपासनं दुःख साधनाभावत्वेन फलं, प्रायश्चित्ते पापध्वंसवदिति तत्साधनत्वेन कृतिर्बोध्यते विधिना ।

262. Moreover, before one understands that it is obligatory to perform some act what is the proof for the existence of sin (arising due to non-performance of the obligatory rites) ?

After knowing from the injunction that such and such act has to be obligatorily performed if a person does not perform that one postulates sin (for non-performance). The injunction, however, is nothing but inoperative first, because there is no mention of the result there (since *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the meaning of *vidhi* according to you, the Naiyāyikas and there is no result (*iṣṭa*) mentioned and so the injunction cannot induce a man in to action).

Thus, to know sin the operation of injunction (is required) and for the operation of injunction one has to postulate sin arising due to non-performance of that what is necessary to be performed—which invites the fault of interdependence.

263. Others hold the view that had it been the case that after having understood from the injunction that such and such act has to be obligatorily performed and if he does not

264. न चैवं प्रत्यवायपरिहार एव फलमस्त्विति वाच्यम्। परिहारस्य प्रागभावरूपत्वेन अनादितया असाध्यत्वात्।

265. न च उपासनाकरणं प्रत्यवायहेतुर्नोपासनाभावः। तथा च दुःखसाधना-भावत्वेन कृतिरिष्टा नतूपासनमिति वाच्यम्। निन्दार्थवादस्य उभयत्र सत्त्वेन उभयस्यापि तथात्वादिति,

perform that, the sin is postulated—then there would have been the fault of interdependency. But (it is not the case here) what is understood is the ground of sin namely, the absence of the meaning of *upa*+ $\sqrt{}$ās 'to perform or worship' *i.e.* activities of performing *sandhyā*' which is of the form of functions, from the *arthavāda* that decries the non-performance of *sandhyā* and from the enjoining of atonement rite (for the non-performance).

Thus, what is understood is that the absence of performance of *sandhyā* is the cause of unhappiness through producing sin. The absence of that (absence of performance of *sandhyā*) *i.e.* the performance of *sandhyā* is desired as not being the means of unhappiness, like the destruction of sins in the case of atonement rites. Therefore, volition as the means of performance of *sandhyā* is conveyed by the optative suffix.

264. One need not argue that let the eradication of the sins be the result (of obligatory rite). Because eradication is nothing but pre-absence (of sins) and as such it is beginningless (*i.e.* eternel) and so it can be accomplished.

265. Neither can it be argued that non-performance (of obligatory rite) is the cause of sins and not mere absence of it and so volition is desired as not as the means of unhappiness but not the performance of *sandhyā*. Because there are *arthavādas* decrying both and so both are like that (*i.e.* both are equally desired).

266. तन्न, एवमपि काम्यत्वे नित्यताक्षतिप्रसङ्गात् ।

267. किञ्च 'अकुर्वन् विहितं कर्मेत्यादिना' नोपास्ते यश्च पश्चिमामित्यादिना च करणभावस्यैव प्रत्यवायहेतुत्वं बोध्यते न तु तद्विषयाभावस्य, अन्यथा अकर्त्तुः प्रत्यवायो नान्यस्येति कथं स्यात् विषयाभावस्य साधारण्यात् ।

268. वस्तुतस्तु कृतिसाध्यत्वे सतीष्टसाधनताज्ञानं प्रवर्तकत्वन निर्व्यूढं । न च कृतौ कृतिसाध्यत्वमस्तीत्यतो न किञ्चिदेतत् ।

266. (*Reply* : *Prābhākar*). Not so. Because even if that is accepted if obligatory rites becomes *kāmya* they will lose their obligatory charac ter.

267. Moreover, by the arthavāda 'one who does not perfor the rite, which is prescribed (by the Veda) etc. etc.' and also by the *arthavāda* 'one who does not perform *sandhyā* to be performed in the evening etc. etc.' what is understood as the cause of sins is the absence of performance only but not the absence of the object of performance (*i.e.* upāsanā).

Otherwise, how is it that the person who does not perform (the obligatory rite) gets sin, but not the other person (who performs it) ? Because the absence of the object of performance is common (to both the cases).

268. Really speaking, (according to the system of Nyāya) the knowledge of *iṣṭatsādhanatva* and *kṛtisādhyatva* induces a man in to action. And since there is no *kṛtisādhyatva* in *kṛti*, the views (advanced by *apare tu*) are not of worth consideration.

269. नव्यास्तु नित्यापूर्वप्रागभावो दुरितद्वारा दुःखसाधनं तदभावोऽपूर्वं दुःखसाधनाभावत्वेनेष्टं तत्साधनत्वेन कृतिसाध्यत्वेन च सन्ध्योपासनं विधीयते इति,

270. तन्न, निन्दार्थवादादिना सन्ध्योपासनाभावस्तदकरणं वा प्रत्यवायहेतुरवगतो न त्वपूर्वाभावः प्रथमं प्रमाणाभावेन तदनुपस्थितेः।

271. विधेः इष्ट साधनत्वबोधकत्वात् परिशेषेणापूर्वमिष्टं कल्प्यत इति चेत्।

272. तर्हि विश्वजिन्न्यायेन स्वर्ग एव फलं कल्प्यतां काम्यत्वस्य त्वयापि स्वीकारात्।

269. The neo-logicians hold that the pre-absence of the *apūrva* produced by the obligatory rites becomes the cause of misery through producing sins. The absence of that pre-absence, namely, the *apūrva* is desired as being the absence of the means of misery. And the performance of *sandhyā* is enjoined as the means of that *apūrva* and as having *kṛtisādhya.*

270. (*Reply*) : It is not correct. By the *arthavāda* decrying the non-performance of *sāndhya* etc. What is understood as the cause of sins is the absence of performance of *sandhyā* or non-performance of it but not the absence of *apūrva.* Because there is no ground (*i.e.* expressive word) first (*i.e.* before the understanding of those decrying *arthavāda*) and so that (absence of *apūrva*) is not presented to one's mind.

271. (*Clarification*) : Well, since an optative suffix causes the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva*, ultimately by way of impossibility of other result, *apūrva* alone is postulated. If we say so then ?

272 (*Reply*) : Then, let heaven be postulated as the result on the basis of the general maxim of *viśvajit*-sacrifice, since you too have accepted *kāmyatva.*

273. किञ्च विधिप्रवृत्तावपूर्वज्ञानं अपूर्वज्ञाने च विधिप्रवृत्तिरित्यन्योन्याश्रयः ।

274. यावन्नित्यनैमित्तिकनिर्वाहस्य तत्तदाश्रमविहितकर्मणां सम्यक् परिपालनस्य च ब्रह्मलोकावाप्तिः फलं श्रूयते, तथा च नित्यस्य सफलत्वमिति केचित् ।

275. तन्न । तस्य विधेर्नित्यविधिमुपजीव्य प्रवृत्तिस्तस्य च फलाभावेन प्रथमं मूकत्वात् ।

अन्यथा परस्परसापेक्षत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयः तस्मात् कार्यता एव विधिः ।

276. ननु नित्ये वेदात् कार्यताज्ञानेऽपि प्रयोजनज्ञानं विना कथं प्रवृत्तिः, न हि प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते इति चेत्,

273. Moreover, after the operation of the injunction (of obligatory rites) there is the knowledge of *apūrva* and after the knowledge of *apūrva* there will be operation of the injunction and so it becomes a case of mutual dependency.

274. Some others hold that the attainment of *Brahmaloka* is the result of the performance of all rites, obligatory and occasional, enjoined for the respective phases of one's life and also of their proper observance. Thus, even the obligatory rites have results.

275. (*Reply* : *Prābhākar*). It is not true. Because that injunction (which causes the knowledge of the result of *Brahmaloka*) operates being dependent on the obligatory injunction and since that obligatory injunction is devoid of (the mention of) result it is as good as silent. Otherwise, there will be mutual dependency because each requires the other. Therefore, *kāryatva* is the meaning of the optative suffix.

276. (*Objection*). Well, although the knowledge of *kāryatva* is possible from the Veda in case of obligatory rites still without the knowledge of purpose how can there be inducement (to the obligatory rites)? Because even a fool does not proceed to act without aiming at a purpose.

277. न नित्ये फलबाधन प्रवृत्तिमात्रे प्रयोजनज्ञानस्याप्रयोजकत्वात्, काम्येऽपि प्रयोजनज्ञानं न साक्षात् प्रवर्तकं उपायाविषयत्वात् प्रयोजनेऽप्रवृत्तेश्च, किन्त्विष्टसाधनताज्ञानद्वारा कार्यताज्ञाने उपक्षीणमेव, कथमयं निश्चयः नित्ये इष्टसाधनताज्ञानासम्भवात् कार्यताज्ञानस्य वेदादपि सम्भवात् ।

278. ननु निष्फले दुःखैकफले वा प्रेक्षावतां कथं प्रवृत्तिः,

279. वेदाधीनकार्यताज्ञानसत्त्वात् सफलप्रवृत्तावपि तस्यैव तन्त्रत्वात् ।

277. (*Reply* : *Prābhākaras*) : It is not so. Because, since result is contradictory in the case of obligatory rites the knowledge of purpose cannot be the prompting factor of inducement in general. Even in the case of *kāmya* rites the knowledge of purpose is not the direct inducer because the means does not form the content of that cognition and since one does not go to perform purpose (but only the means which leads to achieve that purpose). But that (knowledge of purpose) gets exhausted in producing the knowledge of *kāryatva* through the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva.* How can it be decided (that the knowledge of purpose causes inducement through the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* in the case of *kāmya* rites even) ? Because it is impossible to have the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* in case of obligatory rites.

(On the contrary), the knowledge of *kāryatva* is possible from even the Vedas.

277. (*Objection* : *Naiyāyikas*) : Well, how do the wisemen take attempt for an act which does not lead to any result or an act which leads to pains ?

279. (*Reply* : *Prābhākaras*) : (It is possible) because one can have the knowledge of *kāryatva* from the Vedas. Even in the case of acts which lead to some result, that (knowledge of *kāryatva*) itself is the cause.

280. यत्तु लौकिके निष्फले दुःखैकफले वा न प्रवर्त्तते तदिष्टसाधनतालिङ्गकस्य कार्यताज्ञानस्य वेदाधीनस्य वा अभावात् ।

281. न च दुःखैकफलत्वज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकं, सति कार्यताज्ञाने तस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वादर्शनात् ।

282. अथ वा काम्ये लिङ्गोपूर्ववाचकत्वान्नित्येऽपि लिङ्गोपासनादि विषयकमपूर्वं बोध्यते, तच्च निष्फलमपि स्वतएव सुखत्वप्रयोजनं नित्यमभ्यर्थ्यमानञ्चेति ।

283. उच्यते । सर्वत्र नित्ये फलश्रवणाज्जीविफलकामस्य सम्वलिताधिकारः ।

280. (There was your) objection that one will not take effort to perform any day-to-day act if it is devoid of a result or if it leads to pains only since there can be no knowledge of *kāryatva* obtained either on the basis of *iṣṭasādhanatva* or from the Veda.

281. Neither is it a fact that the knowledge that such and such act will cause only pains will prevent a person from doing that act. Because it is not observed that such a knowledge prevents performance if the performer knows that such an act is to be done by him.

282. Or, since the optative suffix expresses *apūrva* in the case of *kāmya* rites let us hold that the optative suffix expresses *apūrva* produced by *sandhyā* etc. Although it is obligatory and does not produce any result still it by itself is to be treated as the purpose as pleasure is purpose by itself.

283. (*Reply* : *Naiyāyikas*) : (To the above objections of yours following is our) reply :—

Since in every case of obligatory rites there is mention of the result (either directly in the injunction or in the *arthavāda*), a collection of a number of factors which make the performer

यथोपरागे नैमित्तिकं स्नान-श्राद्धादि फलश्रुतेः काम्यं अकरणे प्रायश्चित्तादिश्रुतेश्च नियतकर्त्तव्यताकं, यथा वा षोडशश्राद्धस्य प्रेतत्व-विमुक्ति कामनाश्रुतेः प्रेतत्वविमुक्तिहेतुषोडशश्राद्धे सङ्कल्पं विधाय महाजनानामाचारात् काम्यत्वं निन्दार्थवादेनाकरणे प्रत्यवायश्रुतेरवश्य-कर्त्तव्यत्वं तथा सन्ध्योपासनमपि फलश्रुतेः काम्यं अकरणं नरकश्रुतेः प्रायश्चित्तोपदेशश्च नियत कर्त्तव्यताकं ।

284. यत्तु यागे काम्यत्वेऽपि न नियतकत्तव्यताकत्वं, तदकरणे प्रायश्चित्तानुपदेशात् ।

eligible to undertake the activity is attributed to the performer—as in the case of eclipse which is an occasional rite namely, taking bath, performing *Śrāddha* etc. There are *kāmya* rites because their result is mentioned and these have to be obligatorily performed because if one does not perform these, he has to perform atonement rites—it is mentioned. Or, as it is mentioned that a person desirous of releasing the dead from the state of ghost-hood should perform *ṣoḍaśaśrāddha* and so after doing *saṅkalpa* in *ṣoḍaśaśrāddha*, the cultured people perform this *Śrāddha* and so it is a *kāmya* rite. Still, since it is mentioned in the *arthavāda* which decries the non-performance that if one does not perform that he will accumulate sins and thus it is understood as obligatory rite. Similarly, since a result is mentioned, the performance of *sandhyā* is also a *kāmya* rite, but since hell is mentioned as the consequence of its non-performance and also because there is enjoinment of the atonement rite, it is understood as an obligatory rite.

284. (There was another statement that) although a sacrifice is *kāmya*, it does not become obligatory because no atonement rite is enjoined for its non-performance.

285. न च नित्ये फलकामनाया असम्भवः, त्रिकालकाम्यस्तवपाठवत् नित्ये फलकामनासम्भवात्।

286. यत्तु प्रथमप्रवृत्ताहरहःश्रुत्या तत्कालजीविमात्रस्याधिकार बोधनात् न फलकामस्याधिकार इति,

287. तन्न, अहरहः श्रुत्यर्थवादयोः प्रथमगृहीतैकवाक्यताबलेन तत्कालजीविफलकामस्य सम्वलिताधिकारात् अर्थवादोपस्थितं फलान्वयं विनैकवाक्यताभङ्गात्।

285. It cannot be argued that there is no possibility of the desire of any result in the case of obligatory rites because the desire for result is possible in the case of obligatory rites like the morning-noon-evening recitation of the prayers to God.

286. (There was another argument that) since the first operated injunction 'one should perform the *sandhyā* everyday' conveys the eligibility of any one who is alive at that particular time the person who has desire of some result will not be eligible to perform the *sandhyā*.

287. But this is not correct. Because on the strength of the first understood sentence-unity between the injunction 'one should perform the *sandhyā* everyday' and the *arthavāda* (which mentions the result) what is understood is that a person who is alive and has a desire of that result possesses the collection of factors which makes him eligible to undertake the performance. And if the result presented by the *arthavāda* is not construed with the injunctive sentence, the sentence-unity will be broken.

288. न चार्थवादस्य स्तुतिपरत्वान्नैकवाक्यता, बाधकं विना स्वार्थापरित्यागात् विधिवाक्योपस्थिते फले विधिवाक्यस्थफलमादायैव अहरहः श्रुत्या कार्यताबोधनात् ।

289. नन्वेवं तत्कालजीविकामिनोऽधिकारे यदा फलकामनाविरहस्तदा अशुचेरिवाधिकाराभावान्नियतकर्त्तव्यता न स्यात्, अधिकृताकरणे प्रत्यवायो न त्वकरणमात्र इति चेत् ।

290. न. नैमित्तिकेऽपि तत्काले कस्यचित् कामनाविरहिणोऽनियतकर्त्तव्यतापत्तेः ।

288. It can also not be argued that since the *arthavāda* sentences collectively convey praise (and their constituent meanings have no relevance) and so there can be no sentence-unity (with the result). Because unless the constituent meanings are contradicted they are not dropped (for the construction of the sentence unity) and so when the result is known from the injunctive sentence the *kāryatā* is understood from the injunction 'one should perform *sandhyā* everyday' by taking into account the result present in the injunctive sentence.

289. (*Objection* : *Prābhākaras*) : Well, if it is said that a person who is alive and has some desire is eligible to perform the obligatory rite then when he will have no desire he will not be eligible to do that as he will not be eligible if he is not pure and in that case the obligatory rite will not be performed regularly everyday. There will be no sin for non-performance only because sin is produced only if some one does not perform in spite of the fact that he is eligible.

290. (*Reply* : *Naiyāyikas*) : It is not true. Because even in the case of an occasional rite if at that there is no desire the person concerned will not perform the occasional rite—such will be the contingency.

291. अथापवादाभावेनौत्सर्गिकी फलकामनास्त्येव, फलज्ञानस्य स्वविषयकेच्छाजनकस्वभावत्वात् । यस्य तु मुमुक्षापवादेन फलान्तरे कामना नास्ति तस्याकरणेऽपि न प्रत्यवाय इति तन्नियतकर्तव्यताकत्वं नैमित्तिके तथा नित्येऽपि मुमुक्षया फलकामनाबाधेनाकरणेऽपि न प्रत्यवाय इति तुल्यम् ।

292. किञ्चार्थवादोपस्थितफलोपाधिकर्त्तव्यत्वेऽवगते 'अकुर्वन विहितं कर्मेत्यादिवाक्याच्छौचे सति सन्ध्यावन्दनाकरणे निन्दार्थवादेन च नरकश्रुतेः प्रायश्चित्तोपदेशाश्च प्रत्यवाय कल्प्यते । तत्फलकामनाविरहेऽपि प्रत्यवायपरिहारार्थं नियमतः प्रवर्त्ततेविधिप्रवृत्त्यनन्तरं प्रत्यवायस्य प्रामाणिकत्वात् अकरणोन्मुखस्य करणेन प्रत्यवायप्रागभावस्य साध्यत्वात् नैमित्तिके फलोपाधिकर्त्तव्यत्वे कामनाविरहेऽपि नियतकर्त्तव्यतावत् ।

291. (*Clorification* : *Prābhā9ara*) : Since there is no exception there can be general desire of the result because to produce the desire of its own object is the nature of the knowledge of the result.

One who has no desire for any result other than salvation, even if he does not perform those *kāmya* acts there will be no sin and so there is no knowledge of regular performability in the occasional rites. Similarly, there will be no sin for not performing an obligatory rite for one who wants only salvation and has no desire of any other result.

292. Moreover, once it is known that an obligatory act is to be performed because of the mention of a result in the *arthavāda* of that act, a sin is postulated on the grounds (*i*) that there is a *nindārthavāda* namely, "one who does not perform an enjoined act etc." which tells that if some one is in the pure state and even if he does not perform *sandhyā* he is to get hell and (*ii*) that there is an atonement rite enjoined (in the Veda for such non-performances). Even if some one

293. यत्तु निष्फलेऽपि नित्ये वदाधीनकार्यताज्ञानात् प्रवर्तत इति, तन्न, दुःखैकफलत्वेन ज्ञायमाने प्रेक्षावतां कृतेरनुत्पादनियमात् अयोग्यतया नित्ये कृतिसाध्यत्वस्य बोधयितुमशक्यत्वात् ।

294. अतएव सन्ध्योपासनमफलमपि क्रियते वेदबोधितकर्तव्यताकत्वादित्याशङ्क्य गुरुमतमेतन्न गुरोर्मतमित्यभिप्रायेणोपेक्षितवानाचार्थः ।

295. यत्तु पाण्डापूर्वं स्वत एव प्रयोजनं इत्युक्तं, तदपि न, एवं तवापि काम्यत्वे नित्यत्वहान्यापत्तेः ।

does not have the desire for the result of that action still in order to remove sins he regularly performs that obligatory act. Because after the operation of the injunction of the *sandhyā*-performance, the arising of the sin (due to non-performance) has grounds, since by performing some act which is likely to be dropped, what is achieved is the pre-absence of sins like the regular performance of an occasional rite which is performed prompted by the result even when there is no desire (for the result).

293. Your argument that a person performs an obligatory rite, even if there is no mention of any result, because he is prompted by the knowledge of *kāryatā* from the Veda,—is also not correct. Because when it is known that a particular performance is going to cause mere pains the wise people are regularly seen taking any effort to do that act. Because of impropriety it is not possible to cause understanding of *kṛtisdhyatva* in an obligatory act.

294. This is the reason why *Aeārya* put forth the *pūrvapakṣa*-view that the performance of *sandhyā*, though without a result, is performed because its performance is enjoined by the Veda and neglected it by passing a comment that it is a heavy doctrine but not the doctrine of the teacher (Prabhākara).

295. Your another argument that the *paṇḍāpūrva* by itself can be the purpose (which will induce a person in to action) is equally not correct. Because if that is accepted then even according to you the obligatory rites will turn out to be *kāmya* and so their obligations will vanish.

296. किञ्च सुख दुःखाभावश्च मुख्यं प्रयोजनं, तत्साधनञ्च गौणं, नित्यापूर्वन्तु तेषु नैकमपि पण्डापूर्वत्वात्, काम्यापूर्वञ्च सुखहेतुर्गौणं प्रयोजनम्।

297. प्रवर्तकविध्यनुरोधेन तदपि प्रवर्तकं कल्प्यत इति चेत्। न। प्रवर्त्तनीयेन लोकेन तस्य प्रयोजनत्वेनाज्ञानात् गुरुणा नित्यापूर्वं प्रयोजनमुक्तं इत्युच्यमानेऽपि नादरः प्रेक्षावताम्।

298. मुक्ति-स्वर्गौ चालौकिकावपि सुख-दुःखाभावसजातीयतया प्रयोजने, तस्मादेवं वदन् गुरुरपि लघुरेव।

296. Moreover, happiness and absence of unhappiness are the main purpose and the instrument to achieve that is not prominent. The *apūrva* arising from the performance of obligatory rites is none of these since it is an *apūrva* which does not produce any result. The *apūrva* arising from the performance of *kāmya* rites is the cause of happiness but it is not a prominant purpose.

297. (*Clarification* : *Prābhākaras*) : That *paṇḍāpūrva* is postulated as the inducer as per the injunction which induces a person in to action.

(*Reply*) :No. Beacause the person who is to be induced does not know that *paṇḍāpūrva* is a purpose in the case of obligatory rites.

Even if you say that Prabhākara has said that *nityāpūrva* is the purpose (of an obligatory rite) the wise people will have no faith in that.

298. Although salvation and heaven are *alaukika* and still there can be the purpose (which induces a person to act) since these belong to the class of happiness and absence of unhappiness.

Therefore, even if Prabhākara has said so it is insignificant.

299. तदयं सङ्क्षेपः नित्ये दुःखैकफलत्वेन प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः फलोपाधिकतव्यता तच्च फलं दुःखसाधनाभावः पाण्डापूर्वं वेति तदिच्छा प्रवृत्त्यर्थं प्रत्यहमुपेया तां विना प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः तथाचार्थवादिकं विधिवाक्यश्रुतञ्च फलमस्तु कृतमन्येन ।

300. न च कामनाविरहे नियतकर्तव्यता न स्यात्, अपूर्वेदीच्छाविरहेऽपि तुल्यत्वात्, प्रत्यवायपरिहारार्थं नियमतः प्रवृत्तिस्तुल्यैव । यत्र च न फलश्रुतिस्तत्र विश्वजिन्न्याय इति ।

299. Thus, the following will be the summary (of our discussion).

In the case of obligatory rites, since it is not possible to explain inducement if the performance of such rites results in to only labour (without a positive result to achieve). One has to say that their performance is prompted by some result and that result can be either the absence of the means of unhappiness or *paṇḍāpūrva*. And so everyday one will have the desire of that result for the performance (of those acts) because without that it is not possible to explain the inducement.

Thus, let that result be (the inducer) which is mentioned in the *arthavāda* or directly mentioned in the enjoining sentence itself. There is no need (to postulate) any other result.

300. One cannot argue that in the absence of the desire (of that result) there will be no regular performance of that rite. Because the same will be the case (according to your doctrine also) when one will have no desire of (*paṇḍa*) *apūrva* (he will not perform that rite). Also because equal is the ground that there can be regular performance (of an obligatory rite) in order to remove sins.

Where, however, there is no mention of any result (either in the *arthavāda* or in the injunctive sentance itself), there (the heaven will be the result as per the Jaimini maxim of) *Viśvajinnyāya*.

301. नन्विदमिष्टसाधनमिति ज्ञानादेतत्साध्यमिष्टमिति ज्ञानाच्च प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् प्रथमस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वे किं विनिगमकं ।

302. उच्यते, फलेच्छायां स्वविषयविशेष्यकज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वेन क्लृप्तत्वात् उपायचिकीर्षापि बाधकं विना तया ।

303. वस्तुतस्तु कृतिसाध्ययागस्य साध्य इष्ट इति ज्ञानस्य प्रवर्तकत्वे यजेतेतिपदात् प्रथमं कृतिसाध्यो याग इति ज्ञान ततः कृतिसाध्ययागस्य साध्य इष्ट इति ज्ञानं विशेषणज्ञानसाध्यत्वात् विशिष्टज्ञानस्येति ज्ञानद्वयं तव मम तु यागः कृतसाध्य इष्टसाधनमित्येकमेव ज्ञानं ।

301. (*Objection Prābhākara*) : Well, when it is observed that inducement takes place either from the knowledge 'this is the means of the desired goal' or from the knowledge 'this which is to be accomplished in the desired one' what is the deciding factor that the first knowledge alone is the inducer ?

302. (*Reply : Naiyāyikas*) : Because it is an established fact that with reference to thc desire of a result the knowledge in which object of the desire is the qualificand is the cause. The desire of the means (of the desired goal) also satisfies the same rule unless there is any hindrance.

303. Actually speaking, if the knowledge 'that is desired goal which is achieved by the sacrifice which is accomplished by volitional effort' is the inducer, then from the expression *yajeta* first there will arise the knowledge that 'the sacrifice is to be accomplished by volition' and then there will be another knowledge that the desired object is to be accomplished by the sacrifice which is to be accomplished by volition. Because a qualified cognition is accomplished by the knowledge of its qualifier. And so, these two knowledges (will be the inducer according to your doctrine). Whereas according to my doctrine the only knowledge namely, 'the sacrifice which is to be accomplished by the volition is the means of the desired object' (is the inducer).

304. न च कृतिसाध्यत्वं यागे बोधयित्वा कृतिसाध्ययागस्य साध्य इष्ट इति लिङा बोधयितुं शक्यमपि, एकस्वार्थान्वयमपरपदार्थे बोधयित्वा तदन्वितापरस्वार्थान्वयबोधकत्वे आवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः ।

305. अथ साध्यमिष्टं यस्येति साध्येष्टकत्वं शक्यं, तथा च बहुव्रीह्यर्थापेक्षया इष्टस्य साधनमिति षष्ठयर्थस्य लघुत्वात्तदेव शक्यम् ।

306. किञ्च तत्साध्यत्वं न नियमतस्तदुत्तरसत्त्वं, दण्डसाध्ये घटे व्यभिचारात्, नापि तदवच्छिन्नक्षणोत्तरक्षण एव सत्त्वं एवकारव्यवच्छेद्यतदनुत्तरसमयस्याकाशेऽप्रसिद्धेः शब्दस्य तदसाध्यत्वापत्तेः ।

304. Neither it is even possible that the optative suffix will convey first *kṛtisādhyatva* in the sacrifice and then it will convey that the sacrifice which is accomplished by the volition will produce the desired object. Because, a word is never understood as having the capacity of conveying the relation of its own with another word-meaning and then conveying the relation of that related meanings with another meaning. If it is accepted that once the root *yaj* has been satisfied of its expectancy by conveying the relation of sacrifice with the volition, again it has to convey the relation of its own meaning with another word-meaning then there will be repetition (which is a fault).

305. (*Clarification Prābhākaras*). Well, (we propose) the meaning of the optative suffix as '*sādhyeṣṭakatva i.e.* whose *sādhya* is desired object'. (So we can know simultaneously *kṛtisādhyatva* and *Sādhyeṣṭakatva* in the sacrifice and thus there will be no two knowledges to induce).

305 *a*. (*Reply* : *Naiyāyikas*) In that case it is better to prefer genetive *Tatpuruṣa* namely, *iṣṭasya Sādhanam* 'the means of the desired goal' than the *Bahubrihi* (namely, *sādhyam iṣṭam yasya* 'whose desired object is to be accomplished'). Because it is simpler and so that (*iṣṭasādhanatva*) can be the meaning (of the optative suffix).

306. Moreover, 'being accomplished by that' does not mean 'coming in to existence immediately after that'. Because

307. अतएव न तदभावव्यापकाभावप्रतियोगित्वं रूपे रससाध्य-त्वापत्तेश्च ।

308. नापि तदवधिकोत्तरत्वव्याप्यसमयसम्बन्धः, उत्तरत्वव्याप्यत्वं ह्युत्तरत्वानधिकरणकालावृत्तित्वं, तच्चाकाशे प्रसिद्धं गुरुतरञ्च ।

this causal relationship is violated in the case of a pot which is accomplished with the help of a stick (because it is not the case that immediately after the stick the pot comes in to existence). Nor can it mean 'coming into existence only in that moment which is subsequent to the moment associated with that (cause). Because the moment not following that (cause) which is to be excluded by 'only' is not known in the sky (since sky is always present) and so sound cannot be produced by that (sky).

307. This is why, (*sādhyatva)* cannot be understood as being the counterpositive of the absence which pervadas the absence of that (cause). Because in that case, colour will have to be taken as being produced by taste (since whenever there is absence of a particular taste, there is absence of a particular colour (say, in mango) and so taste will become the producer of colour which is absurd).

308. Nor (can one define *sādhyatva* as) the relation with time which (relation) is pervaded by the subsequentness in respect of that (what is considered as cause). Because 'being pervaded by subsequentness' means 'not being at the time which is not the locus of subsequentness'; and that is not known in the sky (because sky is present always everywhere). Also because it is a cumbersome concept.

309. तस्मात् तत्साधनकत्वमेव तत्साध्यत्वं, एवञ्च लाघवात् तत्साधनत्वज्ञानमेव प्रवर्तकं न तु तत्साधानकत्वज्ञानमिति ।

310. स्यादेतत्, इष्टत्वज्ञानस्य प्रवर्तकत्वे तृप्तोऽपि भोजने प्रवर्तेत मनसा तृप्तेरिष्टत्वज्ञानात् ।

311. अथ स्वरूपसत्यपि फलेच्छा कारणं सा च सिद्धतया तृप्तौ नास्तीति चेत् ।

312. तर्हि हन्तैवमावश्यकत्वात् फलेच्छैव कारणं न तु तज्ज्ञानं गौरवात् ।

309. Therefore, 'being produced by that' means nothing but 'being that, whose producer is that (cause). Thus, in stead of that, let the knowledge of being the instrument of that (result)' be the inducer and not the knowlcdge of 'that whose producer is that (cause)'.

310. (*Objection* : *Prābhākar*) : It may be like this : If the knowledge of being desired (object) is the inducer then a person even after satisfaction (of hunger) will go to eat again because still then he knows mentally that satisfaction of hunger is the desired object (of the action of eating).

311. (*Clarification Naiyayika*) : Well, although by itself *iṣṭasādhanatva* exists there (in eating) still the cause of incucement is the desire for the result (=satisfaction of hunger) and that desire is already satisfied (by eating) and so there is no desire (again at that very moment) for the satisfaction of hunger.

312. (*Reply* : *Prābhākaras*) : Then, also ! as the (absolutely) essential factor let the desire of the result be the cause (of inducement) and not the knowledge of that (*iṣṭasādhanatva*) since that will be cumbersome.

313. किञ्च इच्छाज्ञानस्य कारणत्वे इच्छा कारणं न स्यात् स्वज्ञानेन तन्नाशात् इच्छातज्ज्ञानधाराकल्पनेऽनवस्थानात् ।

314. अपि चेच्छाविषयः सुखं, इति ज्ञानं न मानसं सुखस्यासिद्धतया तद्विशेष्यकसाक्षात्कारस्य तत्संनिकर्षं विना अभावात्, ओदनादावपि इष्टत्वज्ञानं न सम्भवति मनसो बहिर् स्वातन्त्र्यात् ।

315. नापि चक्षुरादिना ज्ञातः कृत इतिवत् इष्टत्वज्ञानं, तत्र विशेष्यासन्निकर्षात् ।

313. Moreover, if the knowledge of desire is treated as the cause (of inducement) desire cannot be the cause. Because by its knowledge that (desire) is destroyed and if you argue that although by the knowledge the earlier desire is destroyed there can be subsequent knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* and desire which can be the inducer then that desire also can be cause after it is known and in that case the knowledge will destroy the desire and then another desire will be required by the same process which will be again destroyed and in this way it will lead to endless regression.

314. Moreover, the cognition, namely, 'pleasure is the object of desire' cannot be a mental one, because pleasure is not established (before taking up the activity) and so there can not be any mental perception in which pleasure forms the qualificand since there can be contact between mind and the pleasure. Even in the case of taking up the action of cooking there is no possibility of knowing *iṣṭatva* mentally in *odana* 'cooked rice' since mind has no capacity to reach external objects.

315. Nor can there be any knowledge of *iṣṭatva* by (external senses in *odana*) as there can be the perceptions by eyes like 'it is known', 'it is done'. Because there can be contact with the qualificand (in the case of knowledge and desire but not so in the case of *iṣṭatva*).

316. वस्तुतस्तु इष्टस्य विशिष्य सुखत्वादिना अज्ञाने यागपाकादाविष्टसाधनताज्ञानेप्यप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः इष्टस्याल्पाधिकभावेन नानाप्रकारत्वेन च विशिष्यानध्यवसायात् ।

317. न चेष्टविषयतावच्छेदकसुखत्वादेरुपलक्षणमिष्टत्वं, सुख-दुःखाभाव तत्साधनेषु अनुगतस्योपलक्ष्यस्याभावेनाननुगमादिति ।

318. उच्यते । यत्रेच्छा तत्साधनताज्ञानमेव लोकवेदसाधारणं प्रवर्तकं तेषां सुख-दुःखाभाव-तत्साधनत्वेनेच्छाविषयाणां अननुगतानामपि वस्तुसदिच्छाविषयत्वंमेवानुगमकं, एवं यदा सुखादाविच्छा भवति, स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वे सति सुखादिसाधनमिति ज्ञानं तदा पाकादौ प्रवर्तते ।

316. Really speaking, if the desired object is not specifically known as pleasure etc. there will arise the contingency of not taking up the activity of sacrifice or cooking etc. even if those activities are known as the means of desired goal. Because of qualitative and quantitative difference, the desired objects are of various types and so specifically they can not be known.

317. Nor can one argue that *iṣṭatva* can be the indicator (*upalakṣaṇa*) of pleasureness which is the delimitor of being the object of the desire. Because what is desired and indicated is pleasure, absence of pain and their means and since there can be no cammon indicated (desired object) there can be no property to bring them under one class.

318. (*Reply* : *Nniyāyikas*) : Here is our answer : It is an established fact both in our daily life and in the Veda that the knowledge of being the instrument of that which is desired (by a person) is the inducing factor (of that person). Although pleasure, absence of pain and their means which are the objects of desire cannot be united in one class by any common factor still being the object of desire itself can be treated as the uniting factor (of those three).

319. नन्वेवं प्रवर्तकज्ञानविषयस्य नानात्वेन तच्छक्तस्य विधि-प्रत्ययस्य नानार्थत्वप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्।

320. न, सुखत्वादिनाननुगतं इष्टत्वेनानुगतं फलं प्रति साधन-गमात् त्वस्य यागादेर्लिङादिना बोधनात्।

321. तथा च फलानामनुगमार्थं फलेच्छा शक्या न त्विच्छा ज्ञानकारणत्वेन।

322. अथैवं सुखादिसाधनत्वेन ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकं तन्न शक्यं अननु-यच्च शक्यमिष्टसाधनत्वं तज्ज्ञानं न प्रवर्तकं इति विधेः प्रवर्त-कता न स्यात् इति चेत्।

Similarly, when there is desire for pleasure etc. and when there is the knowledge that it is the means of obtaining what is desired (by some one) and at the same time it is possible to be performed, then the person takes up the activity of cooking etc.

319. (*Objection* : *Prābhākaras*) : Well, since the objects of the knowledge which induces a person are more than one (namely, *svakṛtisādhyatva* and *iṣṭasādhanatva*) the optative suffix expressive of those (objects) has to be accepted as poly-semous.

320. (*Reply* : *Naiyāyikos*) : No. The optative suffix expresses instrumentality of sacrifice etc. with reference to the desired result which is although not united by the property of being pleasure etc. still united by the property of being the object of the desired object.

321. Thus, for bringing the results into one class by a common factor, the desire of the result is taken as the primary meaning (of the optative suffix) but not mere desire as being the effect of knowledge.

322. (*Objection* : *Prābhākara*) : Well, in such a position (taken by you), the knowledge of being the means of pleasure

323. साक्षादेवमेव किन्त्विष्टसाधनं याग इति लिङा बोधिते इष्टाकाङ्क्षायां काम्यत्वेन श्रुतः स्वर्ग एव इष्टत्वेनावगम्यते, तदनन्तरं स्वर्गकामपदसमभिव्याहारात् स्वर्गसाधनं याग इति ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकमुत्पद्यते ।

एवञ्च विधिजन्यज्ञानजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकम् ।

324. यत्तु सर्वेषामेव विधेर्न साक्षात्प्रवर्तकत्वं विधिबोधकात् स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वादेरनवगमात्, स्वेष्टसाधनत्वञ्च अहं इष्टसाधनयागकः स्वर्गकामत्वाद्दर्शवाक्यावगतस्वर्गकामवदित्यनन्तरमर्थात् प्रतीयते ।

in general etc. which, infact, should be the inducer, is not the expressed sense (of the optative suffix) because it is difficult to bring pleasure, absence of pain etc. under one class and what is accepted by you as the expressed meaning of the optative suffix namely, *iṣṭasādhanatva*, its knowledge is, in reality, not the inducer. Therefore, (if your position is accepted) then the optative suffix can not be the inducer.

323. (*Reply* : *Naiyāyika*) : It is true that directly the optative suffix is not the inducer. But after the optative suffix causes the knowledge that 'the sacrifice is the means of desired goal' there arises the expectancy of what the desired goal is and then the heaven mentioned in the injunctive sentence as the desired object is known as the desired goal and after that because of the juxtaposition with the word *Svargakāma* 'one who desires heaven' the knowledge namely 'the sacrifice is the means of (obtaining) heaven' is produced which is the inducer. Thus, the inducer knowledge is that knowledge which is produced by the knowledge produced by the optative suffix.

324. (*Objection* : *Some*) (In fact) all injunctive suffixes are not directly the inducer (of man in action) because from the suffix which causes the knowledge of injunction, the elements like 'being feasible to be

325. तन्न । यत्रेच्छा तत्साधनमिति शाब्दज्ञानादेव प्रवृत्त्युपपत्ते-स्तत्प्रतीतिर्निष्फला ।

326. अन्ये तु साधनत्वमात्रं विध्यर्थः, स्वर्गादिसाधनतालाभस्तु समभिव्याहारात् इष्टसाधनतापक्षेऽपि तस्योपजीव्यत्वात्, तथा हि यजेतेत्यनेन यागः कृतिसाध्यः साधनञ्चेति बोधिते साधनस्य साध्या-काङ्क्षायां कामनाविषयत्वेन श्रुतोऽसिद्धः स्वर्ग एव साधनाकाङ्क्षी साध्यत्वेनावगम्यते उपस्थितत्वात् ।

accomplished by one's own effort' etc. are not understood. The element 'being the means of one's own desired goal' is known by implication after the knowledge namely, 'I am associated with the sacrifice which is the means of my desired goal' because I am desirous of heaven like the desirer of heaven understood from the sentence 'one desirous of heaven should perform the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice.

325. (*Reply* : *Naiyāyika*) : It is not correct. Because if there is desire of *x*, the inducement is possible from the verbal understanding alone namely, this is the means of that *x*, and as such the knowledge of *sveṣṭasādhanatva* is of no use.

326. (*Objection* (*others*) : Others, however, hold that the meaning of the optative suffix is merely 'the state of being a means', the state of being the means of heaven etc. is known from the proximity (of the word *Svargakāma* etc.) and even according to the view (of the Naiyāyika) that 'the state of being the means of desired goal' is the meaning of the optative suffix, that (proximity of the word *Svarga*) is essential. It can be explained as follows :

Once it is understood from the word *yajeti* that the sacrifice is to be accomplished by one's own effort and it is the means, there will arise the expectancy namely, 'means of which *sādhya* ?' and then what is mentioned as the object of desire namely, 'the heaven' which has expectancy of 'means' can alone be understood as *Sādhya* because that is directly presented (to the knower by the injunction).

327. न च यागस्य साधनाकाङ्क्षा, कृतिसाध्यत्वेनैवोपस्थितेः। अत एव विश्वजिदादौ स्वर्ग एव साध्यत्वेन कल्प्यत इति।

328. इष्टसाधनताविधिपक्षेऽपि "तरति मृत्युं तरतिब्रह्महत्यां योऽश्वमेधेनयजते" इत्याद्यर्थवादे विधिबोध्येष्टसाधनत्वस्यार्थवादादेवावगमात्।

329. कुतो विधिकल्पनमिति चेत्।

330. न। अविनाभावात्, तथाभूतसाधनत्वस्य विधेयत्वव्याप्तत्वात्, व्यापकानुपलम्भबाधोद्धाराय वा तत्कल्पनं तत्रेत्यप्याहुः।

327. It is not the case that the sacrifice expects means (but only the aimed object expects means) because the sacrifice is presented as that which is to be accomplished by one's efforts. This is the reason why heaven alone is postulated as *sādhya* in the injunction *Viśvajitā yajeta* 'one should perform the *Viśvajit* sacrifice'.

328. Even according to the doctrine that *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the meaning of an optative suffix the *iṣṭasādhanatva* expressed by the optative suffix is understood from the *arthavāda* in the case of the *arthavāda* 'one who performs the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice crosses over death and crosses over (the demerit of) killing a Brahmin.

329. (*Objetion : Naiyāyikas*) : Why should there be postulation of *vidhi* (in the case of *yajate* in the afore-said *arthavāda*) ?

330. (*Reply : Others*): Because there is invariable concomitance (between *sādhanatva* and *vidheyatva*), since the *iṣṭasādhanatva* of that kind (*i.e.* which is obtained from an injunctive sentence) is pervaded by *vidheyatva* (In other words, *yatra yatra Śrauteṣṭasādhanatva tatra tatra vidheyatva*).

Or else, the postulation of *vidhi* there is to remove the contradiction in the form of 'it is not the means of desired goal') due to the knowledge of absence of *vidheyatva* which is the pervader (of Śrauteṣṭasādhanatva).

331. यत्त्विष्टसाधनत्वाभिधाने करणे लिङ्गोऽनुशासनात् दर्शपौर्णमासाभ्यामित्यनभिहिताधिकारविहिता तृतीया न स्यादिति ।

332. तन्न । उपायतामात्राभिधानेऽपि तद्विशेषकरणत्वानभिधानात् ।

333. वस्तुतस्त्वभिहितान्वयलभ्यं यागेष्टसाधनत्वं इष्टसाधनत्वमात्रस्य विध्यर्थत्वात् ।

331. (*Objection : Grammarians*) : If 'the state of being the instrument of the desired goal' is the meaning of an optative suffix, then one will have to believe that an optative suffix is added to a root in the sense of instrument and in that case the instrumental case-ending in the expression *darśa-pūrṇamāsābhyām* (in the sentence *darśapūrṇamāsābhyām Svargakāmo yajeta*) cannot be justified after the section covered by the rule *anabhihite* (Pāṇini 2.3.1) (according to which an instrumental case-ending can be added to a stem provided the instrumentality is not expressed by the suffix. Since here the instrumentality is accepted as being expressed by the optative suffix the stem, *darśapūrṇamāsa*—cannot get instrumental case-ending added to it by *Kartṛkaraṇayoḥ tṛtīyā* (Pāñini 2.1.18).

332. (*Reply*) : It is not so. Because although the optative suffix expresses instrumentality in general, it does not express particular instrumentality namely, *Karaṇatva*.

333. Really speaking, the state of being the instrument (of heaven) in the sacrifice is obtained through the relation with what is expressed by the optative suffix (but not the number existing in the sacrifice), because the optative suffix expresses mere 'the state of being the instrument of desired goal'.

334. नव्यास्तु चिकीर्षाद्वारा ज्ञानस्य कृतौ हेतुता चिकीर्षा च कृताविच्छा सनः प्रकृत्यर्थगोचरेच्छावाचित्वात् पिपक्षादिवत् ।

न तु कृतिविषयपाकादिविषये कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारकेच्छाभिधायकत्वं पाकादेः प्रकृत्यनभिधेयत्वात् ।

335. न हि कृतिवाचकस्य तद्विषयवाचकत्वं, करोतीत्युक्ते तद्विषय संशयात् ।

336. एवञ्च कृताविच्छेष्टसाधनताज्ञानात् तत्साध्येष्टज्ञानाद्वा वृष्टयादौ तथा कल्पनात् ।

यदा च कृताविच्छा तदा सैव चिकीर्षा अन्यत्रेच्छामात्रं न तु कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानात् कृतौ कृतिसाध्यत्वाभावात् ।

334. The neo-logicians, however, think that knowledge is the cause of volition through 'the desire to do' and 'the desire to do' means the 'desire of volition' because the desiderative suffix expresses the desire of the meaning of the root as in the case of the word *pipakṣā* 'the desire to do cooking'. But (the desiderative suffix) does not express the desire—the qualifier of which is *Kṛtisādhyatva*, and the object of which is the cooking which is the object of volition, because cooking is not expressed by the root (*kṛ*).

335. It cannot be true that which expresses 'volition' expresses the object of that volition. Because when some one says *Karoti* 'he is doing' we get doubt about the object of that volition (*Kim karoti* 'what is he doing' ?).

336. Thus, the desire of volition arises from the knowledge of 'the state of being the means of the desired goal', or from the knowledge of the desired goal to be produced by that (means), because it is postulated so in the case of rains etc. And when there is desire of volition then that desire itself is called 'the desire to do'; elsewhere it is a mere desire. ('The desire to do'), however, does not arise from the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva*, because there can not be *kṛtisādhyatva* in *kṛti*. (In other words, volition can not be produced by volition itself).

337. अथ पाकं कृत्या साधयामी[नी]तीच्छानुभवसिद्धा अनुभवापलापे उपेक्षणीयत्वापत्तेः, सा च कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानात्, सा च चिकीर्षापदाप्रतिपाद्यापि कृतिहेतुः समानविषयत्वात् न तु कृतीच्छा कृतिहेतुः कृतिविषयाविषयत्वादिति चेत् ।

338. अस्ति तावत्पाक कृताविच्छा वृष्टीच्छावत्, अस्ति च कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारिकेच्छा पाके, तथापि कृतीच्छैव कृतिकारणं लाघवात् न तु कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारिकेच्छा गौरवात् ।

339. धात्वर्थानुपरक्ते कृतिस्वरूपे इच्छैव नोदेतीति चेत् ।

337. (*Objection : Prābhākaras*) : Well the desire namely, 'I want to accomplish cooking by (my) volition' is (our regular) experience. If you deny such experience, there will arise the contingency of (your statement also) becoming negligible.

That desire arises from the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* And although that desire (namely, 'I want to accomplish cooking by (my) volition) is not an expressed sense of the word *cikīrṣā*, still it is the cause of volition because both the desire to do and the volition have one and the same object. The desire of volition is, however, not the cause of volition because the object of volition is not the object (of the desire in that case).

338. (*Reply* : *Neo-logicians*) : There can be, indeed, the desire of the volition of cooking like the desire of rains and there can also be desire in cooking, the qualifier of which is *kṛtisādhyatva*. Still the desire of volition alone can be the cause of volition because it will be a simpler proposition, but not the desire the qualifier of which is the *kṛtisādhyatva* because it will be a cumbersome proposition.

339. (*Objection* : *Prābhākaras*) : Well, no desire arises with regard to mere volition without its being associated with the root-meaning (which is the object of volition).

340. न। पाकादिकृतीष्टसाधनताज्ञानात् पाककृताविच्छा ततः कृतिरित्यभ्युपगमात्।

341. न चावगति-प्रवृत्त्योः समानविषयत्वं उभयसिद्धं, तस्यैव विचार्यत्वात्।

342. कथं तर्हि पाकं कृत्या साधयानीतीच्छा।

343. यथा वह्निसाध्यत्वेन इष्टसाधनतावगमात् वह्निना पाकं साधयानीतीच्छा तथा कृतिसाध्यत्वेन इष्टसाधनत्वात् पाकस्य पाकं कृत्या साधयानीतीच्छा।

340. (*Reply : Neo-logicians*) : It is not so, their arises desire of volition of cooking from the knowledge that the volition of cooking is the means of the desired object (*viklitti*) and from that desire volition is produced. This is what is accepted by us.

341. It is not the case that both of us accept that the object of knowledge and volition must be one and the same. Because, as a matter of fact, that is what is to be discussed and decided.

342. (*Objection : Prābhākara*) : Then how can there be the desire namely, 'I want to accomplish cooking by (my) volition' ?

343. (*Reply : Neo-logiclans*) : As there is the desire namely, 'I want to accomplish cooking', the fire arising from the knowledge of 'the state of being the instrument of the desired (cooking)' (in fire) as (the cooking) is accomplished by fire, similarly, since cooking is the means of desired object (*vikltti*) and it is to be accomplished by volition, there can be such desire as 'I want to accomplish cooking by volition'.

344. अन्यथा तत्तदुपायसाध्यत्वेन इच्छा पाकादौ तत्तदुपायसाध्यत्वप्रकारकज्ञानात् स्यादित्यनन्तकारणकल्पना स्यात् ।

345. मम तूपायेच्छायामिष्टसाधनताज्ञानमेव हेतुः, क्रिया द्वारा कृतेरिष्टसाधनत्वज्ञाने क्रियाया अपीष्टसाधनत्वं विषय इति कृतीच्छा भवन्ती क्रियाविषयापि भवतीति ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नानां समानविषयतापि ।
अत एव पाकं चिकीर्षतीति पाकः प्रतीयते ।

346. यद्वा इच्छाविषयविषयतया पाकः प्रतीयते इति तस्यकर्मता ग्रामंजिगमिषति, शत्रुं जिघांसतीत्यत्र ग्रामादेरिव, न हि ग्रामादाविच्छा, सिद्धत्वात् ।

344. Otherwise, the desire to accomplish cooking by particular means will arise from the knowledge in which 'to be accomplished by particular mean' is the qualifier and in this way endless number of cause and effect relationship will have to be postulated.

345. According to my doctrine, however, mere knowledge of 'the state of being the means of desired goal' is the cause of the desire of means. Since volition is known as the means of desired goal through activity, the activity also becomes the means of desired goal and thus when it is the desire of volition, (it can be said that) it is the desire of activity also and in this way (this fact is also maintained that) knowledge, desire and volition should have one and the same object. This is the reason, when some one says 'He wants to do cooking', cooking is understood as the object of 'the desire to do.'

346. Or, (we can say that) cooking is understood as the object of the object of desire and so that cooking becomes an object as the village becomes on object in the cognition 'He wants to go to the village', or as the enemy becomes the object in cognition 'He wants to kill the enemy'. There can not desire of village etc. in the above cases because these are already established facts.

347. अत एव भोगे सुखे च चिकीर्षा तदनुकूलकृतेरिष्टहेतुत्वात् । अन्यथा कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनतापक्षे तच्चिकीर्षासामग्र्यन्तरं कल्प्येत ।

348. एवञ्च सन्ध्यावन्दनं दुःखसाधनावन्दनाभावरूपत्वेनेष्टं तत्साधनं कृतिरिति लिङर्थः ।

349. अन्यथा कृतिर्न कृतिसाध्या सन्ध्यावन्दनञ्च नेष्टसाधनमिति कस्य कृतिसाध्यत्वे सतोष्टसाधनत्वं विध्यर्थः स्यात् ।

347. This is why, 'desire to accomplish enjoyment and happiness amounts to the desire of volition which will produce that enjoyment' or happiness because (the volition is) the instrument of that desired goal. Otherwise, according to the doctrine that the knowledge of *kṛtisādhyatva* and *iṣṭasādhanatva* is the cause of 'the desire to do,' one will have to postulate another set of causal factors for the desire to accomplish that (enjoyment or happiness).

348. Thus, the obligatory worship (*sandhyopāsanā*) is desired as being the absence of non-performance which will cause unhappiness and the means of that (*sandhyopāsanā*) is the volition and this is the meaning of the optative mood (in the injunctive sentence : *aharahaḥ sandhyām upāsīta*).

349. Otherwise, (according to you) volition is not produced by volition and the obligatory worship (*sandhyā*) can not be the means of any desired goal (since no result is mentioned in its injunctive sentence and so according to whom can there be the meaning of optative suffix as 'being the means of desired goal at the same time being feasible to be accomplished by one's volition' ?

350. अत एवैकप्रत्ययाभिधेयत्वप्रत्यासत्तेरन्तरङ्गतया विधिप्रत्ययाभिधेयेष्टसाधनत्वस्य कृतावेवान्वयो न प्रकृत्यर्थे तथैव चिकीर्षाकारणज्ञानजनकत्वात् प्रकृत्यर्थस्य च कृतौ विषयत्वेनान्वय इति ।

351. उच्यते । वह्निसाध्यत्वेन कृतिसाध्यत्वेन वा न पाकस्यौदनसाधनता इत्युक्तम् ।

कथं तर्हि वह्निना पाकं साधयमीतीच्छा इति चेत् ।

352. न, इष्टसाधनत्वेन ज्ञाते यत्र यत्साध्यत्वं ज्ञायते तत्र तत्साध्यत्वेनेच्छा भवतीति ।

यथेष्टसाधनत्वेन ज्ञाते पाके वह्निसाध्यत्वज्ञानात् वह्निना साधयामीतीच्छा, एवं कृतिसाध्यत्वेनावगते इष्टस्य साधनताज्ञानात् कृत्या साधयामीतीच्छा ।

350. Therefore, since the relation namely, 'being expressed by one and the same suffix' is the closer relation, 'the meaning of the optative suffix namely, being the means of desired goal' gets connected with volition itself and not with the meaning of the root, because in that very way, a *vidhi* causes the knowledge which causes 'the desire to do'. And the meaning of the root is related to volition as its object.

351. (*Reply to the neo-logicians*) : You said : 'the cooking is not the means of softening of rice (*odana*) as 'being accomplished by fire' or as 'being accomplished by volition'. (If it is so) then can there be the desire namely 'Let me accomplish cooking by fire'.

352. (*Reply*) : It is not so. Because when something, is known as 'the means of desired goal,' what is known as 'being accomplished by something, one desire that thing to be accomplished by that (something). Therefore, as when cooking is known as the means of desired goal, at the same time when it is known as 'to be accomplished by fire' one gets the desire 'Let me accomplish cooking by fire'. Similarly once it is known that something can be accomplished by volition one gets the desire 'Let me accomplish (it) by volition' from the knowledge that (something) is the means of the desired goal.

353. तथाचेष्टसाधनत्वेन कृतिसाध्यत्वेन च ज्ञाते कृतिसाध्यत्व-प्रकारिकेच्छा न त्विष्टसाधनताज्ञानमात्रादिति ।

354. आचार्यास्तु प्रवर्तकमिष्टसाधनताज्ञानमेव, लिङर्थस्त्वाप्ताभिप्रायोलाघवात् । पचं कुर्याः कुर्यामित्यत्र विधिलिङः सम्बोध्यस्वकर्तृकक्रियेच्छाभिधायकत्वेनाज्ञा-प्रार्थनाशंसनादिलिङो वक्त्रयादीच्छाभिधायकत्वेन लिङ्मात्रस्येच्छावाचकत्वकल्पनाच्च ।

355. एवञ्च स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यस्य स्वर्गकामस्य कृतिसाध्यतया यागो यागयत्नो वा आप्तेष्ट इत्यर्थः ।

353. Thus, when something is known as the means of the desired goal and 'to be accomplished by volition' there arises (in him) the desire in which 'to be accomplished by volition' appears as the qualifier. But such a desire does not arise from mere knowledge of being the means of desired goal.

354. Udayanācārya holds the view that it is the knowledge of being the means of desired goal which induces (a man in to activity). The meaning of the optative suffix, however, is the reliable speaker's desire because it is logically simpler. In sentences, 'one should cook, 'I should cook' and the like since the optative suffix expresses the desire of the activity which is to be performed the person to whom the first sentence is addressed and which is to be performed by me (in the second sentence) and since the potential suffix serving the purpose of order, request and command expresses the desire of the speaker it is postulated that the optative suffix in general expresses 'desire'.

355. Thus the injunctive sentence 'one desirous of heaven should perform (the sacrifice)' means 'the sacrifice or the volition of the sacrifice in the object of the desire of a reliable speaker since the sacrifice is feasible to be accomplished by the person who is desirous of the heaven.

356. ततो यो व्यापारः यस्य कृतिसाध्यतया यद्व्यापारविषयकः प्रयत्नो वा यस्याप्तेनेष्यते स तस्य बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धीष्टसाधनमिति व्याप्तिग्रहात्, यागस्येष्टसाधनत्वमनुमिनोति ।

357. तथा हि यागो मदिष्टसाधनं मत्प्रयत्नविषयतया आप्तेनेष्यमाणत्वात् यथा मत्पित्रा मत्प्रयत्नविषयतयेष्यमाणंमद्भोजनं मदिष्टसाधनं तथाचेदं तस्मात्तथा ।

358. एवं न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यस्य मम कलञ्जभक्षणप्रयत्नोनाप्तेच्छाविषय इत्यर्थः । ततः कलञ्जभक्षणं मम बलवदनिष्टसाधनं मदिष्टसाधनत्वे सत्यप्याप्तेन मत्प्रयत्नविषयतया अनिष्यमाणत्वात् यथा मत्पित्रा मत्प्रयत्नविषयतया अनिष्यमाणं मधु-विषसम्पृक्तान्नभोजनं मम बलवदनिष्टसाधनं तथाचेदं तस्मात्तथा ।

356. This leads to the following *vyapti* : what-so-ever performable activity of a person or what-so-ever volition the object of which is that performable activity of that person is desired by a reliable speaker, that (activity) is the means of his desired goal and is not the producer of any great adversary. From the knowledge of this *vyapti* one infers that the sacrifice is the means of the desired goal (heaven).

357. It can be put as follows : The sacrifice is the means of my desired goal, because desired by a reliable speaker as the object of my volition, as the eating of food is desired by my father as the object of my volition and it is the means of my desired goal. Similar is the case here and hence it is so.

358. Similarly, the sentence 'one should not eat. *Kalañja*' means my volition of eating *kalañja* is not the object of the desire of the reliable speaker. From this follows the following inference :

The eating of *kalañja* is the means of my great adversary, because it is not desired by the reliable speaker as the object

359. स चाप्तो वेदव्याख्याता भगवानीश्वर एव ।

360. यस्तु वेदे पौरुषेयत्वं नोपैति तं प्रतिविधेरेव तावद्गर्भ इव श्रुतिकुमार्याः पुंयोगे प्रमाणम् ।

361. न तर्हि लाघवं तात्पर्यगौरवादीश्वराद्यनन्तकल्पनादिति चेत् ।

362. न, लाघवादिनेच्छाबोधकत्वेनलोके लिङः प्रमाणसिद्धत्वेन फलमुखगौरवस्य अदोषत्वात् ।

of my volition in spite of that fact that it is the means of my desired goal, as the eating of the food mixed with honey and poison and not wanted by my father as the object of my volition is the means of great unwanted adversary. Similar is the case here. Therefore, it is so.

359. That reliable speaker is the God Śiva alone.

360. For one who does not accept that the Veda is an utterance of an Agent, the optative suffix itself is the proof for the association of the Agent with the girl, the Śruti like the pregnancy.

361. (*Objection* : *Mīmāṁsakas*) : Then logical precision will have to be given up. Because, (if speaker's desire is the meaning of the optative suffix, since the desires are many, it will lead to) cumbersomeness with regard to the speaker's intention. Also because one will have to postulate various reliable speakers like god etc.

362. (*Reply* : *Naiyāyikas*) : It is not true. Because for logical economy the optative suffix is well-established as expressive of 'desire' among people and as such even if there

363. न तु कर्तुरस्मरणं बाधकं प्रागेव निरासात् ।

364. तृप्तिकामनया विषभक्षणप्रवृत्तस्य विषभक्षणं तत्कृतिसाध्यतया नेश्वरेणेष्यते ततो विषभक्षणस्य ईश्वरेच्छाविषयत्वेऽपि न तेन व्यभिचारः ।

365. यद्वा यत्कामकृतिसाध्यत्वेनाप्तेच्छाविषयो नेति तस्येश्वरेच्छा विषयत्वेऽपि विशिष्टनिषेध उपपद्यते ।

is no logical precision it is not a fault because such a cumbersomeness arises after the result is known (Here, the cause-and-effect relationship between the optative suffix and its causing the knowledge of desire is the result and that is already established from people's verbal behaviour and so even if there is no precision, it is of no harm).

363. One cannot argue that non-remembrance of the Agent is an impediment for establishing the Agent (of the Veda). Because it has already been refuted (on the basis of the *Smṛti*. This Veda is different in each *manvantara*).

364. Even if taking of poison is also the object of God's desire (because everything can be the object of God's desire) still since God does not want any person to take poison who does not take initiative to take poison with a desire to satisfy his hunger, there is no inconsistency (in the cause-and-effect relationship). Here, since it is known that God's desire is everywhere and God is an *āpta*, there will arise the contingency that one should go to take poison to satisfy his hunger because there is the cause, namely, the knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatva* in taking poison which is inferred from the desire of the reliable Agent, God).

365. Or whatever, action is intended by the reliable speaker as an action 'to be accomplished by the volition of a person who desires something, that action is the means of that desired goal (something) of that person. The taking of poison, however, is not the object of God's desire as an

366. अभिप्रायविधिपक्षे बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वमानुमानिकं इष्टसाधनताविधिपक्षे तु तदपि शक्यमिति गौरवमिति ।

367. इति श्रीमद्‌गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ शब्दाख्यतुरीयखण्डे विधिवादः समाप्तः ।

action 'to be accomplished by that person's volition for satisfaction of his hunger'. Because there is no ground for it. (So, there is no inconsistency of cause-and-effect relationship mentioned above).

This is why, in the injunction 'one should not eat *kalañja*', the eating of *kalañja* is not the object of any reliable person's desire as an action 'to be accomplished by the volition of the person who has gone to eat that for the satisfaction of his satisfaction and so even if that (eating of *katañja*) is the object of God's desire, the particular prohibition can be possible.

366. In the doctrine where a reliable speaker's desire is the meaning of an optative suffix, 'not being the producer of any great adversary' is obtained by inference. However, in the doctrine where the meaning of the optative suffix is 'being the means of the desired goal' that ('not being the producer of greater adversary') also will be expressed sense and so it is not logically precise.

367. Here ends the *Vidhivāda* of the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya.

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Appendix

प्रवृत्तिपरवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं प्रयोज्यस्य तत्तदर्थसम्बन्धव्यापारानुकूलां चेष्टां[1] पश्यन् तटस्थः स्वचेष्टायां कृतेः कृतौ च चिकीर्षायाश्चिकीर्षायां समानाधिकरणसमानविषयक ज्ञानस्यैवावधृतकारणभावः-इति प्रयोज्यस्यापि तत्कारणीभूतं ज्ञानमनुमाय तस्य ज्ञानस्य वाक्यजन्यताप्रवृत्तौ जनयितव्यायां शब्दव्यापारत्वं चावधारयति । तस्य[2] ज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिं प्रति जनकत्वम् ज्ञानत्वाद्यनवच्छेद्यं यद्विषयप्रकारावच्छेद्यतामादाय विश्राम्यति स प्रकारो विधीयते[3] ज्ञाप्यतेऽनेनेत्यनया व्युत्पत्त्या ज्ञानं कर्मविधिरुत्पाद्यते ।
तदुक्तं कुसुमाञ्जलौ–

"प्रवृत्तिः कृतिरेवात्र सा चेच्छातो यतश्च सा ।
तज्ज्ञानं विषयस्तस्य विधिस्तज्ज्ञापकोऽथवा ॥" [5.7]

स प्रकारः किं प्रवृत्तिपरशब्दत्वं वा तद्व्यापारोऽभिधा वा भावना वा सैव नियोज्यप्रयोजनफलिका[4] वा इष्टत्वं वा संकल्पो वा वक्त्रभिप्रायो[5] वा कार्यता वा इष्टहेतुत्वं वा । एवं विप्रतिपत्तौ चरमः पक्षो गौतमीयानां, स एव युक्त इतरेषामप्रवर्त्तकत्वात् ।

तथाहि न तावदाद्यः । अश्रुतवाक्यस्य बधिरस्याव्युत्पन्नस्य च प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् । अग्निष्टोमादिवाक्यजानां प्रवर्त्तकज्ञानानां प्रवृत्तिपरशब्दत्वाप्रकारत्वाच्च । नापि द्वितीयः। अभिधायाः पदार्थस्मृतिहेतुभूतपदतदर्थसम्बन्धात् सङ्केतरूपाद् भिन्नाया[6] असिद्धेः । नापि तृतीयः । भावनाज्ञानस्याप्रवर्त्तकत्वात्, तस्याश्च सर्वलकारवाच्यत्वात् असाधारण्येन लिङाद्यर्थत्वानुपपत्तेश्च । न च करोतीत्यादौ कृतेः स्वगोचरताविरोधेन सजातीयारम्भकत्वनिषेधेन[7] च संख्यैवाख्यातार्थ इति वाच्यम् । आख्यातोपस्थाप्यकृतेरनन्वयेऽपि तदुपस्थाप्यानुकूलत्वांशमादाय धात्वर्थकृतेरन्वयसम्भवात्[8] । न च सर्वलकारैः[9] कृतिरभिधीयत इत्यसिद्धमिति वाच्यम् । भिन्नसमयानुशिष्टानां लडादीनाम् अर्थस्य कृत्यैव व्याकारात् । न च फलानुकूलव्यापार एषामर्थो[10], न कृतिः, कृतिरप्यनेनोपाधिनेति वाच्यं, नियमतः

१. P reads स्वचेष्टां । २. P adds च here । ३. P reads अभिधीयते । ४. P reads ०प्रयोजनिका । ५. P+I. O. read वक्तुरभिप्रायो वा । ६. M_1 reads सङ्केतभिन्नायाः । ७. P reads ०विरोधेन । ८. P+I. O. read अनन्वयप्रसङ्गाभावात् । ९. P reads सर्वलकारेण । १० P reads एवायमर्थः ।

* For the *Nyāyasidhāntadipa*, edited by B. K. Matilal, L. D. Institute, Ahmedabad.

कृत्यैव तेषामर्थस्य व्याकारात् । गृहकन्दरादौ कृताकृतबुद्धिविषयनैयत्याच्च । न च कथं चेतनाचेतनसाधारणः कर्तृव्यवहारो रथो गच्छतीत्यादौ समर्थयितव्य[1] इति वाच्यम् । काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतामित्यत्र दध्युपघातकतात्पर्यककाकपदवदत्रापि लडादिपदस्य कृतिशक्तत्वेऽप्यनुकूलव्यापारतात्पर्यकत्वात्[2] ।

न चानुकूलत्वं लडादिवाच्यम् । अनुकूलत्वेनाक्षेपात् कृतेरिति[3] वाच्यम् । अनुकूलत्वं व्यापारान्तरस्यापि सम्भवतीति तदनाक्षेपकत्वात् । न च लडादीनां फलवाचकता धातोस्[4]तदनुकूलव्यापारवाचकताऽस्त्विति वाच्यं, विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथाहि– लडादीनां फलसामान्याभिधायित्वं वा फलविशेषाभिधायित्वं वा । नाद्यः । फलसामान्यज्ञानस्य[5]ाप्रवर्त्तकत्वात् पचतीत्युक्ते फलविशेषान्वयबोधानुपपत्तेः[6] । न द्वितीयः । यागादिफलविशेषाभिधायित्वे पाकादिफलविशेषालाभात् । धातोस्तु फलमात्रानुकूलव्यापाराभिधायित्वं वा फलविशेषानुकूलव्यापाराभिधायित्वं वा । नोभौ । अनन्योपजीव्यत्वेन विशेषणांश एव फले शक्तिकल्पनस्यो[7]चितत्वात् । यथा काष्ठेन पचति तथा पाकेन पचतीत्यादिप्रयोगप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

अस्तु तर्हि नियोज्यप्रयोजनफलिका भावनेति पक्षः । तथाहि–नियोज्यप्रयोजनं निसर्गसुन्दरतया स्वर्ग एव, 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत'इत्यादिवाक्यादवगम्यते । लिङभिहितभावनायां[8] फलापेक्षणात् । समभिव्याहारविशेषात्[9] स्वर्गस्यैव भावनान्वयः । न चान्तरङ्गतया यज्यर्थेनैव लिङर्थस्य साध्यसाधनभावेनैवान्वये याग एव भाव्यतया प्रतीयते बहिरङ्गतया तु न स्वर्ग इति वाच्यम् । ग्रामं गच्छतीत्यादौ भाव्यमाने गमने ग्रामसंयोगस्येव भाव्यमाने यागे स्वर्गस्य फलत्वेनाविरोधात्[10] । तथा च । स्वर्गफला यागजनिका भावनेति वाक्यार्थनिष्पत्तौ भवति तज्ज्ञानाद्यागे[11] स्वर्गकामस्य प्रवृत्तिरिति मतम् ।

एतदपि न मन्यामहे । भावनाज्ञानस्य भावनायामजनकत्वात् इत्युक्तप्रायत्वात्[12] स्वर्गफलो याग इति [13]प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेरधिकस्यानिवेशनाच्च ।

१. P reads समर्थनाय । २. P reads only दध्युपघातकतात्पर्यकत्वात् । ३. I. O.+M_2 add लाभः here । ४. P adds तु here । ५. P reads फलसामान्यस्य । ६. P reads बोधानापत्तेः । ७. P reads फलकल्पनस्य । ८. P reads लिङ्विहितभावनायाः । ९. P reads समभिव्याहारदर्शनात् । १०. P reads स्वर्गफलकत्वेन । ११ P drops यागे । १२. P reads इत्युक्ताभिप्रायत्वात् । १३ M_1 adds ज्ञानात् here ।

एवमङ्गीकारे प्रतिज्ञान्तरापातात् हितोपायताविधिप्रवेशाच्च ।

नापि पञ्चमः । इष्टत्वं हि इच्छाविषयत्वं तदिच्छाज्ञानस्याप्रवर्त्तकत्वात्।[1]

किं च इच्छा किं विषये विशेषणम् वा उपलक्षणं वा । नाद्यः । इच्छायामपि प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथाहि उपलक्ष्यं सुखादिकं[2] वा चिकीर्षाजनकज्ञानविषयत्वं वा अन्यद् वा । नाद्यः । स्वर्गादिज्ञानेऽपि यागादिनियतविषयप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः[3] फलस्य चाप्रसिद्धस्य प्रवृत्त्यगोचरतया व्युत्पाद्यत्वात् । अननुगमाच्च । न द्वितीयः । चिकीर्षाजनकज्ञानविषयतावच्छेदकप्रकारस्य[4] निरूप्यमाणत्वात् । नापि तृतीयः । तदनिर्वचनात् ।[5] इष्टत्वज्ञाने प्रवृत्तौ सागरमणावपि प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । साध्यत्वेन विशेषणीयमिति चेन्न[6] । साध्यताज्ञाने साधनविषयतानियमात् हितसाधनताविधिप्रवेशात् ।

किञ्च किमिष्टत्वम् । इच्छामात्रविषयत्वं वा । तद्विशेषचिकीर्षाविषयत्वं वा । साऽपीच्छा फलस्य धात्वर्थस्य वा, सापि किं वक्तुर्वा प्रतिपाद्यस्य वा यस्य कस्यापि वा । नाद्यः । वक्तुः फलेच्छाया ज्ञानस्य प्रतिपाद्यप्रवृत्तौ आज्ञाध्येषणातिरिक्तायाँ[7] अजनकत्वात् । न द्वितीयः । प्रतिपाद्यगतफलेच्छायाः सत्याः प्रत्यक्षत्वेन तद्बोधकशब्दस्य निष्प्रयोजकत्वात् । असत्याश्च प्रतिपाद्येच्छायाः स्वज्ञानेन प्रवृत्तावजनकत्वात् । नापि धात्वर्थगोचरत्वं द्वितीयः पक्षः । धात्वर्थस्य साधनत्वापरिचये विद्यमाने प्रयोज्येच्छाविषयत्वज्ञानेऽप्यप्रवृत्तेः प्रतिपादकेच्छाया धात्वर्थगोचरायाः प्रतिपाद्यं प्रत्यप्रवर्त्तकत्वमित्यस्योक्तप्रायत्वात्।[8] न तृतीयः । अतिप्रसङ्गात् । द्वितीयोऽपि न तद्विशेषचिकीर्षेति पक्षः, उक्तोत्तरत्वात् ।

अथास्तु सङ्कल्पः षष्ठः पक्षः[9] । तथाहि स्वप्रवृत्तौ यद्धेतुत्वेनावगतं तदेव परप्रवृत्तावपि अनुमिनुयादिति स्वप्रवृत्तौ च कार्यमिष्टोपायः, अतः कुर्यामिति सङ्कल्पस्य हेतुत्वमेवधारितम्[10] । सङ्कल्पं विना हितोपायताऽनुसन्धानेऽपि[11]

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१. P adds च here । २. M_2 reads उपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकं सुखत्वादिकं वा । ३ P reads ०निवृत्त्युपपत्तेः । ४. P reads ०जनकज्ञाने विषयतावच्छेदकप्रकारस्य । ५. M_2 adds किंच here । ६. P+M_3 drop न । ७. P reads ०(अ)तिरिक्तायां जनकत्वात्. But शेषानन्त reads (अ)तिरिक्तस्य । ८. P reads प्रतिपाद्यं प्रति प्रवर्त्तकत्वम् इत्याद्युक्तप्रायत्वात् । . P reads तथाप्यस्तु षष्ठः पक्षः । १०. P reads अवधारयति । ११. P reads हितोपायतानुधावने ।

प्रवृत्तेरभावादावश्यकत्वात् शब्दजायामपि प्रवृत्तौ सङ्कल्पस्य ज्ञानमेव हेतुतयानुमिनोति । तथा च स एव लिङाद्यर्थः । तन्न । सङ्कल्पस्य चिकीर्षारूपत्वेनोक्तदोषानुकूलत्वात् । अतिरिक्तत्वे मानाभावात्

किञ्चेदमत्राऽऽलोचनीयं किं यस्मिन् जाते प्रवृत्तिरथ यस्मिन् ज्ञाते प्रवृत्तिः[1], स लिङाद्यर्थः । आद्ये ज्ञानादेरपि[2] प्रवर्त्तकज्ञानविषयभावकल्पनप्रसङ्गः । द्वितीये तु सङ्कल्पस्य स्वरूपसत एव प्रवर्तकत्वात् कथमसौ ज्ञाप्यः ।

सप्तमस्तु वक्तुरभिप्रायो ज्ञानं वा इच्छा वा । आद्ये[3] अग्निकामस्य दारुमथनभावना वक्तुर्ज्ञातेति[4] ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यम् । न चैतावता प्रयोज्यस्य प्रवृत्तिः, न चेष्टोपायतामनेनानुमाय प्रवर्त्तते[5] इति वाच्यम् । अनिष्टहेतोरप्याप्तेन[6] वक्त्रा ज्ञायमानत्वात् । द्वितीये तु सा वक्त्रा विशेषिता अविशेषिता वा । न उभयथाऽपि तज्ज्ञानादप्रवृत्तिः । अपि च सहप्रयोगप्रश्नोत्तरहेतुहेतुमद्भावानुपपत्तिभीतैरत्रभवद्भिर्नेष्टोपायत्वादिर्लिङाद्यर्थोऽभ्युपेयते । [7]नूनं वक्त्रभिप्रायार्थत्वेऽपि ममेदं त्वया क्रियमाणमिष्टमतः कुरु किमित्येवं कर्त्तव्यं यतः त्वत्कृतिरत्र ममेप्सिता इत्यादेर्भयहेतोरत्रापि सत्त्वादिदमपि नाङ्गीकारमर्हति । न चेच्छार्थत्वमाज्ञादौ[8] क्लृप्तमिति तदनुरोधेनात्रापि तथा कल्पनम्[9] । सह प्रयोगानुपपत्तेरेव ।

नाप्यष्टमः । तथाहि—किं तत्कार्यत्वं कृतिसाध्यतामात्रं वा स्वकृतिसाध्यतामात्रं वा स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वे सत्युद्देश्यता वा । नाद्यः । कृतिसाध्ये विषभक्षणादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । स्वकृत्यसाध्येऽप्यन्यैः[10]कृतिसाध्यतामादाय प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च । न द्वितीयः । विषभक्षणादौ[11] अनिष्टेऽपि स्वकृतिसाध्ये प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च । न तृतीयः । उद्देश्यत्वस्यैव निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् ।

तथाहि—किमुद्देश्यत्वं इच्छामात्रविषयत्वं[12] वा इच्छामात्रविषयत्वावच्छेदकरूपवत्त्वं वा चिकीर्षाविषयत्वं वा चिकीर्षाविषयतावच्छेदकरूपवत्त्वं वा

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१. P+I. O. drop प्रवृत्तिः । २. P reads प्रवर्त्तकज्ञानस्यापि प्रवृत्तज्ञानविषय० । ३ I. O. adds अग्निकामो दारुणा मथनीयादित्यत्र । ४ P reads ०वक्तृज्ञानेति । ५ P reads प्रवर्त्तताम् । ६. P reads (अ)व्याप्तेन । ७. P reads ननु । ८. P reads इच्छात्वम् । ९. P reads स्यात् । इदमपि नाङ्ग तथा कल्पनम् १०. P reads परकृति० । ११. P+I. O. drop विषभक्षणादौ । १२. There are in all 10 विकल्पs here. I.O. misses one of them (the fir t) P misses two of them (the fifth and the sixth). B th P and M_1 add one more विकल्प given within brackets [.......] above. ।

इच्छामात्रकारणीभूतज्ञानविषयत्वं वा चिकीर्षाकारणीभूतज्ञानविषयत्वं [वा इच्छामात्रकारणीभूतज्ञानविषयतावच्छेदकरूपवत्त्वं वा पाठः] चिकीर्षाकारणीभूतज्ञानविषयतावच्छेदकरूपवत्त्वं वा कृतिसाध्यत्वे सति स्वरूपमेव वा चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यत्वं वा अन्यद्वा । नाद्यः स्वानिष्टे परेच्छागोचरे प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः । सुखे दुःखाभावे भोगे च प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । यागाद्युपायत्वातिरिक्तस्यावच्छेदकस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । न चेष्टत्वमेव तदवच्छेदकमात्माश्रयप्रसङ्गात् । न तृतीयः । चिकीर्षाज्ञानस्यापि[1] प्रवर्त्तकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अन्योन्याश्रयप्रसङ्गाच्च । चिकीर्षायां[2] सत्यां तद्बोधो यागादौ चिकीर्षा च तस्मिन् सतीति । नापि चतुर्थः । अननुगमात् । अनुगतस्य[3] निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । शक्यत्वे वा उपजीव्यत्वे तज्ज्ञानस्य प्रवर्त्तकस्यौचित्यात् । न पञ्चमः । परेच्छाकारणीभूतज्ञानविषयेऽपि प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । स्वीयविशेषणेऽपि ज्ञानज्ञानस्यापि प्रवर्त्तकत्वापत्तेः[4] । अत एव न षष्ठः । नापि सप्तमः । तस्यैव ज्ञानस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात् । नाष्टमः । स्वरूपमात्रज्ञानस्याप्रवर्त्तकत्वात् । स्वरूपविशेषाभिधानेऽपि तस्यैव निर्वक्तव्यत्वापातात् । नोपान्त्यः । श्रमस्यापि[6] चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यत्वेन तत्रापि प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । चिकीर्षाज्ञानस्यापि प्रवर्त्तकत्वापाताच्च । नान्त्योऽनिर्वचनात् ।

नन्वस्तु चरमः पक्षः । तथाहि—मत्कृतिसाध्ययागसाध्यः स्वर्ग इत्येतदेवाभिसंधाय यागे प्रवर्त्तते । इदमेव परेषां कार्यतापदेन विवक्षितम् । स्वप्रवृत्ताविदमेव ज्ञातं सत् कारणं बालस्यापि स्तनपानादिप्रवृत्तौ संस्कारवशादुन्नेयम् । न च साधनतया समं समानसंवित्संवेद्यतया विनिगमनाविरह इति वाच्यम् । समानसंवित्संवेद्यत्वस्यैवासिद्धत्वात् । तथाहि यागसाध्यस्वर्ग इत्यत्र यागनिरूपितनियतोत्तरभावः स्वर्गे प्रतीयते न तु स्वर्गनिरूपितनियतपूर्वसत्त्वं यागे । ननु यत्र घटसाधनं दण्ड इति वाक्यात् प्रथमत एव साधनता प्रतीयते तत्र किं तज्ज्ञानान्न प्रवर्त्तते । आपाततस्तावदेवं किन्तु साधनताज्ञानानन्तरं दण्डसाध्यो घट इत्यनुमाय प्रवर्त्तते । तत्र किं विनिगमकमिति चेत् शृणु । तत्रापि तावत् कृतिसाध्यत्वमवश्यमुपजीव्यं तत्र विशेषणान्तरमव-

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१. M_1 reads चिकीर्षाज्ञानज्ञानस्यापि । २. P reads सञ्चिकीर्षायाम् । ३. P reads अननुगतस्य । ४. M_2 reads प्रवर्त्तकत्वात् । ५. P adds तथाहि । ६. P reads श्रमस्यापि । ७–७ This is missing in P । ८ P reads ०साध्याः स्वर्गजाः । ९. P misses साधनया समम् । १०. P reads वाक्याश्रयमत । ११–११ This portion is missing from P ।

श्यं कल्पनीयं, तत् किं क्लृप्तसाध्यत्वं कल्पतामुत तद्विजातीयं साधनत्वमेव वा। तत्र द्वितीये पक्षे गौरवात् प्रथम एव ज्यायान्। इदमेव चोद्यते। "परेषामणुरपि विशेषोऽध्यवसायकर" इति।

न च फलविशेष्यकेण प्रत्ययेन कथं साधने प्रवृत्तिरिति वाच्यम्। साधनस्यापि प्रकारतया तद्विषयत्वात्। विशेष्यत्वस्य[3] प्रवृत्तावतन्त्रत्वाद्। कृतिसाध्यो यागः स्वर्गसाधक इति यागविशेष्यकस्यापि ज्ञानस्य सम्भवादिति। मैवम्। यथा साजात्यं तव विनिगमकं तथा ममापि क्लृप्तकृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारस्य साधनत्वसामान्याधिकरण्यं[4] विनिगमकम्। तथा च साध्यसाधनताज्ञानस्यैव प्रवर्त्तकत्वं नतु साध्यप्रयोजनज्ञानस्य। किञ्च कृतिसाध्यत्वमुपजीव्यमेव नेष्यते अपि तु कृतिसाधनको यागः स्वर्गसाधनमिति ज्ञात्वा प्रवर्त्तते। तथा च "अणुरपि विशेषोऽध्यवसायकर" इति उभयत्र दत्तपदं नैकत्र पक्षपातमालम्बते। तत्रापि विनिगमनाविरहेऽपि न काचित् क्षतिरिति ध्येयम्।

नन्वेवमिष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्यापि न प्रवर्त्तकत्वम्। असाध्येऽपीष्टसाधने प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। कृतिसाध्यत्वेन विशेषणान्नैवमिति चेन्न। अन्यक्रियमाणे कारीर्यादावपि प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। स्वकृतिसाध्यत्वेन विशेषणान्नैवमिति चेन्न। स्वकृतिसाध्ये अन्येष्टसाधने स्वानिष्टसाधने[7] प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। इष्टत्वमपि स्वीयत्वेन विशेषणीयमिति चेन्न। तथाभूतेऽतीतभोजने प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। साध्यत्वसाधनत्वयोर्विरोधाच्च। न हि यदेवोत्तरभावि तदेव पूर्वभावि सम्भवति। निरूपकभेदेनाविरोधे पूर्वदोषापरिहारात्। स्वकृतिव्यतिरेकेण यन्न सिध्यति स्वेष्टसाधनं चेति ज्ञानान्नैतद्दोषै इति चेत् न। अल्पेष्टसाधने[11] प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। किं च यत् प्रति साधनत्वं तदिष्टं किं विवक्षितम्। वर्त्तमानेच्छाविषयत्वं इति चेन्न। इच्छाज्ञानस्यापि प्रवर्त्तकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। इच्छाविषयतावच्छेदकरूपवत्प्रतिसन्धानमिति चेन्न। तत्त्वादेव। इच्छोपलक्षणं, न विशेषणमिति[13] चेन्न। स्वर्गापवर्गगतस्यैकस्योपलक्षणस्याभावेनाऽननुगमात्।

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१. P reads तद्विजातीयसाधनम् only। २. P reads परेषां मनुरपि। ३. P reads विशेष्यस्य। ४. P reads साध्यताप्रकारकस्य सामानाधिकरण्यम्। ५. P reads साध्यसाधकभावस्य प्रवर्त्तकत्वं न तु साध्यप्रयोजनतेति। शेषानन्त supports the reading in P। ६ P reads पक्षायतम्। ७. P drops स्वानिष्टसाधने। ८. P drops न। ९. P reads रूपभेदेन। १०. P reads नैवम्। ११. M_2 adds बह्वनिष्टसाधने च। १२. M_2+P read ०रूपवत्त्वमिति प्रतिसन्धानम्। १३. P misses न विशेषणम्।

किञ्च इष्टोपायताज्ञानमिच्छाद्वारा कारणं तच्चेच्छाजनकत्वे सति सिध्यति। इच्छाजनकत्वं चेष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्य न सम्भवति व्यभिचारात्। तथाहि—किं तस्येच्छामात्रं वा जन्यम् इच्छाविशेषः चिकीर्षा वा। न तावदाद्यः। उपायताज्ञानं विनापि स्वर्गे भोगे चेच्छादर्शनात्। न द्वितीयः स्वर्गादावपि चिकीर्षादर्शनात्।। कृत्या साधयितुमिच्छा हि चिकीर्षा सा स्वर्गादौ न दण्डवारिता।

किं चेष्टसाधनत्वस्य न विधित्वम्, अहरहः सन्ध्यामुपासीतेत्यादौ इष्टाभावेन तदुपायत्वासम्भवात्[1]। न कलञ्जं भक्षयेदित्यादौ चोपायताविधिपक्षे किं निषेध्यम्?। इष्टोपायत्वमिति चेन्न। बाधात्। न हि कलञ्जभक्षणं न किञ्चिदिष्टं प्रति साधनम्[2]। पर्युदासवृत्त्याऽनिष्टसाधनत्वं विधीयत इति चेन्न, नञोऽसमस्तत्वात्[3] क्रियानुविधायित्वाच्च। न च बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धो निषिध्यते इति। भवेदेवम्। यदि बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धीष्टसाधनत्वं विधिः स्यात्। नत्वेवं, किन्तु बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वप्रतिसन्धानस्य[4] प्रतिबन्धकत्वमिति। नन्वेतावतापि कार्यत्वं विधिरिति न निर्व्यूढम्। एतावदेव प्रकृते साध्यमिति चेन्न। कार्यताविधिवादिनोऽभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात्[5]। तथाहि—चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यत्वमेव तावत् कार्यत्वम्। न च चिकीर्षाज्ञानस्यापि प्रवर्त्तकत्वप्रसङ्गः[6]। तस्याः[7] कृतिविशेषोपलक्षकत्वात्। तस्य च कृतिविशेषस्य[8] गुणजात्यनङ्गीकारवादिनामपि चिकीर्षाकारणत्वनिर्वाहार्थं स्वीकर्त्तव्यत्वात्। अन्यथा कीदृशं प्रयत्नं प्रति चिकीर्षा कारणं स्यात्। प्रयत्नमात्रे[9] व्यभिचारात्। गुणगतजातिवादिनां तु चरणप्रसारिकायाँ अप्यसम्भवात्। तथाच कृतिविशेषसाध्यत्वमेव विधिः कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वापेक्षया तस्य[11] लघुत्वात्। स्वर्गापवर्गादीन् प्रति साधारणत्वाच्च।

न च श्रमेऽपि प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः। श्रमस्य चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतित्वेन कृत्यसाध्यत्वात्[12]। द्वेषयोनिप्रयत्नादपि श्रमदर्शनात्। न च चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यत्वेनातीतभोजनादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः। सामान्यत इष्टापादानात् समय-

१. P reads (अ)सद्भावात्। २. P reads अनिष्टसाधनम्। ३. P reads नञोऽसम्भवात्। ४. P reads प्रति साधनस्य। ५ P reads (अ)नभिज्ञानात्। ६. I. O. reads प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः। ७. I. O. reads तयास्याः। ८. P reads कृतिसाध्यविशेषस्य। ९. P reads ०मात्रं प्रति। १०. P reads कत्या अप्यनुपपत्तेः। ११ P drops तस्य। १२. P कृत्या साध्यत्वात्।

विशेषप्रवृत्त्यापादने त्वतीतत्वात् । साध्यत्वाभावेनापादकत्वाभावात् । नन्वेवं स्वर्गार्थी स्वचिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानात् प्रवर्त्तते, स्वर्गार्थिचिकीर्षाजन्य-[1]कृतिसाध्यत्वं तु दण्डादिसाधारणमतस्तत्रापि प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्ग इति । मैवम् । स्वर्गेष्टसाधनतालिङ्गकचिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिं प्रति जनकत्वात् । न च तद्धेतोरेवास्तु, तेन किमिति न्यायेनेष्टसाधनताज्ञानमेव प्रवर्त्तकमस्त्विति वाच्यम् । इष्टसाधनताज्ञानेऽपि अस्य ज्ञानस्य[2] तुल्यत्वात् । न च दण्डादौ तथाभूतं ज्ञानम् । यदा तु तथाभूतो भ्रमो भवति तदा प्रवर्त्तत एव । स्वर्गार्थिचिकीर्षाजन्यकृतित्वेन रूपेण यत् कृतिसाध्यं तत् ज्ञानस्य वा प्रवर्त्तकत्वमिति ।

अत्रोच्यते । तदर्थिचिकीर्षाजन्यकृतित्वेन रूपेण साध्यत्वं तत्साधनेऽपि नास्ति अन्यथा भ्रमात् प्रवृत्तस्य घटपटादिचिकीर्षाजन्यकृतितो दण्डाद्युत्पत्तिर्न स्यात् । न चात्रेष्टापत्तिः, तथाभूतकृतेरपि दण्डाद्युत्पत्तिदर्शनात् । किञ्चानुपाये उपायार्थी प्रवर्त्तमानो यदि[3] कृतिविशेषसाध्यताज्ञानात् प्रवर्त्तते इति स्वीकर्त्तव्यम्, तदानुपायताप्रतिसन्धानदशायामपि चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानसम्भवात् तत्रापि प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः[4] । न च तत्रानुपायताप्रतिसन्धानमेव निवर्त्तकम्[5], एवं सत्यनुपायताप्रतिसन्धानाभावः कारणम् इति वाच्यम् । तथा चोपायताज्ञानमेव स्वीकर्तुं युक्तम्, लाघवात् ।

एवं मण्डलीकरणादावपि स्वर्गकामचिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानात् प्रवर्तत इति वाच्यम् । तथा च तत्र तस्य सत्त्वात् तद्बोधकस्य वाक्यस्य[6] प्रमाणत्वापत्तिः । न च तत्र स्वर्गसाधनताबाधाच्चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिविशेषसाध्यताबाधः—इति युक्तमसाधनेऽपि[7] तथाभूतचिकीर्षासम्भवस्य पूर्वमुक्तत्वात् । न चेष्टसाधनतालिङ्गककार्यताज्ञानस्यापि प्रवर्त्तकत्वमिति वाच्यम् । व्यभिचारेण लिङ्गत्वायोगात् । न चेष्टसाधनतालिङ्गककार्यताज्ञानं यागादौ संभवत्यपि, कार्यताविधिपक्षे[8] इष्टसाधनत्वस्यैवालाभात्[9] । यथाकथञ्चिद् लाभे वा तत्प्रवर्त्तकत्वमस्तु, कार्यताज्ञानेऽपि तस्यैवोपजीव्यत्वात् । न हि कार्य-

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१. P reads स्वर्गचिकीर्षाजन्य० । २. P reads पक्षस्य, I. O. reads न्यायस्य । ३. P drops यदि and reads ज्ञप्तिकृति० । ४ P reads अतिप्रसङ्गः । ५. M_1 repeats here several lines । ६. P reads बोधकवाक्यस्य । ७. P reads अवसानेऽपि । ८. P reads कार्यतापक्षे । ९. M_1 reads अभावात् ।

ताज्ञानमात्रं प्रवर्त्तकमित्युक्तं प्राक् । इष्टसाधनतारूपलिङ्गधीपूर्वककृतिविशेष-साध्यताज्ञानापेक्षया कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्य लघुत्वात् । तव तु त्रयं मम तु द्वयमिति[1] विपरीतमापतितम् । अत एवानाप्तोक्ते मण्डलीकरणादौ साधनताभ्रमात् प्रवृत्तोऽपि विशेषदर्शनानन्तरं कृतिविशेषसाध्यताप्रति-सन्धानेऽपि न प्रवर्त्तते । तस्मात् सतोऽसुन्दरे विषये यावत् कृतिसाध्येष्ट-साधनता न प्रतिसन्धीयते तावदेवोपायार्थी चिकीर्षतीति मनोरथमात्रमेव परेषां, तदुपजीवने तु तदेव युक्तमुत्पश्यामः ।

न च [2]साधनताविधिपक्षे 'तरति मृत्युं तरति ब्रह्महत्यां योऽश्वमेधेन यजते' इत्यनेनैव[2] साधनतालाभात् नानेन साधनताप्रतिपादकविध्यनुमान-मिति वाच्यम् । अविनाभावबलेन हि विधिकल्पनं व्यापकबाधेन व्याप्य-बाधशङ्कोद्धारणार्थं[3] वा न तु साधनतालाभार्थम् ।

नन्विच्छात्वावच्छिन्नकार्यताप्रतियोगिककारणतावच्छेदकं किं ज्ञान-निष्ठमिति वक्तव्यमनुगतम् । न किञ्चिदिति ब्रूमः । तर्हि ज्ञानस्येच्छायां कथं कारणत्वम्, स्वर्गे सुखत्वप्रकारकज्ञानात् दुःखाभावे च तत्प्रकारकज्ञानात् तदुपाये साध्ये तदुपायताज्ञानादिति गोमयादिप्रभववृश्चिकवदित्यवधातव्यम् । अन्यथा कार्यताविधिवादिनापि किमत्र वक्तव्यम् । तथाहि—चिकीर्षाजन्य-कृतिविशेषसाध्यताज्ञानं न[6] सर्वत्रेच्छाकारणं, असाध्येऽपि तक्षकचूडारत्नादा-विच्छादर्शनात् कृतिविशेषसाध्यत्वाप्रतिसन्धानेऽपि स्वर्गादाविच्छादर्शनादि-त्यलमतिपीडया ॥

ननु हितोपायताविधिवादिनां[8] 'न कलञ्जं भक्षयेत्' इत्यादौ किं निषेध्यम् ? न तावत् कलञ्जभक्षणस्य हितोपायत्वं, बाधादित्युक्तत्वात् । नापि बलवद-निष्टाननुबन्धः । तज्ज्ञानस्याप्रवर्त्तकत्वेन तस्य विधिप्रत्ययानुपस्थाप्यत्वात्[10] तदुपस्थितेनैव निषेधान्वयात्[11] । न च बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वप्रतिसन्धानेऽपि[12] प्रवृत्त्यापत्तिः, तत्प्रतिबन्धकत्वस्य प्रागेवावेदितत्वात्[13] । न च क्रियान्वये-

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१. M_2 adds गौरवमिति here । २–२. This portion is missing in P । ३. P reads शङ्कावारणार्थम् । ४. P+M_1 read गोमयादिवृश्चिकवत् । ५. P reads कार्यविधिवादिना । ६. न is missing in P ७. P+I. O. read सुखादौ । ८. P reads हितोपायताविवादिना । ९. P reads हितोपायताबाधात् । १०. P reads (उ)पस्थाप्यत्वाभावात् । ११. P reads निषेधान्वयः । १२. P reads बलवदनिष्टाननुसन्धानेऽपि । १३. P reads प्रागेवोदितत्वात् ।

ऽपि निषेधस्य "यजतिषु ये यजामहं कुर्वन्ति नानुयाजेषु"इति यथानु-याजेतरस्य यजतिष्विति पर्युदासेनार्थो लभ्यते तथात्राप्यनिष्टसाधनमित्यर्थः पर्यवस्यतीति वाच्यं, वाक्यभेदभयाद् गत्यन्तराभावात् तत्र तथाकल्पनात् । अत्र तु तदभावादिति । मैवम्[1] । बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धिज्ञानस्य हि प्रवृत्तिप्रति-बन्धकत्वे तदभावस्य कारणता वाच्या । तदा विनिगमनाभावात् तदभा-वबलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वज्ञानयोरपि कारणत्वम्[2] ।

एवं बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धीष्टसाधनताविधिरिति[3] । स एव लिङादि-प्रत्ययवाच्यः । तथा च बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धेन विधिप्रत्ययोपस्थाप्येन विशे-षणेन नञोऽन्वय इत्यनिच्छयाऽपि स्वीकरणीयम् । अन्यथा कार्यताविधि-वादिनाऽपि किं वक्तव्यम्[4] । न हि तस्यापि चिकीर्षाजन्यकृतिसाध्यत्वं कलञ्जभक्षणस्य निषेध्यं, बाधात् । नाऽपि कलञ्जभक्षणनिवृत्तिनियोगो[5] वाच्यः । फलाभावेन[6] तथाभूते नियोगे प्रमाणाभावात् । नापि कलञ्ज-भक्षणप्रागभावः साध्यः । तस्यानादित्वेनासाध्यत्वात् । न च योगवत् क्षेमस्यापि पुरुषार्थत्वात् प्रागभावपरिपालनमेव वाच्यम् । न, प्रागभावस्यो-त्तरावधित्वनियमेन तत्परिपालनस्याशक्यत्वात्[8], तदन्यस्य तत्र निषेधस्या-सम्भवादिति ।

नन्वहरहः सन्ध्यामुपासीतेत्यत्र किमिष्टं यत् प्रति साधनत्वं बोध्यम् । न तावत् प्रत्यवायपरिहारः, प्राक्प्रत्यवाये[10] प्रमाणाभावात् । नापि रात्रि-कृतपापाभावः सर्वत्र तदभावात् नित्यताविरोधाच्च । अहरहः स्नायादित्यत्र तदभावात् । न चानुपासनं प्रत्यवायहेतुरतस्तदभाव एवोपासनं साध्यते[11] इति वाच्यम् । उपासनस्य फलत्वे साधनत्वेनान्वयानुपपत्तेः । न चोपासनं प्रयोजनं सम्भवति । तद्धि मुख्यं वा गौणं वा । नाद्यः । सुखदुःखाभावयोरेव तथात्वात् । नेतरः । प्रयोजनोपायस्यैव तत्त्वात्[12] । न च सन्ध्योपासनेन किञ्चित् प्रयोजनं जन्यते । यत्तु कैश्चिदुक्तं प्रत्यवायविरोध्येवाऽपूर्वं सन्ध्यो-

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१. P drops मैवम् । २. P reads कारणत्वात् । ३. P reads (इ)ष्टसाधनं विधिः । ४ P reads वाच्यं । ५. M_1 reads भक्षणे निषेधनियोगः । ६. P reads फलाभावे च । ७. P reads ०भक्षणस्य प्रागभावः । ८. P reads कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् । ९. P+M_1 read प्रतिसन्धानेन । १०. P reads प्रागप्रत्यवाये । ११. P+I. O. read तदभावश्चोपासनं साध्यम् । १२. P reads तथात्वात् । १३. P drops सन्ध्या० ।

पासनेन जन्यते । तच्च प्रत्यवायविरोधित्वेन काम्यं न त्वपूर्वत्वेनेति नापूर्वत्वक्षतिरिति[1] । तत् पूर्वोक्तेनैव विकल्पेन दूषितम् । तथाभूतेऽपूर्वे प्रमाणाभावाच्च । अन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्या कल्पनीयमिति चेन्न[2] । अन्यथोपपत्तेर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । तस्मान्नित्यस्थले काम्याभावादिष्टसाधनताविधिरिति[3] मनोरथमात्रम् । मैवम् । यत् तावदुक्तं सन्ध्योपासनं प्रयोजनं न सम्भवति मुख्यगौणविकल्पगिलितत्वात् तदयुक्तम्[4] । मुख्य एव प्रयोजनेऽन्तर्भावात् । समानाधिकरणेच्छाजन्येच्छाविषयत्वस्य प्रयोजनाजनकप्रयोजनत्वस्य वा मुख्यप्रयोजनलक्षणत्वात् । एतदेव निरुपाधीच्छाविषयत्वमिति गीयते । न चैतल्लक्षणद्वयमुपासनेऽसिद्धम्[5] । तथाहि[6] उपासनस्य दुःखहेत्वभावत्वेन काम्यत्वम् ।

न च दुःखहेत्वभावः किञ्चिदर्थानुकूलतया काम्यते किन्तु स्वरूपत एव, सर्पकण्टकादिपरिहारे[7] तथावधारणात् ।

न चैवं मुख्यं द्विविधं सुखं दुःखाभावश्चेति विभागानुपपत्तिः, दुःखाभाव इत्यत्र दुःखपदेनैकविंशतिप्रभेदभिन्नस्य दुःखस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । यद्वा गौणमेवेदं[8] प्रयोजनम् । ननु कथं गौणत्वं, किञ्चित्प्रयोजनकं हि गौणं भवति[9] । न चानेन किञ्चित् प्रयोजनं जन्यते । एतदपि न । साधनताज्ञानजन्येच्छाविषयत्वस्यैव गौणलक्षणत्वात्[10] । एतदसिद्धमिति चेन्न । यद्यपि हि न सन्ध्योपासनस्य स्वतः किञ्चित् प्रयोजनं प्रति साधनता[11] तथाऽप्यनुपासनस्य प्रत्यवायप्रतियोगिकसाधनताज्ञानजन्येच्छाविषयत्वम्[12] । तदभावत्वेन सन्ध्योपासनस्य सम्भवत्येव सर्पापसर्पणस्य दुःखहेतुत्वज्ञानजन्येच्छाविषयत्वं तदभावस्वरूपत्वेनापसर्पणस्येतिवत् । एवं सन्ध्योपासनस्य प्रयोजनत्वे व्यवस्थिते तद्भावनाया एव इष्टोपायत्वेनान्वयः[13] । यद्वा लिङ्पदेनोपस्थिताऽपीष्टसाधनता इष्टाभावात् सन्ध्योपासने नान्वीयते[14] । न चैतावता इष्टसाधनताक्षतिः लिङादेरिष्टसाधनतायामेव शक्तेरवधारणात् ।

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१. M_1 reads ०रित्यपि पूर्वोक्तेनैव । २. P drops न । ३. P reads काम्यादिष्टसाधनं ।४. P reads ०गलितत्वात्, I. O. reads विकल्पेन पीडितत्वात् । ५. P drops द्वयम् । ६. P drops तथाहि । ७. M_2 reads सर्वत्र कण्टकादिपरिहारे । ८. M_2 drops इदम् । ९. P reads सम्भवति । १०. P reads साध्यताज्ञान० । ११. P reads साधनम् । १२ P reads दुःखहेतुज्ञानजनितेच्छाविषयत्वम् । १३. P reads अंशोपायत्वेनान्वयः । १४. P reads नानुमीयते ।

नन्वेवं कथं सन्ध्योपासने प्रवृत्तिरिष्टोपायताया अभावादिति चेत् । आपाततस्तावदेवम् । उपासनस्य वेदबोधितत्वेन कर्त्तव्यतयाऽनुमायानन्तरम्[1] "अकुर्वन् विहितं कर्म" इत्यादिवाक्यानुसन्धानादनुपासनस्य प्रत्यवायहेतुत्वेऽवगते तद्व्यतिरेकरूपस्योपासनस्य[2] काम्यत्वमध्यार्य तदुपाये प्रवर्त्तते । न तूपासन एव । उपासनस्यायोग्यत्वात् । प्रकरणाद्युपस्थापितोपासनोपायेनैव साधनतान्वय इत्यपि कश्चित् ।

नन्विष्टसाधनताविधिपक्षे[3]ऽपीच्छाज्ञानं प्रवर्त्तकं स्यात् । इच्छाविषयितावच्छेदकप्रकारवत् प्रतियोगिकसाधनताज्ञानं[4] प्रवर्त्तकमित्यपि न समीचीनम् । अत्रापि हीच्छा विशेषणं उपलक्षणं वा । आद्ये तद्भानस्यापि[5] प्रवर्त्तकत्वापत्तिः । द्वितीयेऽनुगतस्यैकस्योपलक्ष्यस्याभावात्[6] अननुगमापत्तिः । न चेच्छान्तर्भावेन शक्तिकल्पना युक्ता । इच्छाया स्वरूपसत्या एव प्रवर्त्तकत्वात् । न चेष्टत्वमुपलक्षणीकृत्य[7] स्वर्गोपायत्वादावेव विधिप्रत्ययस्य शक्तिः । अनेकार्थत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च साधनतामात्रं शक्यम् । तन्मात्रज्ञानस्याप्रवर्त्तकत्वात् । सिद्धान्तव्याकोपाच्चेति ।

मैवम् । साधनतामात्रमेव विधिप्रत्ययशक्यम् । न चैतावता लकारान्तरसाम्यापत्तिः । विधिप्रत्ययस्येतरलकारसाधारण्येनानुकूलप्रयत्नोपस्थापकत्वेऽप्यसाधारण्येन साधनताया अप्युपस्थापकत्वात् । स्वर्गसाधनत्वादिकं तु समभिव्याहारलभ्यम् । इष्टसाधनता शक्येतिपक्षेऽपि स्वर्गादिविशेषोपायतालाभार्थं[8] समभिव्याहारविशेषालम्बनप्रवर्त्तकतर्कस्योपजीव्यत्वात्[9] । इष्टसाधनता शक्येति व्यवहारस्तु वाक्यार्थत्वाभिप्रायेण न तु पदार्थाभिप्रायेणेति[10] न सिद्धान्तव्याकोपोऽपि । किञ्च फलेच्छा यद्यपि स्वरूपसत्येव प्रवर्त्तिका तथापि इष्टत्वे लिङादिशक्तिरङ्गीकार्या । अन्यथा स्वर्गोपायत्वादेरलाभात् । न च समभिव्याहारबलेन स्वर्गादिसाधनत्वलाभः, समभिव्याहारादपि तदेवान्वेति यद्विनाऽन्वयापर्यवसानम् । न हि "स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इत्यत्र स्वर्गेण समं साध-

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१. P misses अनुमायानन्तरम् । २. P misses (उ)पासनस्य । ३. P reads (इ)ष्टसाधनतापक्षे । ४. P reads प्रतियोगिसाधनताज्ञानम् । ५. P reads तज्ज्ञानस्य । ६. M_1+M_2 drop एकस्य । ७. P reads चेच्छामुपलक्षणीकृत्य । ८. P reads विशेषलाभार्थम् । ९. P reads ०विशेषालम्बनेन प्रवर्त्तकस्योपजीव्यत्वात् । १०. P misses न तु पदार्थाभिप्रायेणेति ।

नतानन्वये तदपर्यवसानम् । साधनत्वं हि साध्यान्वयं विना न पर्यवस्यति[1] । तथा च याग एव साध्यत्वेनान्वेति न तु लब्धपुरुषान्वयो निराकाङ्क्षः स्वर्गः । पचतीत्यत्र पाक इव यागोऽपि लब्धाऽन्वय इति चेत् । एवं हि तुल्यत्वेऽपि सन्निहिततया यागस्यैव[2] तथात्वमस्तु, इष्टोपायताविधाने[3] तु यदिच्छाविषयत्वेनोपस्थितं तदेवान्वययोग्यमतस्तदभिधानमेव युक्तम् । अत एव "विश्वजिता यजेत"इत्यत्र तावन्नान्वयो यावन्नेष्टत्वेन स्वर्गोपस्थितिः ।

कश्चित् पुनराह । इष्टसाधनत्वमित्यत्र निरुपाधीच्छाविषयत्वमात्रमिष्टत्वम्, न पुनरिच्छाविषयत्वमात्रं, तथा च स्वर्गेणैवान्वयो न यागेनेति । तन्न । तथात्वे हि'अग्निकामो दारुणी मथ्नीयात्' इत्यत्र साध्यत्वेन अग्नेरन्वयो न स्यात । तस्माद् बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धिस्वकृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमेव निष्फलानिष्टफलाभ्यां व्यावर्त्तमानं विधिरित्येव युक्तम् । 'श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेत'इत्यत्र प्रायश्चित्तबलेन बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धान्न[4] तदन्तर्भावेन विधिरिति चेन्न । तत्र योग्यतया साध्येष्टोपायत्वस्यैवान्वयात् । अपि च विहितम्लेच्छजनपदाभिचारमुद्दिश्य वेदे [5]श्येनयागाभिधानं युक्तम् , अन्यथा वेदप्रणेतुः आप्तत्वं भज्येत । अत एव समस्तस्यैव विधेरन्वयो योग्यः, लोभादिवशात् अविहितब्राह्मणाभिचारमुद्दिश्यानुष्ठिते श्येने प्रायश्चित्तविधेरपि साफल्यमिति किमधिकेन ।

नन्वेवं जीवनयोनिप्रयत्नसाध्येऽभीष्टोपाये[6] च प्राणादिपञ्चके अपि किमिति न प्रवर्त्तते । मैवम् । प्राणादिपञ्चकं हि जीवनयोनिप्रयत्नसाध्यं, तत्क्रिया वा । नाद्यः । प्रमाणाभावात् । द्वितीये तु प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् इत्यत्र प्रवृत्तिपदेन किमभिमतम्[8] । प्रयत्नमात्रं वा तद्विशेषः कृतिर्वा । नाद्यः । इष्टापादनात् भवत्येव जीवनयोनिप्रयत्नो यतः । नापरः[7] । प्राणादिपञ्चकक्रियायाः कृत्यसाध्यत्वात् । जीवनयोनिप्रयत्नसाध्या हि सा । न चासौ कृतिः चिकीर्षायोनिप्रयत्नस्यात्र कृतित्वेनाभिमतत्वात् । अन्यथेष्ट-

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१. P reads साधनतासामान्यं हि साध्यसामान्यान्वयमादाय पर्यवस्यति । २. P misses यागस्यैव । ३. P reads ०विधित्वे । ४. P reads (अ)नुबन्धानुसन्धानात् । ५-५. This is missing in M_1 । ६. P reads अपीष्टोपाये । ७-७. This is missing from P । ८. M_2 reads अभिप्रेतम् ।

साधनतालिङ्गककार्यतानुमानात् तवापि तत्र प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः समान इति स्थूलः प्रमादः । किञ्च कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनताज्ञानं चेद्भवति एतावता प्रवर्त्तत एवेति नेष्यते । अपि त्वेतावतैव प्रवर्त्तते । यत्र त्वन्यथासिद्ध्यादिकं प्रति बन्धकमापतति तत्राप्रवृत्तावपि न कारणताक्षतिरिति किं वारंवारं मर्मोद्घाटनेनेति ।

यत्तु कैश्चिदुक्तं फलेच्छा ज्ञातैवोपयुज्यते । तदहृदयवचनमित्युपेक्षितव्यमेव तथात्वे प्रमाणाभावात् इति आस्तां विस्तरः ॥छ॥१९[1]॥

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१. I. O. and M_1 do not separate व्याप्तिवादः from व्याप्तिग्रहवादः. Hence the counting here is 19. P adds इति विधिप्रकरणम्, M_2 reads श्रीविधिवादः ।

Other Books by the same Author

1.	Studies in the Padapathas and Vedic Philology	1987	85.00
2.	Studies in the Language Logic & Epistemology	1986	100.00

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